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Introduction: A Spatial Approach to Political Violence in 
the Late Roman Republic 
 
Where did political violence happen in Late Republican Rome? Political violence in the 
years 80 to 50 BCE has been an enduring subject for historians of Ancient Rome for millennia. 
Scholars have poured over and over again the period of the “Fall of the Republic” and urban 
violence’s role within it. However, despite the years of scholarship on the subject, the spatial aspect 
of political violence in the final years of the Roman Republic has not fully been examined. 
Situating political violence in its topographical setting can yield important conclusions about 
everything from Roman political behavior to social values. It is an unsatisfactory response to 
simply say that violence happened “in the Forum” or “at the Rostra,” of “on the Campus Martius,” 
as many scholars have done in the past. In the case that an instance of violence did take place in 
the Forum—where exactly in the Forum does it take place? What side of the Forum is it on? What 
buildings is it close to? How does where it occurred affect the social meaning of the violence? 
Human activity does not simply exist in geographical space as a container, as Irad Malkin argues.1 
The space around us shapes our behavior, and our behavior shapes the world around us.  
At the same time, advanced digital tools exist to help scholars image the ancient world in 
never-before seen ways. Online projects such as UCLA’s Digital Roman Forum project, 
Archaeology Mapping Laboratory’s Digital Augustan Rome, Stanford’s ORBIS Geospatial 
Network Model of the Roman World, and a number of other projects demonstrate that the field of 
Classics is increasingly embracing the use of digital modeling as a method to understand ancient 
history and behavior. These online applications are user-friendly, information-filled, and of value 
                                                
1 Irad Malkin, A Small Greek World: Networks in the Ancient Mediterranean (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 12. 
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to both scholars in the field and those with a layperson’s interest. In particular, acquainting myself 
with the Digital Augustan Rome project, which provides an interface for exploring structures on 
the 2-D map of Rome, inspired my own desire to map not only structures, but political behavior in 
the Late Republic. Based on those projects, I wanted to make a visualization that would help me 
come to grips with the slippery location of political violence in the sources and the scholarship, 
while also being accessible to individuals of all scholarly background. 
 I decided for my thesis that I would attempt to map the political violence that occurred in 
the final 30 years of the Roman Republic, a period for which there is no shortage of information. 
The goals of this thesis are then threefold: 
1.   Find out how many instances of political violence occurred between 80 BCE and 50 BCE 
2.   Where possible, locate where these instances occurred. If possible, map with accuracy this 
information onto a GIS-based digital mapping platform (Geographic Information System) 
3.   Explain why there: What about these places contributed to violence in politics—or vice 
versa? How did trends in Roman politics contribute to the use of these spaces? 
 
In short, this thesis intends to map and explicate the relationship of political activity, violence, and 
space in the period of the Late Roman Republic. This is admittedly a large task.  
A number of scholars have informed my own research. The seminal work on political 
violence in the Late Republic is Andrew Lintott’s 1968 Violence in Republican Rome. Lintott’s 
interest was discovering the what of Republican violence—what forms did violence take? P.J.J. 
Vanderbroeck’s Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior is also a foundational work for my 
own study. Starting with Lintott’s list of instances of violence, Vanderbroeck compiled a list of 
instances of collective behavior in the Late Republic, some of them being instances of violence 
His main interest in political violence was the who—who was in the “crowd,” or “gang” that 
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perpetrated acts of demonstration, protest, and political violence? How were they organized? What 
was their relationship to one another? While his development upon the concept of the plebs 
contionalis—an interest-group of plebeians who spent the majority of their time attending 
contiones and participating in legislative activity—has been contested by later scholars, his 
examination of organizational structures and the composition of the late Republic’s crowds is 
valuable. Like Lintott, Vanderbroeck’s study made strides towards a more spatial approach. This 
study is indebted to his appendix, which expands upon Lintott’s list of political violence and 
attempts to some extent topographically locate instances of collective action. His locations for 
events are often vague, with general category titles of “Forum,” “Campus Martius,” and “Capitol.” 
There is more topographical information to be gained from the ancient sources. 
Fergus Millar’s The Crowd in Republican Rome is a crucial work that underpins my own 
approach. He recognizes the use of violence in the Forum and elsewhere, and much of my 
chronology follows his own. However, where Millar often speaks of the actual violence in general 
terms, I attempt to delve into greater physical and spatial detail about what actually occurred, and 
how. Millar was also one of the first scholars to truly introduce the concept of physical control of 
individual pieces of topography as critical in Late Republican political culture.  Diane Favro and 
Christopher Johanson’s examination of the kinetic and sensory experiences of Roman funeral 
processions have also enlivened how I think about ancient space and visualize the sources and 
encouraged me to consider kinetics and motion more in my analysis. Midway through my research 
I came upon Amy Russell’s recent book, The Politics of Public Space in Ancient Rome. Her ideas 
about the use of violence as a both an indicator of a space’s uncontrolled nature, as well as a mode 
of claiming public space for one’s own purposes, influence in particular this thesis’ later chapters.  
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Erich Gruen’s The Last Generation of the Roman Republic is a indispensable companion 
for the chronology and the cast of characters of the Late Republic. Additionally, the colorful 
character of Publius Clodius Pulcher looms large every of Late Republican violence. Jeffrey 
Tatum’s The Patrician Tribune is the most effective analysis to-date that breaks through 
Ciceronian invective to present a balanced picture of the man and his motives. Tatum also corrects 
and clarifies some of the wilder inductive leaps that Vanderbroeck makes regarding the plebs 
urbana.  
 As for the primary sources: I have attempted to cast as large a scope as I can. Despite its 
undeniable bias towards its author, the Ciceronian corpus is the richest literary source we have for 
information about events, violence, and topography in the Late Republic. Along with Cicero, 
Asconius, Appian, Cassius Dio, Sallust, Plutarch, Velleius Paterculus, Caesar, Suetonius, Varro, 
and other more minor authors provide crucial information on events in the Late Republic. Of 
course, the City of Rome itself is one of the most important primary sources. The secondary 
scholarship on Roman archaeology and topography is immense and I will not make an attempt to 
summarize it all here. Filippo Coarelli’s Rome has been an invaluable guide to Rome’s excavated 
spaces, and Lawrence Richardson’s A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome has been 
of significant value as well. Jon Coulston and Hazel Dodge’s companion to Roman archaeology 
has been beneficial, particularly for its wide-ranging bibliography.  
Mapping Violence onto Urban Topography 
 
To create my own map, I used ArcGIS, a Geographical Information System that allows me 
to situate my data points in the world of real geography, not an arbitrary visual model. In locating 
my findings on a universal coordinate system, my findings can be compared, contrasted, and 
integrated with that of other geospatial projects dealing with ancient Rome. My data is compatible 
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with that of other classical scholars and projects that utilize GIS modeling, satellite mapping, and 
even 3-D mapping. This compatibility makes the findings of the individual locations of violence 
even more valuable. It is my hope that my findings on the locations of political violence can be 
shared with other scholars at all levels. My goal in designing this map is to produce a product that 
is accessible and both to academics and proverbial laypeople alike.  
 For my mapping process, I began with satellite images of modern Rome.  
 
Figure 1:Modern Rome, ArcMap Satellite Image 
To make sense of the archaeological sites viewed from the air, I overlaid topographical 
reconstructions from a variety of scholarly sources onto the archaeological sites. Many works that 
deal with Republican politics since Lily Ross Taylor’s Roman Voting Assemblies provide sketch 
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX,
Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community
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maps of Republican sites have been helpful in conceptualizing the Republican city. However, they 
are ill-suited for use in precise GIS work. I started with Imperial-era or present-state maps—these 
allow me to overlay the map images with accuracy. The most useful of these have been 
reconstructions from Filippo Coarelli’s Rome, an English-language archaeological guide that 
synthesizes the results of modern excavations throughout the city, including Coarelli’s own 
seminal excavations of the Forum. Coarelli’s reconstructions include present-state remains and 
modern streets, which is critical for aligning the map overlays in ArcMap. For the Western Forum 
and the Campus Martius, where many sites have been excavated and mapped with certainty, I have 
followed Coarelli’s reconstructions. For the Eastern Forum and the Sacra Via, I have relied on a 
combination of Coarelli’s work and that of Andrea Carandini, filtered through English-language 
articles that summarize his work and include maps based off his excavations. I have also relied 
upon Digital Augustan Rome’s satellite map of modern Rome to situate many of my points and 
buildings.  
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Figure 2:Modern Rome, ArcMap Satellite with Coarelli's Reconstruction of the Western Forum overlaid 
 
On the basis of these plans, I have reconstructed particular buildings around the locations where 
political violence occurred most frequently.  
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX,
Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community
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Figure 3:Ancient Buildings in the Forum reconstructed over modern topography 
 
The locations of certain monuments in the Forum, such as the Fornix Fabianus, the 
Gradus Aurelii and the Praetor’s Tribunal are conjecture, but informed conjecture. For the 
locations of certain homes, I have followed the locations provided the scholars at the Digital 
Augustan Rome project. With these reconstructions overlaid on Rome’s geography as my guide, 
I have located data points representing the location of each of the 69 different instances of 
political violence, each given a number according to their chronological order (#1 being an event 
in 75 BCE, #69 being an event in 50 BCE). For ease of understanding the data, I have compiled 
my GIS map into a user-friendly webmap which is to be consulted simultaneously with the 
written thesis.  
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Figure 4: Political Violence Data Points overlaid on Ancient Buildings 
The use of data points as opposed to other forms of representation has some drawbacks. 
Fixed points only allows for a static representation of activities that were frequently kinetic and 
mobile. For example, I use only one point (#4) to represent the attempted lynching of the tribune 
Gabinius by senators in the Curia, Gabinius’ flight to the Rostra, and the subsequent attack by 
Gabinius’ supporters on the Curia, itself a set of three different actions. For another example, the 
execution of the Catilinarian conspirators in the Carcer in 63 (#18) is represented on the map by a 
single point over the Carcer. However, the single point marking the place of death fails to visually 
encompass the symbolic and politically weighted process by which Cicero escorted the chief 
conspirator Lentulus from a senatorial home on the Palatine Hill, across the Forum, and presented 
him to the executioners. The small paragraph included in the pop-up information on each data 
point works to try and supply this crucial information about additional actions and topographical 
 15 
relationships. Included in the pop-up box is also references to the ancient sources and modern 
scholarship. Like almost all web-based projects, this one is continuously developing. A further 
expansion of this mapping project might see the inclusion of more route-based representation, in 
an attempt to better visualize the kinetic experiences inherent of political violence. However, for 
now, the visual representation and the prose exploration must be consulted in concert in order to 
understand the full picture.  
The link to the map can be found here:  
https://trube.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=542ac0cc162b45d388f390c6aaecb922 
 
 
Space, Exclusion, and Politics in the Late Republic 
 
 Starting with Lintott and Vanderbroeck’s respective lists of instances of violence and 
collective action, I compiled my own list of instances of political violence between 80 and 50 BCE, 
pouring back over the ancient sources, in many cases reaffirming those scholars’ findings, in a few 
cases reassessing, and in other cases discovering anew. In total, I discovered 69 individual 
instances of political violence between 80 and 50 BCE. Three occurred in the 70s, twenty-two 
occurred in the 60s, and forty-three occurred in the 50s. 29 instances of political violence took 
place in the Western end of the Forum, where the senate, met, speakers addressed assembled 
groups from the Rostra, and legislative assemblies took place. Another 17 took place on the Eastern 
side of the Forum, where the courts met and more legislative activity took place. 11 occurred in 
relation to aristocratic homes located on the Palatine, Velia, and Carinae. Four occurred in Rome’s 
temporary theaters, which although located in different places across the city, shared similar 
characteristics. Finally, 8 occurred on the Campus Martius, the flat plain to the west of the city 
walls.  
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Chapter I examines instances of violence that occurred in the 70s. In doing so, it charts an 
arc of transition in the type and locations of political violence that occurred in the 80s. By analyzing 
news scholarship about the location of the praetor’s tribunal and its relationship to political 
violence, this chapter sets the topographical stage for the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter II examines violence in the western end of the Roman Forum. Romans used 
violence at the Curia, on and in front of the Rostra, and within the saepta, the voting apparatus 
used in passing legislation. Violence was tailored to the piece of topography it was intended to 
impact, and was deployed with a particular political goal in mind.  
Chapter III continues the examination of the Western Forum, but presents new trends 
Starting in the late 60s, politicians began to use violence to control wider and wider spaces, 
particularly during legislative assemblies. Instead of directing their attacks at one piece of 
topography, politicians began to fight for control of the entire Forum, fortifying it for themselves 
while physically excluding their opponents. Cicero, Clodius, and Pompey all used violence to stake 
a personal claim to control the Forum. Their attempts to do so represent an increasing 
personalization in the spatial battles over Rome’s primary political space. 
Chapter IV continues to present the arc of towards attempts at increased personal control 
and exclusion in the Eastern Forum. In the 60s, individual politicians organized attacks on the 
courtroom to disrupt proceedings and achieve a particular judicial outcome. Like in the Western 
Forum, these instances of violence started as narrowly targeted on particular spaces. However, 
because of the physical permeability of the Eastern Forum, politicians who fought to control the 
courts were required to control larger and larger areas. By 52, political supremacy over the 
embattled courts was achieved by controlling the entirety of the Forum and forcibly expelling 
one’s opponents. The second part of the chapter examines how P. Clodius Pulcher used a 
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calculated program of political violence to establish personal dominance over the area of the 
Eastern Forum.  
Chapter V examines the role of the senatorial aristocratic residence in the expanding battle 
over political space. The chapter’s first section examines the architectural layout of the atrium 
house and how aristocratic houses served their owners both as bastions against political violence 
and protected spaces from which to plot it. The second part of the shows how Clodius further 
expanded the spatial battlefield and made the senator’s domicile an acceptable location for political 
violence. Clodius, Cicero, and Pompey’s battles for political dominance over the city were fought 
on the arena of the Palatine, Velia, and Carinae in addition to the Forum.  
Chapter VI analyzes another type of exclusion and inclusion. Rome’s temporary festival 
theaters were largely reserved for Rome’s upper classes, and each theater performance put Rome’s 
entrenched class divisions on display. Rome’s theaters were the site of four instances of class-
based violence between 63 and 56 Especially after 57, plebeians frustrated by grain shortages 
attacked upper-class theater performances as a method of political protest to force the political 
elite to address their grievances.  
Chapter VII looks at a final category, violence outside the city walls on the Campus 
Martius. These instances primarily consisted of electoral violence, which appeared later in the 50s. 
Politicians learned from the legislative battles in the Western Forum and used violence to disrupt 
election processes and exclude opponents from the Campus Martius. 
Each chapter presents a diachronic study of the topographical area in question. This thesis 
is far from the first work to determine that Roman politics in the Republic’s final years was veering 
towards a zero-sum game of political control over certain spaces. However, it is the first to attempt 
to comprehensively investigate where all of these spaces were, and analyze them within a single 
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narrative. It also the first to attempt to pair in-depth textual examinations of these instances with 
an accessible and geographically accurate visual representation. Throughout the narrative, 
references to the map will be made with the following notation: (#__).  
Despite my attempts to be wide-ranging in my scope of identifying and locating instances 
of political violence, I do not claim to have achieved perfection. Some instances of political 
violence have undoubtedly slipped through my own list. However, I have attempted to be as 
comprehensive as I can in parsing and locating the often vague references in ancient sources. In 
this thesis, I have attempted to balance the desire to infuse ancient sources with topographical and 
spatial detail with the impulse to understand the development of how Romans conducted political 
violence in the spaces of their city. The result, I hope, is a detail-rich multi-media experience that 
informs and enlivens the reader’s conception of the physical and spatial experience of ancient 
politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Chapter I: Topography and Violence in Transition 
 
This first chapter locates and analyzes the instances of political violence that occurred in 
the 70s BCE. In contrast to the military bloodshed that sealed the dictator L. Cornelius Sulla’s 
control over the city in the 80s, the 70s were quite peaceful. There were only three instances of 
political violence in Rome in the 70s. However, these three instances tell a critical topographical 
story. They constitute an arc of a transition from large-scale extramural military conflict to smaller-
scale, internal political violence centered on specific pieces of topography within the city. 
Additionally, events mid-decade had an immense role in shaping the patterns of political violence 
that would emerge in the 60s and 50s. A spontaneous food riot in 75 kick-started a transformation 
of the Forum’s political topography that would define patterns of political violence until the 
Republic’s collapse. The Rostra became once again a focus of political activity, and the courts 
were moved to the Eastern Forum. These two locations became the most frequent sites of political 
violence in the Late Republic. Finally, a tribune’s use of force to determine the outcome at a trial 
in the relocated courts demonstrated that targeted violence committed with topography carefully 
considered yielded successful results. This chapter will establish the topographical stage on which 
the remaining 66 instances of political violence took place. In doing so, it also serves as a case 
study of this thesis’ method, demonstrating the value of taking a topographical approach to the 
sources’ descriptions of political violence.  
Exiting the 70s 
 
The decade before the 70s BCE was one of massive bloodshed and civil war, caused 
primarily by generals and their armies fighting outside of Rome’s walls. In 87 After Gaius Marius 
and his supporters managed to revoke Sulla’s command against Mithridates and transfer it to 
Marius himself, Sulla marched on Rome with his army and invaded the city via the Esquiline 
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Gate—directly east of the city center—and the Colline gate, directly north-east of the city center. 
He used his troops using them to kill Marian partisans, destroy homes and force Marius into exile.2 
Marius and his supporter Cinna re-invaded the city in 86, battling again outside the city walls. 
They too used their soldiers to carry out bloody purges of their enemies once victorious.3 During 
his dominatio, a virtual dictatorship, Cinna used consular soldiers for wholesale assassination of 
political enemies.4 Finally, in Sulla’s final invasion of the city in 82, his armies fought the Marian 
forces throughout Italy and finally crushed them outside of the city walls at the city’s northern 
Colline Gate.5 Immediately afterwards, Sulla used his soldiers to murder thousands of captured 
opponents outside the walls on the Campus Martius. The same soldiers later conducted his 
proscriptions.6  
While some of this violence took place within the city, instances that did were frequently 
linked to military conflicts taking place outside of the city walls between consular armies. The 
majority of violence taking place within the walls was carried out by soldiers and armed partisans 
of conflicting generals. Sulla’s subsequent dictatorship is often regarded as the end of an era of 
civil war in Roman historiography. Sulla instituted wide-ranging constitutional and judicial 
reforms. He created more standing quaestiones, restructured the cursus honorum, and expanded 
                                                
2 Plut. Sull. 9, Mar. 35; Appian BC, 1.57-61.  
3 App. BC 1.69-71; Cassius Dio, 31.102-4; Plut. Mar. 42-3. 
4 Harriet Flower, Roman Republics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 
92-93. 
5 Plut. Sull. 26-29;  
6 Cassius Dio, 33.109-10; Plut. Sull. 30-31; Lawrence Richardson, A New Topographical 
Dictionary of Ancient Rome (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 430. Sulla’s 
execution of captured prisoners—an alleged 8,000—took place in the Villa Publica, a building 
on the Campus Martius. Plutarch notes that Senators receiving Sulla in the Temple of Bellona on 
the southern section of the Campus could hear the cries of the dying prisoners as he triumphantly 
addressed them.   
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the Senate’s membership.7 Additionally, he stripped the Tribunes of the Plebs of their right to 
propose legislation to the people and disbarred them from seeking higher office, hoping to turn the 
position into an unenviable and de-clawed magistracy.8 Sulla’s reduction of the tribunate would 
have repercussions for the forms of both political violence and political topography from the 70s 
onward.  
The first violence of the 70s appears in the sources as an an echo, an afterthought of the 
recently-concluded Civil Wars. In the consular elections for 78, the first after Sulla had resigned 
his dictatorship, the consulships went to two men of opposing political ideologies. One, Q. Lutatius 
Catulus, was a supporter of Sulla and his reforms.9 His colleague, M. Aemilius Lepidus, was a 
political moderate who had nevertheless run on a platform attacking the most divisive aspects of 
Sulla’s program.10 After Sulla’s death in 78, tensions between the two consuls simmered until they 
reached a boiling point. Lepidus passed a number of laws attempting to roll back Sulla’s program, 
including a restoration of some proscription victims and a corn distribution. However he was 
stonewalled by opponents in the Senate in attempts to rescind veterans’ settlement on the land of 
the proscribed and restore tribunician powers.11 Frustrated by legal attempts to institute his 
program, Lepidus resorted to the military tactics of the previous decade. When called back to Rome 
                                                
7 Flower, 2010, 121. 
8 Ibid., 124-25. 
9 Plut. Pomp. 16.1-2; Plut. Sulla 34.5; App. BC 1.105  
10 App. BC 1.105; Plut. Pomp. 15.2; Plut Sull. 34.4-5; Sall. Hist. 1.48-1.67. In a speech during 
his election canvass recounted by Sallust, Lepidus struck an insurrectionary tone, decrying 
Sulla’s rule as tyranny, crime, and slavery and urging and uprising.  
11 Leonie Hayne, "M. Aemilius Lepidus (Cos. 78): A Re-Appraisal," Historia: Zietschrift fur 
Alte Geschitchte 21, no. 4 (1972): 664. Hayne stresses that although opposed to the Sullan 
program, Lepidus himself was not a radical, and may have mobilized his army not with 
revolutionary intent but as a response to senatorial intransigence to legitimate reforms.   
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from the province of Transalpine Gaul by the Senate to hold the consular elections, Lepidus 
brought his consular army along with him. It was tantamount to a declaration of war.12  
In 77, Lepidus arrived outside of the city and fought the consular army of his colleague 
Catulus outside of Rome (#1). While our information on the actual violence is vague, it is clear 
that it revolved around an attempt to invade the city walls with soldiery. Lepidus camped his army 
outside the city walls and demanded he be given a second consulship, attempting to hold the city 
hostage by threat of violence.13 Appian records that Lepidus was “intending to bring [his whole 
army] into the city with him,” and when he was prevented from doing so, he “ordered his men 
under arms.”14 Catulus did the same, and the two armies fought a battle outside the city walls “not 
far from the Campus Martius.”15 While a specific location is not given, the battle must have taken 
place either north of the Campus Martius or just across the Tiber River to the west.16 Citizens 
watching the clash from the walls would have had the violence of the 80s fresh in their minds, and 
sight of soldiery fighting in these areas would have been an ominous and gut-wrenching sight.17 
                                                
12 App. BC 1.105; Hayne, “Lepidus,” 666; Plut. Pomp. 16.1-2. 
13 Plut. 16.3. “Meanwhile, Lepidus had made a hasty rush upon Rome, and sitting down before it, 
was demanding a second consulship, and terrifying the citizens with a vast throng of followers.”  
14 App. 1.107. 
15 Ibid. 
16 The Campus Martius was considered as the area between the Tiber River’s bend, the 
Capitoline, and the Esquiline. It seems most sensible that the battle took place North of the 
Campus, rather than the west side, seeing as Lepidus was returning from Etruria marching south, 
and likely approached the city from that direction. Sulla’s armies entered through the Colline 
Gate in 82, and the combatants in this battle may have been following recent practice by 
engaging here.  Because the Republican Saepta—the closest thing to a boundary of the 
Republican Campus—stretched all the way up to the modern Pantheon, I have placed the point 
denoting this battle on my map somewhat above this point. However, the real location of the 
point is unrecoverable. 
17 The visceral memory of these civil wars lingered. Even over a decade after this—and nearly 
twenty years after the height of the civil wars—Cicero could count on the listeners of his Third 
Catilinarian in 63 to still clearly remember them: “For call to mind, citizens, all the civil wars, 
not only those of which you have heard, but those which you yourselves remember and have 
seen” (Cic. Cat. 3.25). 
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Catulus’s army defeated Lepidus, who fled Rome. His rebellion collapsed when his allies in Gaul 
and Italy were defeated by Pompey.18 
It in attempting to invade the city, Lepidus was following a model of military violence set 
by Marius, Cinna, and Sulla. Given that the consular elections were due to take place, it is likely 
that Lepidus intended to use his soldiers to demand a second consulship. His soldiers would have 
pacified senatorial resistance to his re-election, and participated in the Comitia Centuriata, the 
assembly that elected consuls.19 However, with the exception of the Catilinarian uprising in 63, 
this type of extramural army-on-army violence was largely absent from Roman politics until the 
outbreak of the next round of civil wars in 49. Pompey, Caesar and their subordinates would later 
use military forces to influence the outcome of legislation, elections, and trials (#25, 56, 68), but 
there was no engagement of consular armies outside the walls or a full-on military invasion until 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49.  
There is vague evidence that Lepidus’ revolt occasioned violence within the walls. In 78, 
Catulus passed a Lex Lutatia de vi which was later used to prosecute perpetrators of urban violence 
in the 60s.20  The law’s existence suggests that there had been disturbances within the city in 
addition to the battle on the plains.21 Later charges under Catulus’ law and other vis legislation 
included accusations of conspiracy to murder a magistrate, leading violent gangs, and burning or 
                                                
18 Appian, 1.107-108.  
19 Hayne, "M. Aemilius Lepidus (Cos. 78): A Re-Appraisal." 
20 Cic. Cael. 70; A. W. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 
110-18. In defending Marcus Caelius against an accusation of Vis, Cicero mentions that Caelius 
is charged under a law passed by Catulus during the Lepidan insurrection: “…a law which 
Quintus Catulus passed at a time when armed dissensions were dividing the people, and when 
the republic was almost at its last gasp.” 
21 Michael Alexander, Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 Bc to 50 Bc (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1990), 212. 
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otherwise harming public and private property.22 It is likely that actions along these lines prompted 
Catulus to pass the law. It is also believable that Lepidus’ march on Rome, reminiscent of Marius 
and Sulla’s own approaches, sparked fighting between supporters of both factions within the city.  
Lepidus’ march on Rome stands as transition of both the type of violence perpetrated, and 
its location, between the 80’s and the subsequent three decades. While pitched military combat, 
proscriptions, and invasions of the city by military forces largely disappeared, intramural civilian 
violence increased. Compared to the entire period in question, the 70s had very few incidents of 
political violence—3, out of the 69 between 78 and 50. However, the two remaining incidents in 
the 70s both presaged a transformation of the Forum’s political topography. As Rome’s political 
system worked its way to restoring the tribunate’s full powers, an act of urban violence prompted 
a consul of 75 to reorganize aspects of the Forum in an attempt to decrease political disruption and 
violence. However, his actions inadvertently set the stage for the patterns that came to characterize 
the violence of the 60s and 50s.  
Setting the Topographical Stage 
 
The act that initialized this topographical transformation took place in 75 during the 
consulship of L. Octavius and C. Aurelius Cotta.23 That year, the city was experiencing a grain 
shortage caused by piratical activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and cash shortages resulting 
from foreign wars in Syria, Spain, and Macedonia.24 According to a fragment of Sallust’s 
                                                
22 Ibid., 111-82. 
23Thomas Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Volume Ii: 99 B.C. - 31 B.C 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1952), 96; Eric Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic 
Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," Phoenix 63, no. 3/4 
(2009): 331-2.  
24 "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs and the 
Praetor's Tribunal," 335; Paul J. J. Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior 
in the Late Roman Republic (Ca. 80-50 B.C.) (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1987), 220. 
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Histories, the lack of grain was “intolerable” to the urban plebs, and the built-up tension released 
itself around the time of the elections for the 74 offices.25 As the consuls Octavius and Cotta 
escorted Q. Caecilius Metellus, a candidate for the praetorship, into the Forum from the direction 
of the Via Sacra, they were set upon and attacked by an angry crowd.26 The crowd chased the 
consuls and Metellus out of the Forum and back eastward up the road. The three escaped by taking 
shelter in Lucius Octavius’ house, which Sallust describes as “nearer,” propior, than other spaces 
of refuge.27 This indicates that Octavius’ home, like many of the homes of elite senators, was 
located directly along the Sacra Via.28 Thus, the entirety of this attack and chase took place in the 
area of the Sacra Via directly east of the Forum. Briefly analyzing the topography of the Sacra Via 
and its relationship to the Forum illuminates why this attack was successful.  
The Sacra Via began at the Temple of Jupiter Stator on the Velia, a hill in the Republican 
period largely leveled by later Imperial construction.29 The road descended westward down the 
                                                
25 Sall. Hist. 2.42. 
26 Fergus Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1998), 44. Millar explains that we can be sure that the consuls were approaching the 
Forum from the Sacra Via because of Sallust’s use of deducentes to describe the Consuls’ 
action—they were literally “bringing down” Metellus. The Sacra Via was on a slope down from 
the Velia, which although obliterated by later Imperial constructions, would have been a 
prominent grade in Republican times. Miller’s point is helpful for locating other aspects of 
political violence, as other ancient sources often describe individuals “going down” to the 
Forum. 
27 Sall. Hist., 2.40.: “cum magno tumultu invadit, fugientisque secuta ad Octavi domum, quae 
propior erat, in […pu]gnaculum…perve[nit].” 
28 Richardson, 1992, 132, 338; Filippo Coarelli, Rome and Environs: An Archaeological Guide, 
trans. Daniel Harmon and James Clauss (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007). 
29 Richardson, 1992, 224, 338; Coarelli, 2007, 82-83. Richardson argues that the Sacra Via 
started all the way to the east at the imperial Arch of Titus and ran from there down to the Forum 
as it does in the current archaeological site. However, Coarelli points out that this tracing of the 
street dates to the imperial period, after Nero’s destruction of much of the northern Palatine 
slopes and the Velia in the fire of 64. Coarelli argues that what was called the “Sacra Via” would 
have headed east only for a few hundred meters until turning northwards towards the Carinae at 
the corner of the imperial Basilica of Maxentius.   
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Velia and entered the Forum just north of the Regia. At the Regia, the road forked into two: the 
primary fork was the northern one, which ran under the the Fornix Fabianus, a triumphal arch built 
121 BCE and located just north-west of the Regia.30 From there, it ran across the northern side of 
the Forum along the Basilica Fulvia to the Comitium, and then stopped at the Scalae Monetae, 
which led up the eastern side of Capitoline Hill.31 Although the area in the modern archaeological 
site of the Forum appears relatively open to a modern observer, in the Republican period, the Sacra 
Via was densely crowded on either side by residences. Figure 1 is a reconstruction of the Forum 
by Christopher Johanson that includes the Sacra Via and the residential area of the Northern 
Palatine that spread out south of the road. While not archaeologically precise for the Forum in 75, 
it provides a much-needed imaging of the closed-in and restricted nature of the Sacra Via. 
 
Fig. 1: Diagram of extended funeral routes at Rome in 160 BCE from Christopher Johanson, “Spectacle in the 
Forum,” 160. 
                                                
30 Richardson, 1992, 154. Richardson dismisses F.E. Brown’s argument that the original Sacra 
Via was the southern fork, which curved below the Regia and entered the Forum’s southeast end 
in front of the Temple of Castor. Richardson asserts that the road would have initially developed 
along an ancient brook which sprung from the Velia and ran across the Forum’s north end. 
31 Ibid., 338.  
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As demonstrated by Figure 1, the Sacra Via’s entrance to the Forum at the Regia was a 
choke point that could easily be blocked by a crowd. Not pictured in Johanson’s map above, but 
located directly northwest of the Regia and spanning the road, was the Fornix Fabianus, which 
may have blocked lateral escape to other parts of the Eastern Forum. 
Many of the houses along the Sacra Via belonged to members of the Senatorial elite, and 
one of the plots Johanson images above, not far east of the Forum, must have been the home of 
the consul L. Octavius.32 The houses themselves are topographically relevant. Christopher 
Johanson, in his 3-D imaging of funeral processions on the Sacra Via, shows that these homes 
dominated the road. Often two stories tall, the buildings had large projecting balconies and facades 
that contained independently accessible tabernae that were rented out to artisans and craftsmen.33 
During funeral processions, “The road was narrow, and viewing space would be limited to the few 
who could line the streets, and those who could sit in the balconies of homes that lined the 
streets.”34 As Johanson’s 3-D modeling of a procession viewed from a Senator’s balcony (Figure 
2) illustrates, there was barely room for three or four people to walk side-by-side comfortably. 
Johanson emphasizes of the road “Space was limited…The streets in the area barely had room for 
the chariots they conveyed.”35 The figure below demonstrates the extreme narrowness of the street, 
and the imposing, alley-like nature of the tall buildings surrounding it.  
                                                
32 Millar, 1998, 44; Richardson, 1992, 338.  
33 Shelly Hales, "Republican Houses," in Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World: 
Companion to the Archaeology of the Roman Republic, ed. Jane Evans DeRose (West Sussex, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 54. 
34 Christopher Johanson, "Spectacle in the Forum: Visualizing the Roman Aristocratic Funeral of 
the Middle Republic" (University of California Los Angeles, 2008), 57.   
35 Ibid., 61.  
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Fig. 2: 3-D modeling of Mid-Republican Funeral Procession on Sacred Way, from Christopher Johanson, “Spectacle in the 
Forum, 63. 
 
Reading Sallust’s account in conjunction with Johanson’s models provides a topographical 
clarity to the study of this individual piece of violence that has henceforth not been achieved. 
Understanding the topography involved in this event helps modern readers better understand the 
event itself. It helps us situate ancient actions described in text in the physicality of the urban space, 
and doing so, helps us understand the very real relationship between individual actions and urban 
topography. Understanding the topography behind this scene—and the many other scenes of 
violence that will be addressed—brings sense and coherence to the actions of all involved.  
On this day in 75, with the city in a frenzy over grain shortages, the news of the consuls 
entering the crowded Forum with Q. Metellus must have provoked an angry and spontaneous 
response. Although Sallust does not specify the size of the crowd, the restrictive topography of the 
Sacra Via meant that it did not have to be large to block the street and have a threatening effect. In 
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the tight space of the house-lined street, with a violent group charging at them from the Forum, 
Octavius, Cotta, and Metellus must have felt dangerously boxed in. As would one in a modern 
urban alley, with lateral views blocked by large buildings and the narrow forward outlet blocked 
by charging attackers, the three panicked and ran. The fact that they fled to Octavius’ house 
specifically because it was “nearer” indicates that there was no time to dawdle—The three were 
frightened for their lives.  
 Cornering the consuls on the Sacra Via was a canny use of topography on the part of the 
crowd. It had a harrowing effect on the consuls, who took pains to mollify angry urban residents. 
Soon after the incident, C. Aurelius Cotta appeared in the Forum dressed in mourning clothes and 
made a humble public apology, explaining the lack of state funds and offering to forfeit his own 
life if necessary.36 However, the urban plebs’ attack at the Sacra Via was much more than just a 
simple food riot. Beyond frightening a pair of consuls, it had a wide impact on Rome’s political 
institutions and political topography. It took place as Sulla’s reduction of the tribunes’ powers had 
increasingly come under fire. Restoration of the tribunes’ powers had become a live question in 
78, 77, and 76 and the proposal had enthusiastic support among the plebs, as well an increasing 
support among a number of aristocrats.37 The potent show of force on the Sacra Via demonstrated 
to the consuls that the urban plebs were a force to be reckoned with, and and their demands for 
strong political representation had to be either mollified or circumvented. Cotta opted to do both. 
                                                
36 Sall. Hist. 2.44-58. 
37 Asc. 66-67C Erich S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1974), 26-28; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic 
Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 334-35. Sall. Hist. 3.41; 
Lepidus had promised to restore tribunician powers in his campaign speech in 78; a Gaius 
Sincinius, a tribune of 76, had also suggested it.  
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First came the mollification. Sallust writes that Cotta, out of fear of the power of the 
plebs—no doubt cultivated by his near-death experience on the Sacra Via—passed a law that 
removed Sulla’s prohibition on tribunes standing for higher offices.38 This had important 
implications for the Forum’s political topography. By restoring tribunes’ ability to climb the 
political ladder of the cursus honorum, the tribunate again became a desirable position for 
ambitious politicians. With this came a revived focus on the Rostra as a political center. Although 
tribunes had held contiones—public addresses—on the Rostra between 83 and 75, these addresses 
under Sulla’s regime held neither the appeal or the political capital that they had in previous years. 
After Cotta’s reform, however, this trend reversed. Both Kondratieff and Millar assert that Cotta’s 
re-opening of the cursus honorum in 75 encouraged tribunes to return to the Rostra with an 
aggressive vigor.39 In Pro Cluentio, Cicero recalled a telling anecdote about the tribune Lucius 
Quinctius, who in 74 “seized upon the Rostra, now long unoccupied, that place uninhabited by a 
tribune's voice since Sulla's tribunician voice arrival, and recalled the masses, by then 
unaccustomed to contiones, to a semblance of their old habit."40 Although exaggerated, Cicero’s 
emphasis demonstrates that there was a clear break from the years prior. Kondratieff summed up 
the trend, writing, “None would disagree that tribunician contional activity had been in a serious 
state of decline since Sulla's reforms, or that Quinctius’ activity represented a comprehensive 
revival of the tribunate's “contional habit” on a scale not seen since the days of the pre-Sullan 
tribunes.”41 With the contional habit restored, the Rostra, as the tribunes’ traditional pulpit for 
                                                
38 Sall. Hist. 3.41. In a speech to the populace in 73 arguing for the restoration of full tribunician 
power, the tribune G. Licinius Macer (MRR, 110) specifically cites Cotta’s fear as a motivation. 
39Millar, 1998, 54-57; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: 
Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 336-37.  
40 Cic., Cluent. 110. 
41 Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs 
and the Praetor's Tribunal," 337.  
 31 
addressing the plebs, became again an important piece of political topography. This topographical 
change occasioned by the 75 food riot had huge implications for the future of politics, violence, 
and space in the Forum. As will be shown later, the Rostra was the site of immense political 
violence in the 60s and 50s. Much of that violence involved the tribunes, and accelerated after 70, 
when the tribunician potestas was fully restored. However, this spontaneous food riot in 75 shares 
a good deal of the responsibility for a centering of politics and violence in the succeeding decades 
around the Rostra.  
At the same time that he re-empowered the tribunes, Cotta took steps to circumvent the 
political power that he knew would come with their use of the Rostra. To do so, Cotta instituted 
another topographical transformation, in this case involving the Forum’s judicial apparatus. As 
early as the 130s, tribunician activity on the rostra had come to be disruptive to the other political 
processes that took place in the Western Forum.42 Tribunician contiones before Sulla’s 
reformations were loud, disruptive affairs that often consumed the entire Western Forum, 
especially when controversial political issues were involved. The Rostra was just one section of a 
complex of stands that surrounded the Comitium, the traditional religious and political space in 
front of the Curia. Only 30 meters northeast of the Rostra, located directly to the southwest of the 
of the Curia, was the Praetor’s tribunal and the stands for quaestiones perpetuae.43 Like all other 
government functions, trials took place outside in full public view. Praetors presided over the 
proceedings on wooden tribunal stands, and trials often functioned like theatrical performances, 
                                                
42 Ibid., 340-41. 
43 Coarelli, 2007, 51-54; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: 
Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 324; Richardson, 1992, 401. Although the 
praetor’s tribunal could be moved throughout the Forum, the traditional location for the urban 
praetor was in the Comitium, distinguished from the tribunal of the praetor peregrinus, which 
was in foro. Additionally, new quaestiones established in the late 2nd and early 1st century like 
the quaestio de ambitu were also originally located on the Comitium.  
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with large crowds of spectators watching.44 In this open-air atmosphere, large contiones held by 
tribunes had the effect of disrupting legal proceedings at the close-by praetor’s stand and the other 
tribunals around the Comitium. Many ancient writers aptly describe the commotion caused by 
contiones as storms and turbulent winds. The noise of fiery oratory, coordinated chanting, and 
thunderous shouts that attended contiones could easily interfere with and even drown out forensic 
speeches at trials.45 Contiones held by popular orators could generate crowds so large that 
participants had to squeeze into loggias of basilicas and tabernae and sit on top of basilicas just to 
hear the speeches.46 In a packed environment like this, it is unlikely that an open-air trial would 
have been able to proceed. The amount of such contiones was also an issue. According to Cicero, 
some tribunes in the 90s and 80s, and later in the 60s and 50s all but lived on the Rostra, speaking 
from it every day.47 The high frequency of contiones greatly reduced the number of days 
functioning trials could take place. Eric Kondratieff sums up disruptive results of overlap between 
the Forum’s tribunician and praetorian topography:  
We can conclude from the foregoing that the urban praetor would frequently have found it 
difficult to conduct affairs at his own tribunal, especially when a popular tribune capable 
of attracting very large audiences was addressing an assembly nearby. The praetor’s 
predicament would be intensified if that tribune were also capable of eliciting enormous 
roars from the crowd; or worse, if he had supporting him a claque of noisemakers to drown 
out the addresses of his opponents.48  
 
                                                
44 Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1949), 99. 
45 Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs 
and the Praetor's Tribunal," 340. 
46 T.P. Wiseman, Remembering the Roman People: Essays on Late-Republican Politics and 
Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 155, 61-62; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's 
Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 341. 
47 Cic. Brut. 305-306. Cicero describes tribunes in 90 as “said to have lived upon the Rostra” 
 and the of tribune Sulpicius in 88 as having “the occasion to speak in public almost every day.”   
48 Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs 
and the Praetor's Tribunal," 344. 
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Cotta realized that the revival of the “contional habit” occasioned by his legislation meant that 
disruptions to judicial processes would return. To prevent this, Cotta decided to physically separate 
the tribune and praetors’ spaces.49 During an overall renovation of the Forum, he moved the 
praetor’s tribunal and and tribunals for the quaestiones perpetuae to the Easternmost side of the 
Forum. There, just north of the Temple of Castor and Pollux and slightly overlapping with the area 
now occupied by the remains of the Temple of Divus Julius, Cotta built a tribunal stand referred 
to as the Tribunal Aurelium and a set of wooden seats called the Gradus Aurelii.50 The seats were 
completed late in 75 or early in 74. In Pro Cluentio, Cicero emphasized that at the trial of a certain 
C. Junius in 74, the steps “were new at that time.”51 In the same sentence, Cicero says that the set 
of seats were designed like the grandstand of a theater, for jurors to sit on. Citing several references 
                                                
49 Kondratieff acknowledges that there is some confusion dating whether it was C. Cotta in 75 or 
his brother M. Cotta, cos. 74, who made the switch. However, he considers the former more 
likely, because he engaged in other renovations around the Forum during his consulship, whereas 
his brother spent the majority of 74 in Bithynia.  
50 Leanne Bablitz, Actors and Audience in the Roman Courtroom (New York: Routledge, 2007), 
14-15; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the 
Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 329-34, 47-50; Millar, 1998, 42-43; Richardson, 1992, 181-2, 
400-1. This tribunal and stairs have confused scholars for years; Fergus Millar, although locating 
them in the correct location in front of the Temple of Castor, attributed them to Sulla, whom he 
asserts moved both the praetor’s tribunal and the quaestiones there during his reforms at the end 
of the 80s; however, this fails to address the 6-year gap between the gradus’s postulated 
construction date and its apparent newness in 74, as attested by Cicero in Cluent. 93. Lawrence 
Richardson is further confused; he denies that the “Tribunal Aurelium” and the “Gradus Aurelii” 
were related, and untenably identifies the tribunal with a stand at the Saepta in the Campus 
Martius. Kondratieff argues based on Cicero’s constant association of the Tribunal Aurelium 
with the Temple of Castor—usually in reference to Clodius’ activities there—that the moved 
tribunals had to be in that area. For a fuller refutation of Millar’s dating and Richardson’s 
location, see Kondratieff 329-330, n. 35. Kondratieff’s argument is supported by Bablitz, who 
argues that the location of the tribunal was either directly on the space now occupied by the 
Temple of Divus Julius, or slightly north-west of the temple. For my map, I have accepted 
Bablitz’s first proposition, that the tribunal and the Gradus would have been on the North-
Western end of the space now occupied by the Temple.  
51 Cic. Clu. 93. “Those steps of Aurelius, which were new at that time, appeared as if they had 
been built on purpose for a theatre for the display of that tribunal.” 
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in speeches and letters of Cicero from 70 to the 50s, both Kondratieff and Millar maintain that 
almost all courts and trials, including the majority of the quaestiones perpetuae, the special 
investigative courts for public crimes, were moved to the Eastern Forum and stayed there.52 In an 
undelivered 5th oration composed for Verres’ prosecution in 70, Cicero appealed to Castor and 
Pollux as patrons of the court and indicated that jurors could see the templum right before their 
eyes, indicating that the court’s location was in that precinct.53 Cicero describes activity at the 
Tribunal Aurelium as connected with the Temple of Castor in 57.54 Although no archaeological 
remains of the Gradus Aurelii have been found, both Millar and Kondrateiff agree that the stands 
would have been made of wood, akin to the grandstands for contemporary theaters.55  
Cotta’s removal of the Forum’s judicial apparatus to near the Temple of Castor and Pollux 
likely succeeded in its functional goals of preserving the courts’ day-to-day ability to properly 
convene. The distance between the Rostra and the Gradus Aurelii, nearly one hundred meters, 
would have sufficiently dampened the disruptive noise from small and moderately-sized contiones; 
The distance would also have left ample room for large crowds to form around both the Rostra and 
the courts without interfering with each other. Additionally, moving the Praetor’s tribunal had an 
added political benefit for or the senatorial class of theoretically reducing the amount an aggressive 
popularis tribune could voluntarily interfere with traditional judicial processes.56 Building a 
prominent new judicial nexus in front of an important temple would have lent prestige to the 
                                                
52 Millar, 1998, 42-43; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: 
Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 348.  
53 Cicero is quoted in Asc. 27-28C; Millar, Crowd, 42-43. 
54 Cic. Red. Pop. 13, Dom. 54, Pis. 11, Sest. 34. 
55 Millar, 1998, 42-43; Kondratieff, "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: 
Tribunes of the Plebs and the Praetor's Tribunal," 329-30. 
56 "Reading Rome's Evolving Civic Landscape in Context: Tribunes of the Plebs and the 
Praetor's Tribunal," 348.  
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praetor and the institution of the quaestiones, which at this time were judged by members of the 
Senatorial class. Already wary of plebian power, Cotta would have had these political 
considerations in mind when he moved the courts.  
Understanding the exact location of the Praetor’s tribunal and the quaestiones perpetuae is 
imperative to telling the story of political violence and topography in the 60s and 50s. Violence 
during judicial proceedings is one of the largest categories of political violence in the 60s and 50s. 
However, ancient sources and modern scholars that discuss violence during trials frequently fail 
to mention where exactly the trial took place. Understanding Millar and Kondrateiff’s placement 
of the praetors’ tribunal and courts in the 60s and the 50s definitively in the eastern Forum helps 
to make sense out of ancient sources’ descriptions of the flow of people and activity across areas 
of the Forum, as will be shown in later chapters.  
Despite his intentions, in the same way that his conciliatory gesture to the plebs ultimately 
resulted in the Rostra becoming a nexus for tribunician activity in the 60s and 50s, C. Aurelius 
Cotta’s relocation of the judiciary to the Eastern end of the Forum did not stop the praetor’s tribunal 
from becoming a focus of political violence. In fact, it put the courts in the sphere of other 
important elements of political topography which actually increased the potential for violence. 
This section of the Forum was lined with tabernae (shops) and banking stands, based primarily 
along the nearby Basilica Aemilia.57 Individuals working in and patronizing these shops provided 
many individuals to act first as spectators in the 60s, and but later as disruptive agents in the 50s.58  
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Moving the courts to the eastern end of the Forum put them close to where the Sacra Via entered 
onto to the Forum. As a result, the courtroom was almost directly in the path of oncoming 
pedestrian traffic. Courtroom often proceedings had effect of spilling out into the busy road. 
Leanne Bablitz notes that when walking westward down the Via Sacra and after passing the 
Temple of Vesta, the poet Horace and his friend, a defendant in an upcoming case, were accosted 
by the case’s plaintiff, who had seen them from the courtroom. She writes, “Horace and his 
companion had likely passed directly by the court itself,” making them an easy target for the angry 
plaintiff.59 However, the reverse of this was also true. Court proceedings, so close to a major 
pedestrian and economic channel, were susceptible from outside interference, particularly from 
the direction of the Sacra Via. The courts’ new proximity to the road made it easy for organized 
groups to rush from the Sacra Via and interrupt proceedings. The juncture would continue to be a 
flashpoint for violence throughout the 60s and 50s.  
                                                
59 Bablitz, 2007, 16. 
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Fig. 3: Plan of the Forum after 75 B.C.E., by Eric Kondratieff showing approximate location of the Gradus 
Aurelii. From Kondratieff, 2009.   
 
 
 The final instance of recorded political violence in the 70s foreboded an eventual failure of 
Cotta’s topographical restructuring. It occurred in December of 74 at the trial of one C. Junius. As 
mentioned briefly above, Cicero recounts took place at the new Praetor’s tribunal at the Gradus 
Aurelii.60 Junius’ prosecutor was none other than the tribune L. Quinctius, who is mentioned above 
as one of the first tribunes to aggressively return to the Rostra after Cotta re-opened the cursus 
honorum to tribunes. Quinctius accused Junius of corruption while serving as iudex quaestionis—
the magistrate in charge of seating and swearing in a jury—during the trial and conviction of 
                                                
60 Alexander, 1990, 74; Vanderbroeck, 1987, 221. Both derive the date of December from 
Cluent. 92, in which Cicero states Quinctius accused Junius only a few days before his term as 
tribune expired, which would have been in mid-December. 
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Statius Albius Oppianicus, which had occurred earlier in 74. Quinctius had been Oppianicus’ 
defense attorney, and the conviction in that case had been a large loss of face for a tribune who 
was attempting to make the most of his and the tribunate’s re-emergent role in Roman public life.61  
 Junius’ trial took place under the praetor C. Verres in the new court at the eastern end of 
the Forum.62 However, Qunictius’ actions demonstrated that a determined tribune could still 
disruptively bring the worlds of the tribune’s Rostra and the praetor’s tribunal together. In the days 
before the trial, Quinctius held loud daily contiones on the Rostra in which he accused Junius of 
malfeasance. When the time came to prosecute Junius, Quinctius was not to be deterred by space; 
If trials had moved away from the contio, Quinctius would have to bring his contio with him. On 
the day of the trial, Quinctius simply descended from the Rostra and directed his crowd to follow 
him. He strolled over to Verres’ tribunal, a manageable distance of only a football field’s length 
southeast through the paved central area of the Forum. Cicero described the scene evocatively: 
“He [Quinctius] came to the court not from the contio, but bringing the contio with him.”63  
 To assess the impact of dropping a crowded contio into Verres’ courtroom, it helps to first 
illustrate for a moment already crowded composition of a traditional Roman court. At the center 
of the Roman courtroom was the Praetor’s tribunal stand, a platform of wood, elevated between 1 
                                                
61 Cic. Cluent. 86-96, 108, 113. 
62 Alexander, 1990, 77; Vanderbroeck, 1987, 221. Both authors mistakenly describe this trial as a 
iudicium populi, a judgment by the people. If that were the case, this trial would have taken place 
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trial of another juror in Oppianicus’ case, Caius Fidiculanius Falcula, detailed in 103-114. 
Although Junius is mentioned briefly in 108, it is only to transition to Fidiculanius’ succeeding 
trial, which he indicates was a iudicium populi. Kondratieff 2009 correctly ascertains the type of 
trial and its location.  
63 Cic. Cluent. 93. 
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and 1.25 meters, on which the presiding magistrate, in this case sat. At this height, the tribunal 
stand was sufficient to put the magistrate above the heads of those standing before the court, but 
low enough to ensure communication between the magistrate and litigants. Due to the 
administrative burden resulting from a praetor’s nearly constant courtroom schedule, Verres would 
have been assisted by a coterie of official scribes, time-keepers, and other aides, located at seats 
and tables beside the platform at ground level. 64 The cases’ jurors, Senators and equites selected 
from the year’s jury lists, also sat beside the Praetor’s tribunal; in criminal cases the number of 
jurors could reach up to 45.65  
In attendance would of course be the plaintiff and the defendant, sitting on benches across 
from each other. They individuals were accompanied by their advocates—who themselves had 
supporting advocates—and a host of other attendees: nomenclatores, scribes, character and 
evidentiary witnesses, close friends, patrons family members, clients, and perhaps a few 
freedmen.66 These attendees would have been placed on benches that ringed the praetor’s tribunal 
in a half-circle. In this new court, the gradus Aurelii, which Cicero describes as the steps to a 
theater, served as some of these benches, accommodating all of these individuals while leaving 
room for spectators. Finally, Verres’ court would have been surrounded by a peripheral crowd, 
often called a corona. This consisted of both individuals just happening to be in the area, and those 
who had come specifically to watch a proceeding. In the Late Republic, the courts functioned 
nearly as public entertainment, and lawyers vied with oratory to enlarge their corona by catching 
the attention of passerby.67 The court’s new location near the well-trod Sacra Via all but guarantees 
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that there were passerby who had stopped in their tracks to view the proceedings, as one does today 
when passing by a performance of public art or sport. 
  Insert into this already noisy and hectic scene the outraged participants of a noisy contio, 
and the disruption it must have caused becomes evident. The crowd poured into the east end of the 
Forum and dramatically surrounded the courtroom and tribunal stand. Cicero states that Quinctius 
“stuffed full” (complerat) the steps with his supporters, suggesting that the crowd was not only 
part of the court’s corona, but made its way into the existing space on the Gradus Aurelii for 
spectators.68 Having physically installed his contio within Verres’ courtroom, Quinctius used it to 
violently threaten Junius into submission and the court into conviction. Quinctius’ contional 
attendees, described as violently agitated (concitatis hominibus), prevented not only Junius and his 
advocates but all involved from rising up to speak.69 Cicero further describes Quinctius’ crowd, 
albeit hyperbolically, as “all violence…a sort of earthquake or tempest—it was anything rather 
than a court of justice.”70 It is most likely that Quinctius’ crowd used a traditional tactic of 
drowning out or shouting down defendants with noise or roars. 
In a crowded courtroom, located at an end of the Forum already noisy with the transactions 
of shopkeepers and bankers, it is not hard to envision the injection of an incensed, shouting crowd 
as a terminally disruptive to the trial. Ringed by a large and incensed audience, Junius and his 
advocates may have also feared for their personal safety. Unlike the Praetor, who had the benefit 
of an elevated stand, the defendant and advocate stood and argued vulnerably at ground level. As 
a result of the tumult, Junius could mount no defense and was convicted. Cicero later describes the 
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70 Ibid., 96.  
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guilty verdict as a result of “an instance of the violence of the multitude.”71 Despite Cicero’s 
exaggerated language, it is clear from his treatment of the trial in Pro Cluentio that the tribune had 
used his rowdy crowd to significantly impact the court’s processes. Cicero contrasts this with the 
later trial of a C. Fidiculanius, in which the defendant was acquitted on the same charges “because 
at the trial there was no sedition, no violence, and no crowd.”72  
Quinctius’ arrogation of the Praetor’s court for his contional crowd demonstrates the 
continued vulnerability of the courts in spite of Cotta’s attempt to create two separate topographies 
for both. Moving the praetor’s tribunal to the eastern end of the Forum had the effect of reifying 
its immobility. In contrast, the tribunes were largely mobile and could speak from almost anywhere 
in the city. One hundred meters, although farther than the original thirty meters between the 
Praetors’ and Tribunes’ stands, is still not a large distance, and with the aid of an attendant or 
another tribune, magistrates and audiences could quickly make their way to the other side of the 
Forum.73 The majority of Rome’s day-to-day political functions—excepting elections on the 
Campus Martius—still took place in a relatively small and circumscribed area within the Forum. 
The courts still lacked real barriers and were conducted in the open air. All of these aspects evident 
in Junius’ case that contributed to Quinctius’ victory—topographical closeness of the Forum’s 
political processes, relative vulnerability of such processes, resulting vulnerability to noise and 
physical bodies—become increasingly relevant for political activity in the 60s and 50s. Quinctius’ 
disruption of Junius’ trial is a telling coda to the 70s, and a foreboding introduction for the next 
two decades.  
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and the Praetor's Tribunal," 353-4. 
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When an angry plebian mob cornered the Consul C. Cotta among the houses of the narrow 
Sacra Via in 75, little did they know that the harrowing experience would occasion a topographical 
transformation that would establish the locational patterns of violence for years to come. Cotta’s 
response to the attack on his life led to the resurgence of the Rostra as a site of political importance 
for the Tribunes; it also established the eastern Forum as the new center of judicial affairs, and 
thus, violence. The re-arrangement of the Forum’s topography fulfills of a transition in the style 
and location of political violence. In 78, the destruction of the Consul Lepidus’ armed rebellion in 
a violent clash marked the end of an era in which armed conflict with soldiers outside of the walls 
and attendant bloodshed inside the walls was the norm. In its place, the 70s ushered in an era in 
which almost all of the violence took place within the Servian Walls. From 75 onward, the extra-
mural military conflicts of the 80s were replaced by civilian-led violence, often but not always 
within the Forum, that centered on control of specific topographic elements, including the Rostra 
and the praetor’s tribunal. Cotta’s attempt to remove the courts from harm’s way was prescient if 
unsuccessful, as he realized the courts were a strategic target that was vulnerable to interference.  
Quinctius’ actions demonstrated a keen awareness of the relationship between space, 
people, and political decision-making. It also demonstrated for future politicians that force could 
produce results. This relationship would be revisited again and again, first at the Rostra and the 
Praetor’s tribunal, then elsewhere in the city in search of results throughout the 60s and 50s. 
Political violence in Rome’s succeeding two decades was rarely random; nor was it often 
spontaneous or crowd-directed, like the attack on Octavius and Cotta. Instead, like Quinctius’ 
actions at Junius’ trial, violence was committed by single individuals or small groups, targeted on 
specific topographic elements, and fundamentally related to the political function and space that it 
was intended to impact.  
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Chapter II: Controlling Topography in the Western Forum 
 
Twenty-nine instances of political violence occurred in the Western Forum, the majority 
of which will be investigated in-depth in this chapter. The space that I am categorizing as the 
Western Forum stretches from the Area Capitolina on the Capitoline Hill, down the Capitol’s 
western side, to the eastern end of the Basilica Sempronia. It is a largely arbitrary designation, as 
the Forum was not divided in such categories in ancient times. At the northwest corner of the 
Forum proper sat the Curia, the thickly built meeting house for the Senate. Adjacent to the Curia 
was the Basilica Porcia, the headquarters of the Tribunes of the Plebs. Just across a street, the 
Clivus Argentarius, was the Carcer, the state prison. Monumental buildings framed the Forum’s 
western end. The Basilica Opimia, the Temple of Concord, and the massive Tabularium rose on 
the slopes of the Capitoline Hill to the west of the Curia. Along the Southwestern corner stood the 
Temple of Saturn, the site of the state treasury. Sometimes, if there was a religious festival 
occurring, the space between the Temple of Saturn and the Curia would be occupied by a large 
wooden theater. A steep road, the Clivus Capitolinus, led up from the area of the Temple of Saturn 
to the imposing mount of the Area Capitolina, the sacred and political space in front of the massive 
temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. At the center of the Western Forum was the Rostra, the 
speaker’s platform, from which the members of Rome’s political aristocracy communicated with 
the rest of the city. Behind it was the Comitium, a curved space in which the archaic Romans had 
voted on legislation until 145 BCE. The paved space in front of the Rostra was where Romans 
assembled to hear speakers, and male citizens assembled in their tribal units to vote on legislation 
in the Comitia Tributa, the tribal legislative assembly. Still south of that was the Lacus Curtius, a 
monument to an early Republican hero/anti-hero.74  
                                                
74 Coarelli, 2007, 52-53; Millar, 1998, 40; Richardson, 1992, 170-74. 
 44 
In addition to these monumental buildings, as an individual in the Forum, you would have 
to reckon with the crush and press of daily business going around you. As the paved area of the 
Forum stretched out to the Eastern end of the space, it was bounded by the monumental Basilica 
Aemilia to the north and the Basilica Sempronia to the south. Stretching in front of these were the 
Tabernae Argentariae and Tabernae Veteres respectively, lines of one-room stalls to be used as 
shops. Multiple roads, including the the Clivus Argentarius, Argiletum, Sacra Via, Vicus Tuscus, 
and Vicus Iugarius all ran into the central space, making the Forum a permanently busy crossroads.  
This chapter has three sections, focusing on the three locations of political violence in the 
Western Forum: The Curia, the Rostra, and the saepta, the voting apparatus used for legislative 
assemblies. Ten of the instances of political violence in the Western Forum took place around the 
Curia, the senate’s official building on the Comitium, or additional temples in which the Senate 
was meeting. The Senate’s ability to meet indoors was designed to protect it from disruption. 
However, it also made the senators that constituted it easy to locate, surround, and subject to public 
pressure. Starting in the 60s and intensifying in the 50s, politicians hoping to pressure the senate 
into adopting certain policies used organized demonstrations, riots, and attacks on the Senate 
building to intimidate Rome’s senators. While the ability of the aristocracy to shift its meeting 
place proved a counterweight, anti-senatorial politicians proved that they could follow the 
aristocracy. 
The second part of the chapter examines violence at the Rostra, the speaker’s platform. 
The Rostra’s height lent impressive symbolic weight to a speaker’s words, but also made him 
extremely vulnerable to hostile crowds. For politicians that had the manpower to organize 
sizeable crowds and the appeal to control them, the Rostra could be used as a tool with which to 
humiliate and intimidate political opponents, and a place to force one’s enemies to be exposed to 
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physical assault. The third section examines violence during legislative assemblies. Legislative 
assemblies were centered on the physical act of walking in a line and casting a ballot at one 
specific location. The physical process of assemblies was frequently interrupted, and battles over 
laws revolved around control of the physical voting apparatus or the immediate space around it. 
For each section, the chapter tracks developments in how Romans used the space for violence 
chronologically throughout the 60s to the 50s.  
Boxing in the Senate—Violence around the Curia(e) 
 
The discussion of the role of the senate building in political violence in the Western Forum 
is best begun with an example that illustrates the topographical relationships at play between the 
Curia and the rest of its surroundings. In 67, a tribune of the plebs named Aulus Gabinius proposed 
a bill that would have transferred the command of the war against Rome’s great enemy in Asia, 
Mithridates, to the wildly popular general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey).75 Hoping to 
ingratiate Pompey and increase his own stock with the public by openly supporting the general, 
Gabinius proposed a tribunician bill in 67 to give a yet-to-be-designated consul—understood to be 
Pompey—a three-year extraordinary command to fight pirates in the Mediterranean. The bill was 
received well at its introduction by attendees of a contio held by Gabinius.76 However, trouble 
ensued when the proposal was subsequently debated by the Senate.  
 That day, the Senate met in the Curia.77 The Curia was a imposing rectangular building 
with a  high walls and a roof. The Senate was unique in that it was the sole public institution of the 
                                                
75 For Gabinius’ close and supportive relationship with Pompey, see Gruen, 1974, 63, 66, 106, 
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Republic that met indoors, as opposed to the courts and the assemblies.78 The Curia had recently 
been enlarged in 80 by Sulla to accommodate the new senators Sulla enrolled as dictator. Inside, 
the Curia had rows of wooden benches along each of the two longer sides, with a central aisle 
running down the middle.79 At the northern end of the aisle, the presiding magistrate, often a consul 
or a praetor, would sit on a curule seat; At the other end of the aisle was a nearly perpetually open 
door which opened on to the Comitium, the ancient circular space in which the comitia tributa had 
met to vote until 145.80  
The open door was politically and topographically relevant. It allowed for 
interconnectedness within the Western Forum’s political topography. Roughly fifty meters south 
across the Comitium was the Rostra, the speaker’s platform which faced the Forum’s open space. 
The Rostra itself was associated with tribunician activity, and used by magistrates of all types to 
communicate with a citywide audience. The short distance from the Curia’s open door allowed the 
rapid transfer of information across the city: Events inside the Curia could be transmitted via an 
informant on the Senate’s porch across the Comitium to the Rostra. From the Rostra, reports of 
senatorial deliberations could be transmitted to the rest of the Forum and the city. Just south of the 
Rostra was the open space of the Forum where the Comitia Tributa, the legislative assembly, voted 
on legislation debated in the Senate, and citizens were accustomed to mass there and wait for the 
results of senatorial debate.81 Including the short distance to the Rostra, the area was also cramped 
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with other buildings and activities. Adjoining the Curia to the west was the Basilica Porcia, the 
headquarters of the ten tribunes of the plebs.82 Directly to the southwest of the Curia, until its 
removal by Aurelius Cotta in 74, was the praetor urbanus’ tribunal stand.83 After 80, the Curia-
Comitium complex had become even more cramped. Sulla had extended the building southward 
into the Comitium during his expansion to accommodate his expansion of the senate to 600 men.84 
Fig. 1 demonstrates the Curia-Comitium complex in the Mid-Republic as modeled by Christopher 
Johanson.  
The Curia, then, was a uniquely identifiable space located at Rome’s political heart. In the 
small space of the physically and politically crowded area of the Western Forum, it was also 
subject to the pressures that this crowdedness generated. As senators entered, exited, and debated 
within the Curia, they were forced to contend with any individuals that may have been outside.85 
The uniquely closed nature of the building provided senatorial meetings with a level of protection 
unknown to other political processes; However, it also meant that senators could be easily trapped 
and influenced by surrounding crowds.  
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Figure 5: The Mid-Republican Comitium-Curia complex, viewed from the East. In Christopher Johanson, 
Spectacle in the Forum, p. 91. Note that as a result of Sulla’s reconstruction of the Curia, in the period 80 to 50 
the building would have actually been larger and extended forward into the circular Comitium space, decreasing 
the distance between it and the Rostra. From left: Temple of Concord, Carcer, Basilica Porcia, Curia, and 
Comitium. 
 
On the day that Gabinius introduced his legislation to the Senate, the Curia was likely a 
full house, given the controversial nature of the legislation. Although the building had the capacity 
to hold all of Sulla’s 600 senators, more often in the Late Republic attendance for controversial 
debates was between 200 and 400 senators. Given that Gabinius’ proposed bill generated violently 
strong feelings among the Senate, it is likely that the number fell on the higher end of this range.86 
While members of the populace outside of the senate supported the proposal, many Senators 
viewed the arrogation of more power to Pompey as a step towards tyranny.87 The debate in the 
Curia quickly turned acrimonious. Soon, threats of violence gave way to the real thing, and an 
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undefined number of senators made a move on the tribune Gabinius, attacking him (#4). Dio states 
that the Senate “came near slaying Gabinius in the very senate-house, but he eluded them 
somehow.”88 Inside the Curia, with its narrow central aisle and benches filled with hundreds of 
senators, the threat to Gabinius’ life was legitimate. Senatorial groups had beaten the popular 
tribune Tiberius Gracchus to death with their wooden seats in 133, and if this group had cornered 
Gabinius, they may have done the same. Dio’s use of the word “somehow” registers appropriate 
surprise that Gabinius made it out of the filled building alive. There also may have been a few 
senators who offered Gabinius support, as the entire house was not opposed to the plan: A young 
C. Julius Caesar is described as supporting the proposal. Gabinius may have had other supporters 
that held off the mass of the house long enough for him to escape. Regardless, Gabinius escaped 
his attackers and fled out of the Curia’s main door.89 
Cassius Dio indicates that soon after the Senate’s rejection of the tribune’s proposal and 
their attempt to kill its proposer), a group of individuals waiting outside was informed of what had 
taken place. He writes, “when the people learned the feelings of the senators, they raised an 
uproar.”90 This immediacy should be interpreted literally, as the topography of the Western Forum 
allowed the information to spread quickly to those waiting elsewhere in the Forum for results of 
the debate. The attack on Gabinius, a supposedly sacrosanct tribune of the plebs, was a symbolic 
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affront to the plebs worth disseminating. Other listeners on the Senate’s porch—such as his 
tribunician colleagues—could have quickly announced it from the Rostra. Upon entering the 
Forum from the Curia, Gabinius could easily have rushed directly across the Comitium to mount 
the Rostra himself. From there, he could have announced the attack on his person—and the insult 
to the plebs that it constituted—to the assembled crowd waiting in front.91 A speaker’s vocal range 
from the Rostra into the Central Forum was limited by the bustle of the space’s daily economic 
and political life to a radius of 42 meters in front and 30 meters to the speaker’s side.92 However, 
3-D modeling work done by Christopher Johanson on sight lines demonstrates that a speaker on 
the Rostra would have been seen from almost anywhere in the Forum in the Late Republic.93 
Speakers frequently used dramatic gestures like waving their arms to communicate with 
individuals at the back of contiones. They were also known to have displayed visual aids and props 
such as paintings, spolia, imagines, mourning clothes, and—especially later in the 50s—weapons 
and wounds.94 In this case, Gabinius could have displayed any rips in his clothing or bodily wounds 
he may have received at the hands of his attackers in addition to any other gestures. The sight of a 
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supplanted spoken words. 
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bloody tribune, even if far-off, would have been an instant attention-grabber. Quickly, then, 
individuals throughout the Forum were informed of the violence at the Curia. 
The listeners in turn moved rapidly. Before the Senate even had time to move from where 
it was convened in the Curia, a crowd charged from various points in the Forum macross the 
Comitium to the Curia’s door. Dio describes a hurried scene: “When the people learned the feeling 
of the senators, they raised an uproar, even going so far as to rush upon them as they sat 
assembled.”95 Viewing the charging crowd through the entrance the Senators made for the door 
and literally ran for the hills, likely escaping out of the Forum via the nearby exits on the Capitoline 
Hill.96 The crowd seemed determined to do harm: “And if the senators had not gotten out of the 
way,” Dio continues, “they [the crowd] would certainly have killed them.”97 Although no sources 
describe the size of the group, it must have must have been large, or appeared that way, in order 
to cause the Senate to flee like it did. Unlike the Rostra, the Curia was not significantly elevated 
off of the Comitium, making the Senate’s position indefensible to an onrushing crowd. In the 
scrum outside of the Curia, the crowd managed to grab one of the senators—the Consul, C. 
Calpurnius Piso. Plutarch writes that the crowd nearly tore Piso to pieces, and Dio says that Piso 
“was about to perish” for the sins of his Senatorial colleagues.98 However, Gabinius, the instigator 
                                                
95 Dio 26.24.2. 
96 Coarelli, 2007, 52; Richardson, 1992, 234. Coarelli shows four exits to the Forum that would 
have been convenient as a crowd approached from the south-east central area: The Vicus 
Iugarius, which led south-west along the base of the Capitoline Hill towards to the Forum 
Holitorium (see also Coarelli 310-11); Richardson writes that the Clivus Capitolinus, the 
thoroughfare which climbed the Capitoline Hill toward the temple and precinct of Jupiter 
Optimus Maximus; The Scalae Gemoniae, which climbed the north-eastern side to the Capitoline 
to the Arx; and the Clivus Argentarius which ran along the northeast slope of the Capitoline hill 
behind the Curia . 
97 Dio 26.24.2. 
98 Dio 26.24.2; Plut. Pomp. 25.4. 
 52 
of the attack, begged that the crowd spare him. Calmed by the tribune, the crowd released Piso and 
dispersed.  
 This first incident reveals much about how the Curia functioned in the topography of the 
Western Forum. The Curia was a well-known and visible target. Importantly, Curia was very close 
to the rest of the topography in the Western Forum. There were no barriers between the central 
Forum and the Curia with the exception of the Rostra, which had to be circumnavigated, in the 
case of this crowd. The Curia could house up to 600 senators, but it is unlikely that all of them—
many of whom will have been old—were spry enough to escape a charging crowd. In the instance 
involving Gabinius, the senate barely had time to escape once they saw the crowd charging over 
from the Rostra. Especially if you were a politician who could organize large crowds, you could 
entrap the senate with ease. The following examples will show that once entrapped in their Curia, 
the senate was malleable to outside pressures. 
In 63, Gaius Julius Caesar was a rising popular star. He had gained early prominence and 
wide popularity among the plebs urbana by stressing his family connections to the famous 
popularis general Marius and providing enormous largess in the form of spending on games.99 
During the Catilinarian Crisis of 63, suspicion had fallen on Caesar as a potential conspirator after 
he gave a rousing speech in support of clemency for the captured conspirators.100 After the 
execution of the conspirators, Caesar was himself called to the Curia to testify regarding his alleged 
involvement in the conspiracy.101 Caesar’s summons must have caused his supporters some 
                                                
99 In particular, his funeral oration for Julia, Marius’ deceased wife and Caesar’s aunt, as well as 
his restoration of Marius’ victory trophies over the Cimbri on the Capitoline Hill, established his 
popular credentials and greatly increased his popularity. On his popular largess, see Plut. Caes. 8 
and Vanderbroeck, 1987, 222-3, 229-30. 
100 Plut. Caes. 7.4-9. 
101 Plut. Caes. 8. 
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agitation. Only days before, the other alleged conspirators had been executed without trial. As 
Caesar’s questioning in the Curia dragged on, a group of his supporters that had assembled in the 
Forum grew restless. Concerned that Caesar might be coming to some harm, the crowd “came up 
with loud cries and surrounded [περιέστη] the senate-house, demanding Caesar and ordering the 
senate to let him go.”102 Plutarch uses the Greek περιέστη for “surrounded” which also mean 
“encircle” or “station around,” as with a military force. The language suggests that the crowd was 
not only protesting outside the Curia, but had actually blocked the way in and out, trapping the 
Senators in until they decided to release Caesar (#19). As with the charging crowd in 67, the 
demonstration around the Curia seems to have significantly alarmed the Senate. Not only did they 
release Caesar, but Cato, that staunch supporter of the Senate’s primacy, introduced a bill for free 
grain distributions in order to further appease popular anger.103 As with Gabinius’ appeal to the 
crowd in 67, a large group of urban plebs had exploited the Senate’s immobility and closeness to 
the central Forum space.  
 One potential antidote to this problem of being cornered in the Curia was a change of 
venue. Of all the primary political functions of ancient Rome, the Senate was the only one that 
frequently changed its location. In addition to meeting in its ancestral house in the Western Forum, 
the Senate could meet officially in other spaces that were inaugurated templa.104 Throughout the 
late Republic, it met variety of temples and other halls designated “curia,” including the Temple 
of Concord in the Western Forum, The temple of Jupiter of Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline 
Hill, the Temple of Jupiter Stator, the Temples of Bellona and Apollo in the Campus Martius, and, 
                                                
102 Plut. Caes. 8.5.  
103 Plut. Cat. Min. 26.1 
104 Amy Russell, "The Definition of Public Space in Republican Rome" (University of 
California, Berkeley, 2011), 101.  
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after 55, the Curia hall built into the porticus surrounding the massive Theater of Pompey on the 
Campus Martius. There were different motivations for choosing these different sites. The Temples 
of Bellona and Apollo lay outside the pomerium, the city’s ritual boundary that a general with 
imperium could not pass, and the Senate often met there to receive victorious generals or enemy 
ambassadors.105 However, as R.D. Weigel argued, during the Late Republic the Senate’s mobility 
often derived from a desire for isolation from interfering crowds, so senators could debate without 
outside pressure. When he feared attack and assassination during the Catilinarian Conspiracy in 
63, Cicero summoned the Senate to meet in the Temple of Concord, which was higher up on the 
slope of the Capitoline Hill to the west of the Curia, or the Temple of Jupiter Stator, which was in 
the less accessible, building-packed residential region to the east of the Forum along the Sacra 
Via.106  
 The change of venue was not always effective. During the debate over whether to exile 
Cicero in 58, the senate met in the Temple of Concord, an imposing marble structure that sat on 
the slope of the Capitoline and overlooked the Forum. Built in 121 by Lucius Opimius, the 
patrician consul who had killed the popular Gaius Gracchus, it was suffused with connotations of 
state and senatorial power, and it was used as Senatorial stronghold during the Catilinarian 
conspiracy. However, in 58, it was shown to be just as vulnerable to outside pressure as the Curia 
down in the Forum. The Temple of Concord was only 80 meters from the Rostra and was clearly 
                                                
105 Richard D. Weigel, "Meetings of the Roman Senate on the Capitoline " L'Antiquité Classique 
55 (1986): 334-35; Coarelli, 2007, 271; Richardson, 1992, 57-8. 
106 Traditionally, scholars have placed the Temple of Jupiter Stator on a set of foundations near 
the Arch of Titus. However, Coarelli argues that the course of the Sacra Via in Republican times 
did not, as other scholars like Johanson imagine it, run to meet the Clivus Palatinus, but instead 
turned north around the area of the remains of the Basilica of Maxentius. Carandini disagrees 
with Coarelli’s assessment. However is important in all of this debate is that the Temple of 
Jupiter Stator was far from the Rostra and the Forum, where it would be less vulnerable to 
crowds and demonstrations.  
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visible from all over the Forum. As the Senate debated Cicero’s exile, two groups took advantage 
of their accessibility to stage demonstrations. Cicero, not one to go easily into the night, organized 
a crowd of supporters to protest the fact that his exile was even a question. The crowd was largely 
equestrian clients from the city and supporters from the municipal elite in the countryside. Their 
presence was designed to put pressure on the debating senators. However, shortly after Cicero’s 
crowd had assembled, a competing group arrived. They were the supporters of C. Clodius Pulcher, 
the aggressively popularis tribune of that year and the architect of the campaign to exile Cicero. 
In front of the steps of a temple ironically dedicated to the god of civil unity, Clodius’ and Cicero’s 
supporters broke into a massive brawl, the sounds and violence of which could not have been lost 
on senators debating within the temple’s cella (#29).107 Clodius’ group, apparently armed with 
rocks and a few swords, drove away Cicero’s band of supporters and ringed the area themselves, 
likely engaging in the sort of shouting protest that has been described above.  
 Clodius used the tactic of intimidating a cornered senate frequently, almost always with 
success. In December of 57, the Senate was debating when to set the upcoming elections and trials. 
Clodius had been accused de vi—for using violence, an eminently provable charge against him--
and was pushing for the elections to be held before the trials.108 If elected aedile for 56, he would 
have judicial immunity and the case would be dropped.109 During the crucial debate, the Senate 
was back in the Curia in the Forum. As senators within the Curia began moving from one side of 
the room to the other—an informal way of voting with their feet to show support for a speaker or 
proposal—Clodius began to loudly argue for postponing the trials. It appears that his speech was 
a signal, because at that moment, a loud shout came from just outside the senate door (#44). 
                                                
107 Cic. Dom. 54, Sest. 26, Pis. 23. 
108 Vanderbroeck, 1987, 252. 
109 Gruen, 1974, 442. 
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According to Cicero’s letter to his brother, Clodius had stationed a number of supporters on the 
Graecostasis, a wooden platform that stood to the right of the senate door along the Comitium, and 
on the steps of the Curia. The Graecostasis was so close to the open door that people standing 
outside on it could hear the Senatorial debates inside.110 When it seemed that the debate was going 
against Clodius, he indicated to his supporters to begin their shouting protestations.  
 As with previous instances, the sound of shouts from directly outside the Curia—this time, 
on its doorstep—spooked the senators. Cicero wrote to his brother Quintus, “At this sudden alarm 
we broke up with loud expressions of indignation on all sides.” The fact that all it took was one 
well-timed threatening burst of shouting from immediately outside to force the Senate to quickly 
adjourn indicates an immense skittishness about outside agitators. The senators, it seems, were 
easily intimidated. The tactic was effective, as the frazzled Senate decided to put off the issue. As 
Cicero wrote ruefully to his brother, “Here are the transactions of one day for you: the rest, I think 
will be put off to January.”111 
 Also in 57, Clodius staged a large-scale food riot designed to intimidate a cornered Senate. 
During the annual Ludi Romani, the annual festival held for Jupiter, the senate was meeting in the 
Temple of Concord. At the same time, Rome was going through the throes of a virulent grain 
shortage, leaving much of the urban plebs in distress.112 Clodius organized a hungry mob of 
plebeians to first charge a theater set up in the Western Forum, and then rush to the Temple of 
Concord to menace the senate (#40). The group was armed, and injured a consul who emerged 
from the temple’s cella in a vain attempt to quell the crowd.113 If few shouting protestors spooked 
                                                
110 Varro L. L. 5.155.  
111 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.1.3 
112 Jeffrey Tatum, The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
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the senators, an injured consul must have been a shock.  The next day, the Senate convened and 
hastily approved Pompey as commissioner of the grain supply in an attempt to placate the plebs’ 
fears and prevent another riot outside the senate building. In this instance, both Clodius and the 
plebs were able to get what they wanted: Clodius appeared as the plebs champion in helping 
pressure the senate into addressing the grain situation; the plebs, by using violence, forced the 
cornered senate to address their grievances.  
In 56, Clodius used a similar tactic to force the Senate into accepting Pompey and Crassus’ 
bids for second consulships. Many members of the senate opposed the attempt as a power grab by 
the members of the first triumvirate, which had reconciled with each other during the conference 
at Lucca earlier in 56.114 Following a bitter debate within the Senate which went against the former 
general, Clodius arrived with a large group of supporters to turn the tide. When he arrived, senators 
barred Clodius from entering the building. It also appears that the Senate had planned for Clodius’ 
arrival, and had installed a group of armed equestrians on the senate’s steps as protection. When 
the equestrians threatened to kill Clodius if he entered, Clodius called to the large crowd behind 
him for help. His supporters charged up the steps towards the door and attacked the equestrians. 
The steps around the senate must have been crowded in this inter-class free-for-all (#49). 
Somehow—the sources are silent on the matter—the riot ended down without significant injury.115 
As they retreated, Clodius’ supporters forebodingly threatened to burn down the Curia. Despite 
his inability to access the Curia itself, Clodius as usual got his way. The senate later voted to 
approve Pompey and Crassus’ consulships.  
                                                
114 Erich S Gruen, "Pomey, the Roman Aristocracy, and the Conference of Luca," Historia: 
Zietschrift fur Alte Geschitchte 18, no. 1 (1969): 95-96. 
115 Dio 39.27.3-29.3; Val. Max. 6.2.6. 
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This is not to suggest the senate was helpless or hapless when it came to preventing outside 
influence. There were times where it took advantage of a venue far enough from the forum to act 
without fear of Clodius’ organized protesters. When the senate wanted to approve a resolution 
supporting Cicero’s recall from exile in early 57, they held the meeting in the Temple of Jupiter 
Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline Hill. They met in the same location in September of the same 
year, the day after Clodius’ had led the food riot during the Ludi Romani. In both cases, it seems 
clear that they were seeking slightly more isolation and protection from the mobs that had harassed 
them previously on both issues.116 After the Curia was burnt down in 52 during the violence 
following Clodius’ murder on the Via Appia, the senate met on the Palatine hill, in one of the 
temples on the southwest corner.117 Compared to the Forum, which had been completely taken 
over by Clodius’ rioting supporters, the Palatine was a relative refuge. When a series of attacks on 
aristocratic homes on the Palatine later proved even that refuge to be unsafe, the Senate met in the 
Curia attached to the Theater of Pompey on the Campus Martius, where it could be guarded by 
Pompey’s soldiers.  
The Rostra: A Double-Edged Weapon 
 
The second area that political violence took place at in the Western Forum was the Rostra, 
the speaker’s platform. The Rostra was the city’s most public space, and a speaker who could 
command a crowd had immense political influence. This influence could also be used to visit 
violence on others. In the 60s and 50s, politicians used the Rostra as a weapon with which to 
humiliate, harass, and assault their political opponents, who they repeatedly hauled up onto the 
stand to face hostile crowds. Up on the Rostra, individuals were exposed and vulnerable to the 
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vicissitudes of the crowd. Because the Rostra was such a powerful tool for those who possessed 
it, violence was also used to keep others from opponents the Rostra.   
To start with the discussion of the Rostra, we return to Gabinius and his bill to give the 
Pirate commission to Pompey in 67, which caused violence in the Curia.118 In 67, following his 
near-lynching in the senate—and the crowd’s near lynching of the consul Piso—Gabinius put his 
bill to give the pirate commission to Pompey to a vote. Gabinius and his fellow nine tribunes had 
assembled a Comitia Plebis Tributa, a plebian tribal assembly, to vote on it.119 As Lily Ross 
Taylor’s pioneering study on Roman voting assemblies discovered, the Comitia Plebis Tributa—
along with the Comitia Tributa, the tribal assembly that included all citizens—often voted in the 
central space of the Forum directly in front of the Rostra—although there were other potential 
locations.120 Voting could also take place in the Area Capitolina at the stairs of the Temple of 
Jupiter, or on the stairs and tribunal at the Temple of Castor and Pollux in the Eastern end of the 
Forum.121 While none of the sources explicitly indicate that the Rostra was the tribunal for this 
assembly, it can be contextually inferred. The Rostra was, as Quinctius’ activity in the 70s 
demonstrated, the domain of the Tribunes. For a wildly popular proposal such as this, it was to 
Gabinius’ interest to hold the comitia in the most visible space possible. The Rostra, with its 
symbolic value and high-profile location, was a natural choice.  Furthermore, a quote from a speech 
of Cicero only a year later indicates the Rostra and the Central Forum was the comitia’s location. 
                                                
118 While Plutarch’s narrative immediately jumps to a description of the vote on Gabinius’ bill 
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 60 
Describing the comitia that ratified Gabinius’ proposal, Cicero describes the Western Forum as 
unbelievably crowded for the vote:  
When the whole Roman people, the forum being crowded, and all the adjacent temples 
from which this place [the tribunal] can be seen being completely filled,—the whole 
Roman people, I say, demanded Gnaeus Pompeius alone as their general in the war in 
which the common interests of all nations were at stake?122 
 
The mention of “adjacent temples” is particularly telling. The steps of the Temples of 
Concord and Saturn were close to the Rostra, respectively 98 and 90 meters away.123 More 
importantly, these temples had clear sight lines straight to the Rostra, making their steps and podia 
prime seating locations for the day’s entertainment.124 The sheer crowdedness of Cicero’s scene—
spectators climbing over buildings to get a view—is similar to scenes of what Kondratieff calls 
“super-contiones” with crowds cramming into and atop basilicas. At such contiones, these 
spectators’ goal was invariably to get a view of the Rostra, not the Temple of Castor and Pollux.125 
Gabinius then was officiating this Comitia Plebis Tributa from the Rostra, facing the central area 
of the Forum. Several meters below him, running along the Rostra’s curved front was laid out the 
legislative voting apparatus.126 As Amy Russell argues, the Rostra’s height was part of a symbolic 
process designed to encourage citizens to conform to “expected forms of behavior” when watching 
speeches or voting.127 A height of several meters in theory made it hard for spectators to physically 
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disrupt proceedings. It also was intended to psychologically engender respect. Russell writes 
writes that, “As [a citizen] stood on the ground and looked up to he Rostra,” he would have been 
acutely “aware of his position in the hierarchy vis-à-vis the speakers.”128 However, as Russell 
herself goes to argue, these psychological controls often failed. They did so tellingly during the 
voting on Gabinius’ bill.  
 
Figure 6: The Rostra (restored view after Gjerstad) from  Amy Russell, The Politics of Public 
Space in Republican Rome, 63. 
As the voting was about to begin, a number of co-tribunes stood beside Gabinius on the 
Rostra.129 One, Lucius Trebellius, had been convinced by the senate to oppose the law. Trebellius 
                                                
128 Ibid. 
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interposed his tribunician veto by uttering the word intercedo, and brought the proceeding crashing 
to a halt.130 Gabinius was furious, and a large amount of the crowd clogging the Western Forum 
likely felt the same. With temple podia crowded with supporters and all eyes on him, Gabinius 
had to respond assertively or suffer a massive loss of face on an extremely public stage. Infuriated 
by his colleague’s veto, he immediately re-ordered the comitia to vote not on his own law, but on 
whether or not Trebellius should be deprived of his office. Despite the clogged Forum, the change 
seems to have been adopted quickly and orderly, as Asconius and Dio report that the tribes began 
immediately voting on Trebellius’ fate. Trebellius initially persisted in his veto. However, tribe 
after tribe the same result was returned to the Forum—yes for deposition. After the 17th tribe voted 
for deposition, a tense Trebellius grudgingly rescinded his veto before the 18th could vote and 
make it a majority.131 Gabinius quickly re-organized the comitia yet again to resume voting on the 
original question, the pirate commission. The ease with which Gabinius did so—the sources 
provide no narrative break between the original vote, the deposition, and the return to the original 
vote—suggests rapt attention to Gabinius’ directions as the presiding magistrate, despite the 
Forum’s acoustic imperfections. It also suggests the role of other tribunes, tribal officials, and 
lower magistrates—who themselves were in hearing distance—in organizing the activity of the 
comitia taking place at his feet.132 
                                                
legislation depicts a scribe—to hold the text of the law—and a herald—to read the law—also 
present on the stand, plus the Consul C. Piso. The scribe and herald should be understood to be 
on the Rostra this day also. 
130 Asc. 72C; Dio 36.30.1. 
131 Asc. 72; Dio 36.30.2. Dio writes that Trebellius maintained his silence “with difficulty.” 
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Wary of Trebellius’ fate, most of the other tribunes stayed quiet. However, one named 
Lucius Roscius Otho was still determined to make his opposition to the law known. At first, he 
attempted to speak in opposition, but when he came forward to speak, “no one would listen to 
him.”133 The spectators and voters, supportive of the law, had no time for further interruptions. 
When Roscius attempted to persist in his opposition, raising two fingers to indicate a division of 
the command, the Forum erupted explosively (#5). It is clear that Roscius’ hand gesture was seen 
by watchers throughout the Forum. Responding in anger, “the crowd gave a great threatening 
shout” that was apparently of such vitriol and such volume, that Plutarch and Dio both report that 
“a raven flying over the Forum was stunned by it and fell down into the throng.”134 Roscius, 
threatened by the violence of the crowd’s reaction, “kept quiet not only with his tongue but with 
his hand as well.”135 Alerted by a visible hand signal, spectators throughout the Forum, many of 
them likely plebeians, exploded in rage that their will was being disrespected by their own tribune. 
Although no official number is given, Cicero’s description above indicates that the crowd in the 
Forum was large enough to be impressively—if not fatally—loud. Although the anecdote about 
the bird is doubtful, Plutarch’s description of “surge and billow in the air” raised by the crowd is 
a realistic description that could just as well apply to a crowd in a packed football stadium 
screaming threateningly at an opposing team. Exposed to the open air, surrounded by a mass of 
voting citizens only meters below and spectators all around, Roscius will have felt accordingly 
vulnerable and threatened. The Rostra’s stairs were easily accessible, and could have been 
mounted by spectators if passions had demanded it. The figure below is modeling by Christopher 
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Johanson of a mid-Republican funeral oration which envisions the Forum as packed as it was for 
the vote on Gabinius’ bill. It is a view of the Rostra and the Curia from alongside the Basilica 
Aemilia, and models the Western Forum at its maximum viewing capacity. If we replace the orator 
on the Rostra (the black figure) with Roscius, then the Rostra looks like an incredibly isolated 
island in the center of a sea of angry opposition. Roscius’ concern becomes more convincing.  
 
Figure 7: Looking west, the Western Forum at maximum viewing capacity, highlighting the Rostra and 
Comitium space. Visible behind the Rostra from right to left are the Curia, the Basilica Porica, the Carcer, and 
the Temple of Concord. In Christopher Johanson, Spectacle in the Forum, p. 136. 
 
The episode is telling about both the power and the vulnerability inherent in the Rostra as 
a political tool. As the presiding tribune with a supportive crowd, Gabinius was able to use his 
dominant and central position to communicate his orders and yoke the comitia proceedings to his 
will. On the other hand, Roscius, advocating an unpopular position with little support, was 
vulnerable to the noise and ill-concealed rage of the crowd. Although physically protected for the 
moment by the Rostra’s elevation, Roscius was also fully exposed and unprotected. Fear of the 
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crowd, even when on the Rostra, was an important motivating factor, and Roscius’ actions showed 
that sound in addition to physical roughhousing could act as effective political violence. 
Furthermore, as following examples will show, height was no guarantee of protection from 
political violence. 
Intimidation could give way to harrowing physical attack easily on the Rostra, as an 
attempted vote in 67 illustrates. Another tribune, Gaius Cornelius, had promulgated a law that 
aroused fierce senatorial opposition.136 When the day came to vote on the exemption law, the scene 
was almost exactly the same as that of Gabinius’ law. The Comitia Plebis Tributa stood assembled 
in front of the Rostra and voters waited with their tribes to be called to vote. A significant amount 
of people stood on the Rostra. As the presiding magistrate, Cornelius would have been standing 
on or sitting near his wooden tribunal stand, Standing nearby were other members of the tribunician 
college as well the consul C. Piso, who was attended by his lictors, bearing the fasces.137 Proximate 
to Cornelius, a scribe stood holding the codex containing the law’s text. Next to him stood a 
praeco, an official herald or crier, whose role it was to read the law.138 The scribe handed the codex 
to the herald, who began to read it. However, almost immediately, another cry of intercedo rang 
out. As Asconius records, senatorial opponents had once again convinced a tribune to veto the 
                                                
136 Asc. 57C; Miriam Griffin, "The Tribune C. Cornelius," The Journal of Roman Studies 63 
(1973): 208-09. Gabinius’ bill prohibited the Senate from providing solutio—the granting to an 
individual exemption from a law’s obligation—without being ratified by a legislative assembly 
of the plebs. According to Asconius, the Senate in ancient times had, if exempting an individual 
via decree, referred such decrees to the people for perfunctory ratification. However, by 
Cornelius’ time, such referrals  had long been abandoned and ceased to be a political issue.136 In 
resurrecting the issue, Cornelius sought to reduce the Senate’s power by re-inserting the popular 
assemblies into its decision-making process. 
137 Asc. 58C; Dio 36.39.1-4. 
138 A. W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 46, also n. 28. 
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proposal. All eyes turned to the tribune P. Servilius Globulus, who refused to allow the herald to 
continue to read the bill.139 Yet another vote ground to a halt. 
Facing the same predicament as Gabinius, Cornelius did not bother with the elaborate 
procedure of deposition. Instead, he simply ripped the codex out of Globulus’ hand and proceeded 
to read the law from where the herald had left off. The consul Piso, still present on the stand, was 
indignant. Interrupting Cornelius’ reading, he shouted at both Cornelius and the assembled citizens 
watching the escalating drama unfold above their heads that Cornelius’ act was an illegal 
subversion of the tribunician right to veto laws. Piso’s vehemence was met, as was Trebellius and 
Roscius’ opposition, “with a torrent of abuse from the people” and “a great uproar” from the 
assembly.140 Asconius writes that a number of people in the crowd were “shaking their fists at 
him,” suggesting a threatening intent.141 
This is where events take a more violent path than Gabinius’ legislation. Unintimidated by 
the angry roars of the crowd, Piso ordered his lictors to descend into the crowd to arrest those 
shaking their fists at him. Piso’s twelve lictors descended the Rostra to ground level to arrest the 
men. 142 Almost immediately, the shouting match escalated into a physical conflict. Members of 
                                                
139 Asc. 58C; Dio 36.39.1-4. Asconius and Dio’s accounts here vary in multiple respects. 
Asconius provides a clear sequence: Cornelius introduced legislation against provincial 
corruption; The Senate frustrated it; Cornelius introduced the law on exemptions and held a 
legislative assembly. Dio does not mention the provincial loan-shark law, and states that the 
subsequent violence was primarily over electoral regulations, not the exemption law. Griffin, 
1973, 192-203, notes that Dio’s account presents “obstacles to belief” due to a number of logical 
errors. She asserts that Asconius, who had access to Cicero’s speeches, letters, biography, and 
other accounts when writing the commentary on Pro Cornelio, presents a much clearer and more 
credible account of events. 
140 Asc. 58C; Dio 36.39.3. Here, Asconius and Dio’s sources align again, and describe the 
subsequent attack on Piso in similar language, albeit with more detail provided by Asconius. 
141 Asc. 58C.  
142 Liv. 2.55.3; Wilfred Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 13. Twenty-four lictors in total attended the Consuls in the early 
Republic, twelve for each consul. 
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the crowd overpowered the lictors and snapped their fasces, the bundled wooden rods with axe-
heads that symbolized the consul’s imperium.143 At the same time, the crowd turned its ire to Piso, 
still on the Rostra. Picking up stones from the Forum ground around them, members of the crowd 
made Piso the subject of target practice (#6).144 It is unclear how many individuals participated in 
the stoning. Asconius writes that “stones were hurled at the consul even from the furthest fringe 
of the contio,” suggesting that there were throwers all the way in the back of the crowd. 
Vanderbroeck reads this “even” as a qualifying adverb and accordingly limits the throwers to have 
only been a small group in the back of the crowd.145 Vanderbroeck suggests that “it is possible that 
an organized small group was responsible for the escalation of violence, since Asconius mentions 
that not the entire assembly threw stones at Piso.”146 For the purposes of his collective action 
model, Vanderbroeck is interested in demonstrating that the stone-throwing may have been 
organized by a smaller group operating from the edge of the crowd, potentially directed by 
Cornelius himself. If so, this event provides an illustrative example of how an assembly could be 
undermined by a small group of people on the sidelines with (literally) well-targeted action. 
However, the Latin for “even” is etiam, which can be defined as “likewise,” “furthermore,” “and 
also,” and “and even.” All these definitions connote an addition of sorts, and Asconius’ etiam 
could be taken to mean that stones were hurled throughout the crowd and also from the furthest 
                                                
143 Asc. 58C; Dio 36.39.3; Nippel, 1995, 13. 
144 It is unclear how many individuals participated in the stoning. Vanderbroeck suggests that “it 
is possible that an organized small group was responsible for the escalation of violence, since 
Asconius mentions that not the entire assembly threw stones at Piso. If so, this event provides an 
illustrative example of how an assembly could be undermined by a small group of people on the 
sidelines with (literally) well-targeted action.  
145 Vanderbroeck, 1987, 225. 
146 Ibid. 
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fringe of the contio. Either way, the impact would have been similar.147 Apart from some memorial 
statuary, the Rostra offered little protection to a speaker.148 Lictor-less and exposed multiple meters 
up on the Rostra, Piso was an easy target for projectiles from anywhere in the crowd.  
Pelted by stones, Piso may have retreated from the Rostra. Apart from some memorial 
statuary, the Rostra offered no protection to a speaker.149 Dio records that “the crowd…threatened 
to tear him limb from limb,” similar to the language he and Plutarch used to describe Piso’s near-
lynching outside the Curia.150 Having attempted to kill the consul once, the members of the crowd 
may have been comfortable attacking him again. As he descended the stairs down the back of the 
Rostra, members of the crowd could have easily come around the stand and intercepted him. This 
is not to suggest Piso was entirely alone. As consul, he would have been defended by the retinue 
of friends and clients that unceasingly followed the officials around. Though seeing as the crowd 
quickly dispatched his lictors, he may have been in serious danger.   
Before any real harm could come to Piso, Asconius writes that Cornelius dismissed the 
comitia.151 Dio leaves Cornelius’ intentions as to the violence in question, saying only that 
“Cornelius, accordingly, seeing their violence, dismissed the assembly for the time being before 
calling for any vote.”152 Asconius, ascribing to Cornelius good intentions, writes, “Cornelius, 
greatly concerned at this disorder, dismissed the concilium forthwith.”153 Asconius’ goodwill 
                                                
147 Both interpretations support the claim that Piso was on the Rostra. If he was on the ground at 
the front of the crowd, or somewhere in the middle of it, it would have been difficult for throwers 
at the furthest edge of the crowd at the same elevation to get a clear shot. However, Piso on the 
Rostra was an easy target no matter where in the crowd the thrower stood. 
148 Richardson, 1992, 174. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Dio 36.39.3.  
151 Asc. 58C; Dio 36.39.4. 
152 Dio 36.39.4. 
153 Asc. 58C. 
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towards the tribune is likely as a result of his sources—it was probably the view Cicero took in his 
own defense of Cornelius. Both sources report that later, Cornelius passed a slightly moderate 
version of the bill, this time with Senatorial approval. If we consider, as Dio implies and 
Vanderbroeck suggests, that a small group potentially associated with Cornelius used the stoning 
to purposefully disrupt the assembly when events started going against him, it offers a chilling 
demonstration of a cunning tribune exploiting political topography, crowd behavior, and 
projectiles to sabotage political processes and force the Senate to compromise. Alternatively, if we 
take Asconius’ account to be true and Cornelius’ concern to be genuine, the episode offers an 
equally chilling demonstration of how quickly and easily a determined crowd could wrest control 
of political processes and spaces from exposed and outnumbered magistrates. The Rostra as a 
political space, as this episode shows, had a number of vulnerabilities that made conducting normal 
governmental actions volatile and potentially dangerous, but also politically beneficial if one could 
control the crowd.  
These two examples viscerally demonstrate how the Rostra could be used as a weapon to 
humiliate, pressure, and even injure political opponents. Henrik Mouritsen’s conclusions on the 
nature of contiones in the Late Republic are particularly illuminating in light of the evidence 
presented above: 
Contiones called ad hoc seem to have been one-sided, organized events—masquerading as 
the assembled Roman people. The 'staged' character of the meetings offered magistrates an 
opportunity to pressurise and embarrass political opponents in public. An invitation to a 
hostile contio was a 'no-win' situation for the politician in question. Ignoring a challenge 
from a magistrate could be used against oneself...attending however, meant that one had to 
face a hostile crowd organized by an opponent who could thus attack from a much stronger 
position, supported by their shouts and jeers.154 
 
                                                
154Henrik Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 53. 
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The first example, in which Gabinius successively intimidated Trebellius and Roscius, has 
the feeling of a drama in which Gabinius—because he controls the crowd—controlled the action. 
The second example also falls under Mouritsen’s definition of “staged,” if we assume that 
Cornelius had organized the stone-throwing himself. Between 67 and 52, politicians popularis 
bases of support in particular relentlessly exploited the Rostra as a site from which to expose their 
opponents to intimidation and harm.  
In 67, Cornelius and Gabinius dragged Piso up on the Rostra yet again (#7). This time, it 
was to compel him to publicly support the consular candidacy of another popularis and ally of 
Pompey, M. Lollius Palicanus. Valerius Maximus writes that up on the Rostra, Cornelius and 
Gabinius “harassed” Piso and “from all sides pestered him” with questions and “terrible threats.”155 
Their rapid-fire questioning likely elicited the excitement and anger of the crowd, which had 
proved to be receptive to their pronouncements in the past.156 Both understood very keenly that 
atop the Rostra with the two of them, with an angry crowd below, Piso was vulnerable. By forcing 
him to appear on the Rostra, Gabinius and Cornelius drew on their past experiences and tried to 
use the intimidating topography of the Rostra to bludgeon Piso into submission. 
A similar type of public bludgeoning—this time, in a physical sense—took place in 62. In 
the wake of the Catilinarian Conspiracy, Cicero and his senatorial allies used the remnants of the 
initial hysteria to conduct a wave of prosecutions against both actual participants in the conspiracy, 
                                                
155 Val. Max. 3.8.3.  
156 Maximus presents some liabilities as a source. First, his personal biases are clearly against the 
two tribunes—he describes the episode as “pitiful and shameful,” and praises Piso’s bravery. 
Secondly, he is a collector of rhetorical anecdotes has an interest in sensationalizing the tribunes’ 
conduct, as the episode is included in his book of rhetorical anecdotes to provide an example of 
Piso’s determination in the face of harassment. Even if exaggerated though, Maximus’ story 
further demonstrates the use of the Rostra as a political tool. Both Gabinius and Cornelius knew 
how to elicit roars and threats from a crowd, and Piso was a favorite target of theirs.  
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and old rivals within the aristocracy they wanted out of the way.157 During these prosecutions, an 
informant of ill-repute named Lucius Vettius alleged that Caesar had been involved in the 
conspiracy.158 Caesar had no desire to see his nascent career stopped by a lowly informant. In his 
capacity as praetor, Caesar confiscated Vettius’ property and ordered him jailed.159 However, 
before throwing him in the Carcer, Caesar wanted to ensure that Vettius’ credibility was crushed 
in the most public of ways. According to Suetonius, while he was on his way to the prison, Vettius 
was presented to an assembled crowd in the Forum on top of the Rostra. Although Suetonius’ 
narrative does not specify who put Vettius up on the Rostra, it is likely that Caesar or one of his 
agents allowed Vettius to speak. Up on the Rostra “Vettius…was handled very roughly in a contio 
before the Rostra and nearly torn apart” (#62).160 Suetonius’s description of Vettius as almost 
                                                
157 For a clear and cogent discussion of the post-Catilinarian wave of prosecutions, see Gruen, 
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followed in William McDermott, "Vettius Ille, Ille Noster Index," Transactions and Proceedings 
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Catilinarian Conspiracy. When Cicero discovered the Conspiracy, McDermott alleges Caesar 
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“exposing” a conspiracy against Pompey. However, Gruen denies that Vettius was working for 
Caesar in 62 or 59. However, it is unlikely that Caesar would have allowed Vettius to appear on 
the the Rostra and denounce him immediately after his goods were confiscated and immediately 
before he was thrown into prison unless Caesar stood to gain from it. Additionally, Vettius was 
later released from prison with little fanfare, and he reappears at large in 59 when is is seen 
serving Caesar’s purposes by accusing Caesar’s opponents of a conspiracy against Pompey (Cic. 
Att. 2.24, Vat. 24-26, Sest. 132).  
159 Suetonius, Jul. 17  
160 Suet. Jul. 17.  
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mangled seems hyperbolic, particularly as he does not describe anyone coming around the Rostra 
and climbing the stairs to reach Vettius. However, as we have seen above, perceived attacks on 
leaders popular with the plebs urbana—such as Pompey, Caesar, and their allies—provoked a 
ferocious response. It is not surprising that those same supporters would have been just as vicious 
to a lowly informer. They may have thrown rocks as they had at Piso in 67, or attempted to grab 
Vettius as he was on his way up or down from the platform.  
 Vettius’ appearance on the Rostra is a good example of a “staged” contio. If Gruen is 
correct, and Vettius was indeed hired by Caesar’s opponents Q. Catulus and Cn. Piso to disgrace 
him, then Vettius’ treatment sent a violent signal to Caesar’s opponents in the aristocracy. If Q. 
Catulus or Cn. Piso were watching, they could easily imagine themselves in Vettius’ shoes could 
be them the next time they spoke from the Rostra. If we accept McDermott’s assumption that 
Vettius was Caesar’s agent, Vettius’ appearance on the Rostra is evidence of minutely calculated 
stage-management, with the Rostra as the intended performance space. Furthermore, regardless of 
Caesar’s intentions, the event also allowed Caesar’s supporters, many of them members of the 
plebs urbana, to send a potent message to all involved in Roman politics: if you touch our popular 
heroes, there will be consequences. A similar scene ensued when a young budding politician, C. 
Porcius Cato, announced from the Rostra his intention to try Gabinius for corruption in 59. In the 
same speech, he made the mistake of referring to the wildly popular Pompey as a tyrant. Cicero 
wrote dryly to his brother “[Cato] mounted the Rostra in a public meeting and called Pompey an 
‘unofficial dictator.’ No one ever had a narrower escape of being killed” (#26).161  
When Clodius wanted to prosecute his archrival Milo in 56, he did in not in the Praetor’s 
court in the Eastern Forum, but instead held a iudicium populi, a judicial assembly on the Rostra, 
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decided by the comitia plebis tributa. The reason? “An aedilician iudicium populi held out the 
prospect of grand political drama, whose consequences…could hope to be shaming if not 
downright tragic for Milo.”162 On the day of the trial, Clodius stacked the audience with his own 
supporters whom he had taught a set of chants in advance. When Pompey arrived came to testify 
on Milo’s defense, Clodius began using call-and-response chants to insult humiliate the general.163 
This time though, Clodius’ opponents hoped to prevent potential humiliation and violence by 
stacking the audience in front of the Rostra with their own supporters. Milo’s personally organized 
gang of gladiators and clients were present, and once the chanting started, tensons flared up 
between the two groups until a scuffle broke out. A few of Milo’s men ran around and forcibly 
ended Clodius’s humiliation of Pompey only by tackling Clodius off of the Rostra and knocking 
him onto the ground (#45).164  
 The finale of Milo’s trial demonstrates the reverse to the Rostra’s use as a weapon. Just as 
politicians endeavored to force their enemies up to the Rostra to shame or attack them, it was also 
important to prevent opponents from reaching the Rostra. A strong speaker who could capture the 
attention of the crowd could do considerable political damage to his opponents, as the previous 
events have demonstrated. In the 50s in particular, violence was used specifically to prevent 
indivdiuals from mounting the Rostra.  
In 55, Cato the Younger, who had filibustered the passage of Lex Trebonia de provinciis 
consularibus for over two hours, was physically dragged backwards down the steps of the Rostra 
and into the Comitium by the lictor of the tribune Trebonius, who proposed the bill and wanted it 
passed (#55). Once off the Rostra, Cato continued speaking to the men lined up to vote alongside 
                                                
162 Tatum, 1999. 
163 Dio 39.18-19; Plut. Pomp. 48.7; Cic. Fam. 1.5b.1. 
164 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.3.2. 
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the stand, so the lictor “once more laid hands on him, led him away, and put him out of the 
Forum.”165 Likely the lictor dragged him towards the nearest exits on the Argiletum or the Clivus 
Argentarius. However, Cato wriggled free and dashed back towards the Rostra and attempted to 
mount it again before being caught by other lictors and hauled off.166 Plutarch reports that this was 
repeated several times until Trebonius finally lost his temper and ordered Cato dragged off to the 
Carcer to be temporarily imprisoned.167 Two years later, Cato was attacked again attempting to 
mount the Rostra. He had proposed in the senate what amounted to a campaign finance reporting 
law in the wake of massive bribery during the elections for the consulship of 53. In retaliation, a 
crowd of supporters of the targeted consular candidates attacked him as he was making his way 
across the Forum to the Rostra, pelting him with rocks and other projectiles (#58). He apparently 
made his way back to the Rostra only by grabbing hold of one of the ships’ prows that stuck off it 
and clambered up to the platform. Once up on the platform, Plutarch writes that Cato was able to 
bring the disturbance completely to an end with his oratory.168 While likely an exaggeration of 
Cato’s oratorical powers, the comment does indicate that once a politician was able to make it up 
on the Rostra, the height and symbolism of the stand lent him immense influence.  
 The final instance of violence around the Rostra demonstrates what happened when these 
two approaches to the Rostra—use it as a staged political tool, or keep your enemies off it—
collided. After Milo murdered Clodius on the Via Appia, he returned to Rome in secret and began 
bribing individuals among the tribes. 169A few days later, Milo and the tribune M. Caelius held a 
contio in which the only attendees were bribed slaves and plebs from the countryside. Caelius 
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made a dramatic show of professing Milo’s innocence, and demanded that the assembled crowd 
act as the populus Romanus and declare Milo innocent in a iudicium populi on the spot.170 Despite 
the almost farcical nature of Caelius’ production staged production, pleading their case from the 
Rostra in front of a supportive crowd threatened to have a powerful public impact in Milo’s favor. 
However, the late Clodius’s supporters were unwilling to give Milo any chance to plead his case 
in an unbiased court. The other tribunes for the year burst into the Forum along with a huge crowd 
and attacked Milo (#67). They killed a number of Milo and Caelius’ supporters, and  forced the 
two to dress as their own slaves in order to escape.171  
Brawls in the Saepta: Controlling Space during Legislative Assemblies 
 
Closely related to violence on the Rostra was violence during legislative assemblies. Unlike 
the Senate, which deliberated within the four walls of a building, the assemblies took place in the 
open air. These processes were both time-intensive and equipment intensive. Although this chapter 
already discussed an instance of violence at a legislative assembly—the stoning of Piso during the 
passage of Gabinius’ law (#5)—the violence in that instance was directed at the magistrate. 
However, violence at legislative assemblies was focused on control of the physical voting 
apparatus. Since comitia play a large role in political violence both in this and in later chapters, it 
is important to explain the physical nature of the voting process. Lily Ross Taylor’s reconstruction 
of tribal assembly legislative procedure is as follows: Rome’s voters were divided into thirty-five 
tribes, artificial divisions created for the legislative process. When it came time to vote, citizens 
assembled into their thirty-five tribal divisions and waited in front of the Rostra, cordoned off from 
each other by means of ropes. The first tribe to vote was selected by lot; afterwards, the tribes were 
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summoned successively.172 Once his tribe was called, a voter would walk single-file down one of 
two roped-off lines, called the saepta. At the end of the column, he mounted the pons, a wooden 
plank which led up to a wooden platform a few feet high. The platform contained the cistae, the 
wicker baskets that served as ballots. If the voting was taking place in front of the Rostra, this 
platform was attached alongside the Rostra’s front so the presiding magistrate could sit up above 
the cistae and ensure the proper procedure was followed. 173  Before he reached the pons, a voter 
was handed a wax tablet by the custodes, an election official. On the tablet he would write a V to 
approve legislation or an A to reject it. Walking up the pons, he placed his tablet in the basket and 
descended the apparatus on the other side.174 If the assembly was taking place at the Rostra,  as 
voter placed his ballot, he would have walked under or near the Rostra’s “beaks,” the captured 
ships’ prows that stuck out from the edifice and gave it its name.  
Legislative assemblies, as Taylor’s reconstruction makes clear, were predicated on an 
orderly physical process. The voter was expected to wait patiently with his tribe, walk single file 
through the saepta, and take and deposit his ballot without and interruption. However, because the 
materials used in the comitiae were so fragile—ropes, wooden posts, wicker baskets—they were 
particularly susceptible to violence. Individuals who wanted to disrupt the legislative process could 
direct their ire at the magistrates, as happened during Cornelius’ legislation in 67. Or, perhaps 
easier and more simpler, they could physically destroy the apparatus used for voting. This final 
section will examine three instances of legislative violence in the Western Forum that provide 
different examples the topographical relationships involved in the disruption of a legislative 
assembly.   
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In 67, the much-beleaguered consul Calpurnius Piso proposed a law against electoral 
bribery at the behest of the Senate, and held a Comitia Tributa for its passage in the Forum. 
According to Asconius, the legislation laid harsh penalties on the divisores, “bribe-distributors,” 
for electoral bribery.175 Initially reputable officials who ensured voter turnout among Rome’s 
thirty-five legislative tribes by distributing largess from wealthy patrons, the divisores had become 
middlemen for individual candidates’ electoral bribery by the late Republic.176 Although 
effectively middlemen for acceptable patronage and then unacceptable bribery, the divisor for each 
tribe had an established and public role “in that everyone knew who they were and they had a 
specific relationship to a particular tribe.”177 The law thus threatened their social standing among 
their tribes as well as their increasingly central role in electoral politics. They did not take the threat 
lightly. 
When the day came to pass the law, Piso, attended by his lictors and his retinue was 
officiating the Comitia Tributa within the Forum. A crowd of voters, separated into their thirty-
five tribes, was assembled below him. Some were beginning to walk down the roped-off saepta 
and place their ballots in the baskets. However, during the middle of the voting process, Asconius 
writes that Piso was forcibly ejected from the voting area by a large group of divisores.178 How 
Piso’s ejection took place is unclear. Perhaps, as an interest group aware of each others’ identities 
with a recent history of having been assembled together,179 the divisores had planned their attack 
                                                
175 Asc. 74-75C. 
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in advance. It is also unknown how many divisores there were per tribe. Rome’s tribes were large, 
and may have required multiple divisores to effectively mobilize voter turnout. Regardless of the 
actual number of divisores, they likely had help in disrupting the voting process. As middlemen of 
significant social standing whose profession was to mobilize voter activity, they were likely to 
have adherents and attendants within their own tribe who would have assisted them in disrupting 
the assembly.180 Even if the divisores amounted to only thirty-five, that multiplied by at the least 
two personal clients would have been more than a match for Piso’s twelve lictors and personal 
retinue.  
How did the divisores disrupt the voting process? The form of violence is also not specified 
in Asconius. However, another disrupted legislative assembly in 61 may provide some answers. 
In 61, P. Clodius been indicted on a charge of incestum for multiple offenses of a scandalous 
nature, including violating the rites of the female-only Bona Dea festival, adultery with Caesar’s 
wife, and alleged incest with his sister.181 Clodius’ opponents wanted to ensure a conviction, and 
proposed a law regulating the selection of the jury that was intended to make a conviction more 
likely. Clodius, who had no desire to see his nascent career cut short, used carefully planned 
violence to disrupt the assembly. On the day of the comitia, a crowd of Clodius’ supporters arrived 
separately from the rest of the assembled voters in front of the Rostra and began shouting to their 
fellow citizens to vote against the proposal. When that failed, Clodius opted for physical 
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intervention. Cicero writes that Clodius’ supporters actually forced their way under the ropes 
dividing the lines of voters from the rest of the Forum, and blocked the paths of the voters. Standing 
on the front of the pontes, they took over the job of ballot distribution and ensured that only ballots 
with “A” were distributed. Cato, seeing the spectacular illegality of what was taking place, rushed 
up to the Rostra and with a few other magistrates, dissolved the comitia.182  
It is likely that something of the sort was taking place in 67, when Piso confronted the 
divisores. Given that the divisores were tribal election officials, they may have already been there 
at the start of the comitia, ostensibly serving as extra support staff, at which point they could have 
infiltrated the saepta.  However, seeing as Asconius describes them forcing Piso out of the voting 
area with vis, some sort of aggressive violence must be posited. Perhaps they threw stones to force 
Piso off the Rostra, or began ripping up ropes, posts, and baskets of the voting apparatus to prevent 
any vote from happening., Evidently, Piso realized that he needed some backup. With his retinue 
trailing behind him, he fled the Forum eastward. He ascended the Sacred Way and disappeared in 
the narrow street dwarfed by senatorial villas. The divisores, for the moment, had won. However, 
their victory was only temporary. For not long after he disappeared up the street, Piso reappeared 
striding down the Sacred Way.183. Asconius writes that Piso “had come down [descenderat] with 
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183 I derive Piso’s point of exit and entry into the Forum from a single word in Asconius’ 
account, descenderat. He writes that Piso maiore manu stipatus ad legem perferendam 
descenderat, “had come down with a larger band of men about him to secure the passage of the 
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could have “come down” through—including the Clivus Capitolinus, the Scalae Gemoniae, the 
Clivus Argentarius, and the Argiletum—few would have yielded him as immediate a group of 
supporters.  
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a larger band of men about him to secure the passage of the law.”184 Entering the Forum, Piso 
marched his now-swollen retinue west across the Forum over to the crowd assembled before the 
Rostra and engaged the divsores in battle. According to Asconius, Piso’s group was larger, and 
thus able to force the divisores out of the Forum. Subsequently, the assembly resumed and the law 
was passed.185  
This episode demonstrates first and foremost that an organized group with an interest in 
preventing the passage of certain legislation could physically take control of the voting apparatus 
in an attempt to prevent its passage. However, it also shows that topographical limitations provided 
magistrates an opportunity to adequately respond. Piso was able to leave the Forum, issue a call 
for emergency support, organize that support, and return down into the Forum to find the the 
assembly still voting. How long did all of this take? Henrik Mouritsen’s calculations on the length 
of legislative comitiae sheds light on these circumstances. According to Mouritsen, a 3,000-person 
legislative assembly taking place in the Forum would have taken six and a half hours for all 3,000 
participants and thirty-five tribes to vote. As most assemblies held less than that number, the time 
would have taken shorter.186 Following the logic of a multi-hour voting process, Piso would have 
had some time to publicize his supporters before the comitia concluded, and the events described 
not be pictured as so rushed. However, the immediacy with which Asconius’ narrative 
characterizes Piso’s turnaround is also realistic. Piso was the magistrate presiding over an 
assembly passing an important law with his name on it. Any minute off of the Rostra and outside 
of the Forum posed a political loss of face and the opportunity for a tribe’s votes to be influenced. 
                                                
184 Asc. 76C. 
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186 Mouritsen, 2001, 23. Where Ramsay MacMullen posited that 20,000 citizens could vote in 
the space in front of the Temple of Castor, Mouritsen demonstrates that a maximum of even 
10,000 is unrealistic, and most assemblies would have even involved below 3,000 voters.  
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Given the fragility of the voting apparatus—consisting of wooden stands, ropes, and wicker 
baskets—the divisores could have been expected to demolish it quickly. The close topography of 
the Forum—the Rostra was less than 300 meters from the Sacred Way—allowed Piso to exit and 
re-enter with rapidity, picking up a large group of supporters in the process. While Mouritsen’s 
calculations demonstrate that assemblies could be vulnerable to violence for multiple hours, the 
logic of Asconius’ account suggests that Piso allowed little of those hours to elapse.  
This chapter will examine one more instance of legislative violence in the Western Forum. 
The previous examples of Piso and the Bona Dea trial legislation demonstrated the extent to which 
the voting apparatus, located in the open in the Forum, could be penetrated and tampered with. In 
67, a tribune named Gaius Manilius attempted to rectify this vulnerability in attempting to pass his 
own legislation. Late in 66 Manilius introduced a law which would have distributed the vote of 
Rome’s freedmen to the tribe of the person that had manumitted them, thus increasing an individual 
freedman’s voting power.187 The law was unpopular among the plebs and opposed by the 
aristocracy, and lacked the support to pass in an assembly.188 Manilius knew that too many would 
turn out to oppose his bill if he held it in the Forum. In an attempt to prevent his opponents from 
making it to the assembly, he summoned it at dusk, which was technically a violation of legal 
procedure. He also held the comitia on the day of the Compitalia festival, a citywide festival in 
                                                
187 Asc. 45C, 65C; Dio 36.42.1-2; Millar, 1998, 35-36; E.J. Phillips, "Cicero and the Prosecution 
of C. Manilius " Latomus 29, no. 3 (1970): 546; Taylor and Linderski, 2013, 144-45. Most 
wealthy patrons belonged to families from rural tribes, but their manumitted slaves, many of 
whom lived within Rome, voted in the four urban tribal units. Since they were concentrated in 
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However, if redistributed across all the tribes, the individual freedman’s vote would be worth 
more. The freedmen’s gain would have come at the loss of the non-servile plebs urbana, who 
would lose voters in their tribes as well as suffer the slight of having freedmen’s interest 
advanced over them. The aristocracy also opposed the bill because they thought Manilius was 
trying to build himself a freedman clientele.  
188 Dio 36.42.3; Gruen, 1974, 407-08; Taylor and Linderski, 2013, 145. 
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which many freedmen participated, hoping that some would come and vote on the bill. This was 
also illegal.189 However, to top it all off, he summoned the comitia not in the center of the Forum, 
but in the Area Capitolina, the precinct high atop the Capitoline hill in front of the steps of the 
mammoth temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. 
The walled site was far from optimal for legislative assemblies. Including the Temple of 
Jupiter, there were over five smaller temples, multiple sacrificial altars to Jupiter and other 
divinities, multiple freestanding commemorative statues of gods and famous men, and bronze 
tablets serving as public records of legislation. In addition to these state-erected structures, 
personal victory trophies and votive offerings were so densely strewn across the area that they 
required wholesale removal twice, in 179 and later under Augustus, to ensure that people could 
access the Temple.190 Given all of these objects, the space for a comitia was quite limited, and the 
saepta, pontes and cistae of Manilius assembly were squeezed up against the large steps of the 
Temple of Jupiter, with the tribune presiding from the Temple’s podium.191  
However, a large group was the opposite of what Manilius had in mind. According to 
Asconius, Manilius, followed by a “gang of slaves and freedmen,” ascended the Clivus Capitolinus 
and initiated the assembly. As other magistrates—traditionally present at assemblies, as Piso’s 
appearances at tribunician comitiae have shown—and voters began to climb the hill to participate, 
they encountered a violent surprise. Asconius writes that Manilius…was pursuing this aim [of 
passing the law on freedmen’s votes] with rioting and blockading the climb to the Capitol.”192  As 
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Henrik Mouritsen demonstrated, Roman voting assemblies required no quorum to legitimize 
legislation. “Even the most far-reaching bills could be passed by any number of citizens, as long 
as the correct procedures were followed.”193 Despite his temporal violations, Manilius could 
potentially pass his legislation with only a nominal group of citizens participating as long as he 
could complete the voting process uninterrupted. The Capitoline Hill was an eminently defensible 
bastion for this purpose. It loomed an imposing 35 meters high above the Forum’s center, with 
sheer cliffs on all sides except to the north.194 The Area Capitolina itself was ringed by large 
retaining walls, and had only three narrow entrances.195 The main entrance was the Clivus 
Capitolinus, the only road from the Forum up the hill;196 other entrances were narrow stairs that 
could be easily blockaded. 197 
                                                
193 Mouritsen, 2001, 33. 
194 Coarelli, 2007, 30; Richardson, 1992, 70. 
195 Coarelli, 2007, 31; Richardson, 1992, 70. 
196 Richardson, 1992, 70. It rose steeply towards the southwest starting at the Temple of Saturn 
and was relatively narrow, only wide enough to accommodate a procession of moderate width 
197 Ibid., 69, 80; Russell, 2016, 107. Richardson associates the Centum Gradus with the Tarpeian 
Rock, which he places on the Capitoline’s southwest. Coarelli more convincingly argues that the 
Tarpeian Rock would have been part of the Arx and was located above the Forum, where public 
executions would have have been in more public view and located proximate to other pieces of 
judicial topography, including the Carcer and the tribunal spaces (before their removal to the 
Eastern Forum in 75). Regardless of the rock’s location, the Gradus’ ascent up the south-western 
Capitoline was a steep one. 
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Figure 8: The Area Capitolina, From Russell, 2016, 107. 
  
It was not the first time a magistrate had used the Area Capitolina as a bastion. Tiberius 
Gracchus held his final assembly there, and his supporters violently defended it as members of the 
senate marched up the Clivus Capitolinus to beat Gracchus to death with their wooden senate 
benches.198 In 100 the tribune Lucius Appuleius Saturninus seized the Area Capitolina with a large 
band of supporters and barricaded themselves in for a number of days, resisting the efforts of 
consular troops under Gaius Marius’ command to dislodge them.199 Although Saturninus later 
surrendered, it was not due to weakness in the fortified site. Marius’ troops did not take the 
Capitoline by force, but compelled his surrender by cutting off his water supply.  
                                                
198 Plut. Tib. Grach. 17-19.  
199 App. BC 1.32; Plut. Mar. 30.3-4.  
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This time, however, Manilius’ supporters did not fare as well. Asconius writes that as 
Manilius tried to rush the bill through the comitia, L. Domitius, one of the quaestors for the year, 
charged up the clivus Capitolinus and broke through the crowd. Although quaestors were assigned 
few lictors, Domitius may have had help from other magistrates, clients, and passerby. Although 
at an elevated remove from the Forum, the Area Capitolina was entirely visible throughout the 
Forum and only 330 meters away from the Rostra. Domitius or another magistrate could easily 
have mounted the Rostra and pointed out to any citizens in the vicinity the commotion happening 
in the sacred precinct of Rome’s supreme patron. The sight of an illegal vote which would have 
reduced the plebs urbana’s power may have also contributed to some plebs joining Domitius’ 
train. Many of Manilius’ supporters were apparently killed by Domitius’ group, but Asconius does 
not record how many, if any, of Domitius’ supporters were killed.200  
Despite Domitius’ success in breaking through the crowd, Manilius’ plan evinced a keen 
understanding of the Capitoline’s topography and its political potential. Asconius reports that the 
next day—the first of the political year—the new consuls convened the Senate, which invalidated 
the law based on the fact that it had been illegally legislated on a festival day and on the grounds 
that it had been passed with vis.201 However, the fact that the Senate took pains to annul it suggests 
that Manilius’ assembly on the Capitol was at least procedurally successful. Manilius’ blockading 
of the Area Capitolina’s entrances evidently held off Domitius’ supporters for long enough for the 
ill-attended assembly to conduct its business. In its success, Manilius’ ploy reveals a deep 
weakness in Roman legislative functions. The lack of quorums for assemblies provided an opening 
for politicians to utilize both violence and space to their advantage. If you could somehow keep 
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Oxford University Press, 2006), 250. 
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your opponents out of the voting apparatus while providing access to your supporters, you could 
technically achieve your goal. However, this approach had its drawbacks. If the space in which a 
politician attempted to pass legislation was too small and his group of supporters too limited, he 
risked alienating large numbers of the voting population, as did Manilius. Without the broad-based 
support of larger crowds, Manilius had no pressure with which to counter the Senate’s annulment 
of his law. For comparison, C. Cornelius’ attempt to pass his exemption law with violence 
procedurally failed—in that his assembly was disbanded. However, the show of force by his 
supporters forced the Senate to compromise, providing him with the legislative victory that he 
sought. Although effective in an immediate sense, Manilius’ success with force was limited to the 
Area Capitolina. 
Conclusion: Targeted Violence Yielded Results 
 
 As this chapter has shown in detail, the process of participating in politics in the Western 
Forum was built around a number of physical and spatial experiences. A dizzying amount of 
political violence took place in the area of the Western Forum in multiple different locations and 
for multiple different reasons. However, this chapter has shown that Roman politicians were 
extremely attentive to topography. Violence was committed in a particular space for a particular 
reason, for a particular political goal. Outside attackers used noise, protests and physical attack in 
attempts to force the senate into adopting specific policies. Attacks on the Senate could be used to 
provide particular results, whether it was the release of a popular champion, the exile of Cicero, or 
the creation of a grain commission. Similarly, the Rostra could be used as a tool with which to 
humiliate, harass, and harm opponents. The Forum was the site of other ad hoc attacks on property. 
In 58 when the consuls Gabinius and Piso tore down the altars of the gods Isis and Serapis 
following a senate prohibition of the cult, there was a riot, likely at the site of the altar on the 
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Capitoline.202 In 56, Cicero and a group of personal clients marched up the Capitoline Hill to where 
public laws were exhibited and destroyed the bronze law tablet recording his exile (#50). 203 Later, 
he stole the full records of Clodius’ tribunate from the Tabularium and either destroyed them or 
hid them in his house.204 However, the story of violence in the Forum is primarily one of violence 
against people, not against property. Romans used violence at specific pieces of topography, 
against each other to achieve certain political goals. However, starting in 63, the scope of the area 
that political actors wanted to control began to increase. Instead of just focusing on one piece of 
topography and one goal, politicians set their sights on the entire Forum and beyond. Manilius’ 
attempt to assert control over a wider space—the Area Capitolina—to protect his legislative 
process presages a new trend in Roman politics that would appear starting later in the 60s.  
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Chapter III: Expanding the Battlefield 
 
 The preceding chapter amply demonstrated the mechanics and tactics of the majority of 
instances of political violence in the Western Forum. As noted in that chapter, violence was often 
directed at a specific piece of topography for a specific political result. The first two chapters 
charted a narrowing of scope of political violence. In the 80s, generals used wide-scale violence 
to impose control over the entire city. After Lepidus’ failed rebellion, the topographical focus 
narrowed down to attacks on individual spaces like the Rostra and the Curia. However, starting in 
the late 60s and then extending into the 50s, that trajectory began to reverse. The comitia of 
Manilius on the Area Capitolina, in which Manilius attempted to control a larger space than just 
the immediate area of the comitia, presaged a trend in Roman politics. Starting in the 60s and 
accelerating in the 50s, political actors began expanding the topographical scope of their political 
violence. This chapter will introduce this analysis by examining the remaining instances of 
violence that occurred in the Western Forum. 
Topographies in the Western Forum in particular were linked and interwoven. It was no 
longer sufficient to force an individual off the Rostra, or corner the senate in the Curia. Particularly 
in legislative assemblies, dominating the entire space of the Western Forum with violence became 
necessary in order to achieve a political goal. More and more sources start speaking of battling 
groups forcing each other “out of the Forum.” This chapter introduces what this concept looks like 
physically. The concept that Roman politics increasingly devolved into a battle for the space of 
the Forum is not a new one. However, what that really means in terms of the spatial experience 
has not been sufficiently imaged in detail. This chapter also introduces another concept that is 
crucial to the trajectory of Roman political violence: personal control of political space. In the 
years after 63, politicians increasingly fought to control topography in ways that not only achieved 
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a specific political goal, but in ways that accrued to their own personal prestige. Later chapters 
will demonstrate how Cicero, Clodius, and Pompey vied with each other for personal domination 
over Rome’s political spaces, both public and private.  
Claiming the Forum—Cicero’s Catilinarian “Triumph” 
 
The Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 looms large in ancient sources, historiographical 
tradition, and modern scholarship. Cicero’s Catilinarian Orations portray the supposed revolt of 
the disaffected senator L. Sergius Catalina (anglicized as Catiline) as a power-hungry degenerate 
who had plans to burn the city and unleash a civil war worse than the likes of Sulla and Marius.205 
Reading Cicero’s prose, one would assume that the year 63 was one of significant violence. 
However, there is almost no evidence for the violence of the sort that Cicero describes in his 
speeches. The so-called “First Catilinarinan Conspiracy” of 66-65 has been shown to be myth, an 
exaggeration of Ciceronian rhetoric.206 The instances of violence associated with the alleged plot 
were actually independent instances of judicial violence that will be explained in the next chapter. 
In fact, the most prominent instances of violence that occurred in Rome were committed not by 
Catiline or his co-conspirators, but by Cicero himself. Catiline had fled the city without harming 
anyone; the plot on Cicero’s life had been foiled;207 and the conspirators who were captured at the 
Mulvian Bridge, allegedly heading to Gaul to cause sedition, surrendered without almost without 
a fight.208 It was Cicero’s own personal bodyguard of equestrian men who nearly killed Julius 
Caesar after he had made his compelling speech in favor of clemency for the conspirators. They 
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grabbed him as he was leaving the Temple of Jupiter Stator, and only escaped with the help of his 
friend Curio, who shoved him out the temple’s threshold to safety.209     
It is well known that Cicero ordered the captured conspirators controversially executed 
without trial in the Carcer, the fearsome state prison a few hundred meters west of the Curia. 
However, what is less frequently discussed is how he does it. Hoping to fight questions about the 
execution’s legitimacy as well as to start building a control over the city that rivalled Pompey’s, 
Cicero had them killed in a very particular way. Cicero’s process of killing the Catilinarian 
conspirators drew on the symbolism of the military triumph and the funerary procession in a way 
that was intended to legitimize his borderline illegal actions. In drawing on this symbolism, Cicero 
laid a momentary but powerful claim to the space of the entire Forum-Palatine complex that was 
calculated to raise his own political stature and compete with Rome’s foremost military figure, 
Pompey. 
The captured conspirators were being held in the homes of prominent men of praetorian 
rank or above. Lentulus, the ringleader in Rome, was imprisoned in the house of Publius Lentulus 
Spinther, whose home was located on the Palatine Hill.210 Another conspirator, Statilius, was 
handed over to C. Julius Caesar who at this point had moved to the official residence of the 
Pontifex Maximus, which was located at the eastern end of the Forum directly east of the Atrium 
Vestae.211 Instead of having Lentulus summoned to him, Cicero very publicly ascended the 
Palatine to retrieve him. Plutarch describes the pair’s return to the Forum in a tense and 
topographically-minded paragraph:  
And first he took Lentulus from the Palatine hill and led him along the Via Sacra and 
through the middle of the Forum, the men of highest authority surrounding him as a body-
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guard, and the people shuddering at what was being done and passing along in silence, and 
especially the young men, as though they thought they were being initiated with fear and 
trembling into some ancient mysteries of an aristocratic regime. When Cicero had passed 
through the forum and reached the prison, he delivered Lentulus to the public executioner 
with the order to put him to death. Then Cethegus in his turn, and so each one of the others, 
he brought down to the prison and had him executed. (Plut. Cic. 22) 
 
Having retrieved Lentulus from Spinther’s home on the Southwest of the Palatine, Cicero likely 
descended the Clivus Palatinus northwards, and then took a left to join up with the Sacra Via as it 
entered the Forum. Cicero’s route into the Forum was one that was loaded with immense 
symbolism. Once he joined with the Sacra Via, Cicero was following the route of Rome’s most 
prominent public rituals, the funeral procession and the triumph of a victorious general.  
As Diane Favro and Christopher Johanson have concluded, aristocratic funeral processions 
were arranged to begin along the Sacra Via, beginning from the house of the deceased. They then 
descended the Sacra Via, crossed the forum’s plaza, and stopped at the Curia-Comitium 
complex.212 A general’s triumph joined the Sacra Via and followed the same route into the 
Forum.213 In a triumph, the general started out on the Campus Martius and entered the city at the 
slopes of the Capitoline Hill. The triumph wound its way across the Circus Maximus, north around 
the Palatine Hill, and turned west across the Velia to meet up with the the Sacra Via as it entered 
the Forum.214 
As with a funeral procession, Cicero was surrounded by members of the nobility—“men 
of the highest authority”—who helped guide Lentulus, soon to be a corpse himself, to his final 
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destination. 215 Most importantly, as with both funerals and triumphs, all eyes were watching. 
Triumphs and funeral processions were consuming and overbearing affairs, particularly if you 
lived along the procession route through the clustered Palatine, where both types of procession 
clogged up the streets;216 They were also captivating acts of street theater that were hard to 
ignore.217 Plutarch’s description of “the people shuddering at what was being done and passing 
along in silence” suggests that the onlookers are transfixed as they would be with a funerary 
procession or a triumph, but in grim horror. Aristocrats and day laborers alike stopped to watch 
Cicero’s descent towards the Forum.  
Usually, triumphs would finish by ascending the Clivus Capitolinus to provide offerings at 
the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. However, occasionally they would pause at the Carcer 
to drop off prisoners to be executed. The Carcer was Rome’s only public prison building. In its 
basement was the fearsome dungeon called the Tullianum, where executions of non-citizens took 
place. It was located in a complex that Eric Kondratieff calls the “topography of punishment,” a 
cluster of sites associated with Rome’s judicial process.218 The Carcer was close to the old location 
of the courts and the Praetor’s Tribunal, which had stood on the northwestern curve of the 
Comitium until 74 BCE. The Carcer was separated by a small path from the Basilica Porcia, 
outside of which the tribunes of the plebs sat stationed on wooden benches, prepared to intercede—
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or choose not to—on behalf of citizens about to be imprisoned or executed.219 Looming fearsomely 
above the Carcer on the slope of the Capitoline hill was the Tarpeian Rock, the ancient site of 
execution from which citizens accused of capital crimes were thrown.220 As a general’s triumphal 
procession approached the Carcer, it thus drew on old and visceral associations of legal punishment 
to legitimize the general’s actions. 
Cicero’s procession stopped here, and committed Lentulus to the executioner. As 
Richardson notes, traditionally, only non-citizens were executed in the Carcer. Cicero’s execution 
of Lentulus, a leading Roman citizen, was then unorthodox. Then again, the entirety of Cicero’s 
process was unorthodox, and of dubious legality as the conspirators had received no formal trial. 
As Mary Beard writes in her book The Roman Triumph, “the killing of the leading captives [in a 
triumphal procession] was not ‘ancestral custom’ at all.” In fact, the execution of captives, 
particularly those that were potentates or commanders, was “something that was rarely done.” 
However, Beard argues that executing captives was so rare that when it was done, it had an 
“exemplary, mythic quality.”221 By killing the conspirators in the Tullianum, Cicero was drawing 
on ancient traditions to provide a sort of sanction for his own questionable actions. In Cicero’s 
war, Lentulus and his conspirators were akin to were the defeated captives. Cicero’s escorting of 
Lentulus drew explicitly on the imagery of a captured foreign potentate—what Beard calls a 
“celebrity prisoner”—publicly debased in the triumph.222  
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Cicero’s show of consular strength, with its allusions to military force, carried semantic 
overtones that he may have hoped would legitimize—hallow, even—his rather hasty decision. As 
Fergus Millar notes, the scene Plutarch describes resembles “a sort of ritual.” Cicero was not a 
conquering general, but he was consciously drawing upon the triumph’s violent connotations. As 
K. H. Waters argued convincingly in 1970, Cicero was attempting to make the most of the 
conspiracy for his own personal gain, and fancied himself rising through his defeat of the 
conspiracy to the level of eminence that Pompey had achieved through war.223 In his Third 
Catilinarian oration to the senate after the conspirators’ capture, he compared the conspiracy to a 
war—“the very greatest and most cruel war within the memory of man.” 224  He also compared his 
service to “those that have carried on foreign wars.”225 Plutarch’s subsequent, lighter description 
of Cicero being escorted home after the execution “with cries and clapping of hands as he passed 
along, calling him the saviour and founder of his country” evokes the scene at a celebratory victory 
triumph.226 To his critics, Cicero certainty looked like he was attempting to accumulate a 
militaristic-type prestige. In addition to his lictors, Cicero used the opportunity of the conspiracy 
to justify having a bodyguard of armed equites, the same ones who nearly murdered Caesar after 
the senate debate on the conspirators’ fate. Plutarch’s reference that Metellus Nepos and Caesar 
introduced a bill directly after the execution of the conspirators in order to recall Pompey from 
abroad not to deal with Catiline’s army, but Cicero’s increasingly arbitrary power, indicates that 
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Cicero was perceived of as taking advantage of his emergency powers in an increasingly 
militaristic way, perhaps with the intent to rival Pompey himself.227  
This is not to argue at all that Cicero, was aiming at a dictatorial rule, as his critics later 
would crow when they exiled him in 58 for the execution of the prisoners. However, the analysis 
above exists to highlight two aspects of Roman politics that become increasingly important in the 
50s. The first is that topography in Rome should be viewed as relational. The conspirators’ 
execution cannot be thought of simply as occurring at the Carcer. As this section has shown, a 
whole symbolic and freighted process that drew on multiple topographical relationships preceded 
Cicero’s arrival at the prison. By bringing the conspirators down personally to the Tullianum, 
Cicero created a topographic link between the aristocratic homes on the Palatine Hill and the 
Western end of the Forum. Had Cicero simply waited at the Carcer and had somebody else led the 
prisoners down, the deed would have been done, but it would have lacked symbolic power. By 
utilizing the entire space between the Carcer and the Palatine, not just a fragment of it, Cicero 
legitimized his executions with performative spatial action.  
Secondly, by evoking a military triumph, Cicero laid a personal claim to the space between 
the Forum. For the brief time that he was the triumphator, for those moments that led Lentulus 
down from the Palatine, Cicero extended his personal authority all the way from Lentulus’ house 
on the Palatine to the Carcer—and over everything in between. An execution in the Forum allowed 
Cicero to strike fear and respect into the hearts of residents on the Palatine. This “personal claim” 
was something that would happen increasingly often in the 50s. Cicero, Pompey, and Clodius 
increasingly battled over larger and larger swaths of Rome’s space, using violence to claim a type 
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of personalized control over public and private spaces. Cicero’s execution of the conspirators 
should be seen in that light.  
 “They drove him out of the Forum”: Widening the Space to be 
Controlled 
 
Cicero’s command of the entire Forum—presaged a shift in the battles over political space. 
Instead of fighting over specific pieces of topography—the Curia, the Rostra, the Saepta, the Area 
Capitolina—the entirety of the Forum became up for grabs. As individual actors became more 
accustomed to using violence, it was no longer sufficient to have control over the Rostra, the 
Forum, or even the Curia: A politician needed to control as much of it as possible in order to be 
successful. One of the most visceral examples of this process is the battle over the Lex Fabricia in 
57. The law was a proposal to recall Cicero from exile promoted by the tribune Fabricius, a 
Ciceronian ally. Aligned against Fabricius was Clodius, who was determined to prevent Cicero’s 
return.   
In a novel move, both groups descended to the Forum not at daybreak, the traditional time 
to arrive at a comitia, but at night.228 Each was trying to get a better field position vis-à-vis the 
Forum’s legislative topography. Fabricius’ group had arrived first—as a result, they took the 
Rostra.229 During a tribunician comitia, the Rostra was the most important objective. It allowed 
the presiding magistrate to oversee the voting below his feet. Additionally, if you were excluded 
from the Rostra, you could not interpose a tribunician veto to stop the proceedings. Fabricius’ 
group was large. He was supported by seven other tribunes, each of whom likely had their own 
clientelia and personal supporters. On the Rostra with them was Cicero’s brother Quintus, who 
had come to make a personal appeal for his brother’s recall. Clodius’ group arrived second. 
                                                
228 Cic. Sest. 75. 
229 Vanderbroeck, 1987, 245. 
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Realizing that Fabricius had already occupied the Rostra, Cicero writes that Clodius took 
everything else: “They had occupied the Forum, the Comitium, and the Curia, at an early period 
of the night, with a number of armed men and slaves.”230 When Cicero says “Forum,” he likely 
means the space directly in front of the Rostra, where the saepta, pontes, and cistae for voting 
were set up. Cicero’s comments that Clodius also occupied the Curia and the Comitium do not 
have to mean literally that his supporters were inside the Curia, but should be taken to mean that 
Clodius’ forces surrounded the Rostra from the area of the Comitium, on the edge of which was 
the Curia. 
At daybreak, Clodius’ allied tribunes attempted to climb the Rostra’s stairs to interpose 
their vetoes, but they were stopped by Fabricius’ supporters. Frustrated in his attempts to legally 
obstruct the vote, Clodius put his supporters into action (#34). As Dio reports, Clodius had 
borrowed a set of leftover gladiators from a set of funeral games his brother Appius had recently 
held.231 These gladiators, along with Clodius’ usual coalition of plebeian supporters, surrounded 
Fabricius’ group on the Rostra. Fabricius and his men put up a fight, but were no match for 
Clodius’ superior numbers and his professional gladiators. Fabricius, Q. Cicero, and the other 
tribunes fled the Rostra down into the area of the saepta, and unspecified number of people were 
killed in the voting enclosures. Cicero paints a hyperbolic picture of the bloodshed, claiming later 
that his brother only escaped death by hiding under the bodies of the dead in the sapeta: “Having 
been driven from the Rostra, he lay down in the place of the comitia, and covered himself with the 
                                                
230 Cic. Sest. 75. Although Cicero writes that Clodius had arrived earlier in the night, 
Vanderbroeck notes that this information is more indicative of Cicero’s strategy to prove Sestius’ 
innocence that of the truth. The fact the Fabricius’ group managed to occupy the Rostra suggests 
that they did in fact arrive first.  
231 Dio 39.7.2.  
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corpses of slaves and freedmen.”232 When another pro-Ciceronian tribune named Marcus Cispius 
arrived to the Forum with reinforcements, Clodius’ group drove attacked him as well. Cicero 
writes “They drive away by force [vi depellerunt] Marcus Cispius…as he was coming into the 
Forum.233  
In August, Cicero’s supporters tried again to recall him from exile. Realizing that the 
Forum was too vulnerable to Clodius’ attacks, they decided instead to hold the vote in the comitia 
centuriata, the archaic and cumbersome assembly used to elect consuls.234 Procedurally, the 
assembly was slanted towards the wealthier citizens, whose votes mattered more. Perhaps more 
importantly, it voted on the Campus Martius, the flat plain to the west of the city. It would be 
harder for Clodius to obstruct voting there, as opposed to in the constricted space of the Forum.  
Before the vote, there was a preliminary contio held in the Forum, and Pompey planned to 
use it as a last-ditch effort to demonstrate that Clodius’ control over the space could be broken.  
Pompey escorted the contio’s main speaker, a skittish Quintus Cicero, down from the Palatine 
along the Sacra Via.235 They were surrounded by a large band of armed men. Following them was 
a procession of municipal elites, wealthy equestrians, and members of Pompey’s rural veteran 
clientele, who all had arrived in the city for the sole reason of voting for Cicero’s recall.236 At some 
point during the contio, Clodius’ plebeian supporters attempted to attack the gathering (#37). 
However, Pompey was prepared. His armed men—some of whom may also have been military 
veterans—fought back. There were wounded on both sides, but Pompey ultimately got the better 
                                                
232 Cic. Sest. 75. Tatum, 1999, 178. 
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235 At the time, both Pompey and Q. Cicero lived east of the Forum; Pompey had just spent the 
remainder of 57 barricaded in his home on the Carinae by Clodius’ mobs, and Q. Cicero had a 
home on the Palatine Hill and on the Carinae near Pompey.  
236 Plut. Cic. 33.3; Pomp. 49.3. 
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of Clodius. The former tribune and his forces were expelled from the Forum [ἀναστήσας ἐκ τῆς 
ἀγορᾶς] and the contio continued undisrupted, followed immediately by the vote to recall Cicero.  
 The battles over Cicero’s recall had demonstrated that conflicts in the Forum were 
becoming increasingly complex, and of a larger scale than in the previous decade. Before 57, there 
are few recorded deaths during instances of violence in the Western Forum.237 Fatal violence was 
often threatened, and it was that threat that often proved so powerful a tool in intimidating a 
magistrate, group, or even the assembled Senate. However, the battles over Cicero’s recall saw 
bloodshed on an unprecedented scale for the period. They also saw an expansion of the space that 
was intended to be controlled. As Fabricius’ aborted stand on the Rostra demonstrates, merely 
controlling one piece of topography was no longer sufficient. Clodius’ group got the upper hand 
by surrounding Fabricius’ group by claiming the Comitium and the open Forum space for 
themselves. Pompey’s show of force at the contio preceding the vote to recall Cicero was his 
answer to Clodius’ widening zone of control. Clodius’ large numbers of occupying plebs and 
gladiators could only be countered by even larger supporters from the countryside. However, 
Clodius, it seems, had the last laugh. The fact that Cicero’s supporters were forced to resort to the 
comitia centuriata on the relative safety of the Campus Martius was in itself a symbolic expulsion 
from the Forum. Using it for the recall bill was a less-than tacit admission that Clodius had 
achieved a sort of legislative dominance over the Western Forum’s voting space. Legislative 
success no longer depended on being able to expel opponents from the Saepta or control the voting 
apparatus, but the ability of actors to expel opponents from the entire Forum. The verbs depellerunt 
“expel” and ἀναστήσας, “drive out” are meant to be taken literally.  
                                                
237 Gaius Manilius’ attempt to pass his law distributing freedmen’s votes from the Area 
Capitolina (#9) is one.  
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In 55 BCE, the events of the battle over the Lex Fabricia repeated themselves, albeit with 
some topographical innovations. Rome’s politicians had clearly learned the experiences of the past 
few years. Pompey and Crassus had been elected consuls in 56 with the aid of violence on the 
Campus Martius (#52), and they intended to pass a tribunician law granting themselves five-year 
proconsular terms in Spain and Syria respectively, as well as extending Caesar’s proconsular term 
in Gaul for five years. They chose the tribune Trebonius to propose the legislation. However, the 
law was opposed by Cato and a coalition that included two tribunes, Aquilius Gallus and Ateius 
Capito.238 Cato had used violence other times to combat the triumvirs, and he could be expected 
to do so again.  
The night before the vote, forces descended to the Forum as they had in 57. Like the Lex 
Fabricia, the Lex Trebonia was a tribunician proposal that would be passed in the comitia plebis 
tributa. This also meant that the assembly could be dismissed by another tribune, should he be able 
to mount the Rostra. Thus, it was critical for Cato’s group to get either Aquilius or Ateius on the 
Rostra in order to dismiss the assembly. For Trebonius, it was equally critical to ensure that neither 
tribune made it up the Rostra’s stairs. Aquilius in particular was rightly worried that Trebonius 
would attempt to keep him out of the Forum or attack him—or both. Dio writes that, “Hence 
Gallus, fearing that some one might on the next day keep him from the Forum or do something 
worse still, went into the Curia in the evening and passed the night there.”239 Protected during the 
night by the Curia’s walls, he planned to be the first to reach the Rostra the next morning and 
dismiss the comitia.240 However, Trebonius anticipated Aquilius’ actions. When his group came 
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down after Aquilius, Trebonius barred the doors of the Curia, leaving Aquilius locked inside for 
the entire day (#56).241  
 Aquilius neutralized, Trebonius solidified his position. With the aid of men provided by 
other colleagues in the tribunate, multiple consular and tribunician lictors, and armed gangs 
organized by Pompey and Crassus, Dio writes that Trebonius “occupied the meeting-place of the 
assembly by night and barred out Ateius, Cato, Favonius, and the others with them.”242 The 
physical details are vague, but rather than let the opposing group find a foothold, it appears that 
Trebonius and his group fortified the space of the comitia with some sort of human barrier. 
Potentially they had set up guard-posts around the comitia space. It is clear from the events of the 
morning that they had not only occupied the Forum’s saepta and central space but also the Rostra. 
Ateius deemed the Rostra so inaccessible that instead of trying to mount it, he and Cato clambered 
onto the shoulders of individuals in the crowd waiting to vote. Ateius may have been trying to get 
high enough above the crowd to shout out his tribunician veto. However, Trebonius’ lictors 
knocked them to the ground and hustled both out of the Forum. Trebonius’ other supporters 
engaged Cato and Ateius’ supporters, wounding many and killing a few (#57).243 Despite the 
violence, Trebonius’ hold on the Western Forum remained solid. Cato’s group had not managed 
to damage the voting apparatus in any way, so the comitia continued and passed the law.  
Towards an Expanding Field of Battle 
 
The battle over the Lex Trebonia demonstrates a clear development towards a desire—and 
a need—to control increased amounts of space in the Forum. Whereas earlier legislative 
assemblies depended on one piece of topography, these battles in 57 and 55 border on attempts to 
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try and control the entirety of the Forum. Political violence in the Forum was not successful unless 
the Curia, Rostra, central Forum space, and even entrances to the Forum could be controlled.  
As the three examples of this chapter have shown, controlling topography was becoming 
increasingly relational. Whereas in chapter II, possession of a single space was enough to achieve 
a political goal, politics in the Forum was characterized by possession and exclusion. Returning to 
Cicero’s use of the execution-cum-triumph to claim control of the Forum, if briefly: The next 
chapter, on the Eastern Forum, will document an increasing trend towards the use of violence to 
programmatically impose a type of private control over parts of the city. Cicero, Clodius, and 
Pompey all experimented with this type of personalized spatial politics, but Clodius is the one who 
truly developed it in a calculated way. The themes of exclusion and personalization are ones that 
will be further explored in the subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter IV: Personalizing Space in the Eastern Forum 
 
Eighteen of Rome’s 67 instances of political violence took place in the area this thesis is 
describing as the “Eastern Forum” (Fig. 1). The area I describe was bounded by the Basilica 
Aemilia to the North, and the Temple of Castor and Pollux to the south. Romans would have 
considered the Regia and the Fornix Fabianus the closest thing to an “entrance” of the Forum in 
the modern sense. However, I have included the first part of the Sacra Via leaving the Forum as 
far as the Temple of Jupiter Stator. Before 75 BCE, the space between the Temple of Castor and 
Pollux, the Basilica Aemilia, and the Regia was unoccupied. However, after Cotta’s restructuring 
in 75, this space was afterwards occupied in part by the court of the urban praetor. The zone, like 
the Western Forum, was defined by its role as a crossroads: The thoroughfares of the Via Sacra, 
Vicus Tuscus, and Scalae Graecae all opened into the area.244 The Eastern Forum also like the 
Western Forum, had a commercial character.245 A large section of the tabernae fronting the 
Basilica Aemilia opened up onto the Sacra Via and the court space. Directly to the southwest of 
the Temple of Castor was the Velabrum, which housed workshops and storehouses.246 Even the 
ostensibly residential Sacra Via was packed with commercial activity, as aristocrats with houses 
along the road rented out spaces along their facades to artisans and shopowners to set up stalls. 
People were constantly moving in and out of the Eastern Forum, shopping, selling, and transacting. 
The Temple of Castor, which had a symbolic associations with popular politics, lent the area a 
popularis air. Though, like all spaces in ancient Rome, the presence of the aristocracy was felt 
looming up ahead. Behind the temple of Castor, the Palatine Hill rose steeply, ascended by a set 
                                                
244 Russell, 2016, xix. 
245 Ibid., 48. 
246 Coarelli, 2007, 78. 
 104 
of stairs called the Scalae Graecae. On it were the large, visually impressive homes of Rome’s 
elite, watching the Forum like guards.  
 
Figure 9: The Eastern Forum 
 
Courtroom Permeability and Judicial Violence   
 
After L. Quinctius’ occupation of court proceedings during Junius’ trial 74, there are no 
recorded instances of violence at the courts until the year 66. However, between 66 and 52, there 
were 8 instances of political violence that took place at the courts. The lack of physical barriers 
around the courts, and its location in the busy flow of the Forum provided an opportunity for 
groups, large and small, to disrupt trials. Unlike violence in the Western Forum, which was often 
spontaneous and less organized, judicial violence was almost always the result of an organized 
group. The mid-60s saw multiple politicians hoping to prevent convictions use personalized gangs 
to intimidate or physically attack court proceedings. The predictable time and location—a result 
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of the lack of a concept of a change of venue—meant that the state’s only recourse to violence was 
increased strength in numbers. Magistrates hoping to prevent physical interruption used their 
lictors and senatorial bodyguards to ring proceedings, with marginal success. It was only in 52 that 
Pompey managed to imperfectly prevent judicial disruption at the cost of bringing the space of the 
entire Forum under his coercive personal control.  
Important to keep in mind for this section is the setup of the Roman open-air courtroom, 
summarized in Chapter I but repeated here for clarification. The center of the proceedings was the 
urban praetor, who sat on a curule chair on his wooden tribunal stand built by Aurelius Cotta, about 
a meter above the ground. In front of him were the wooden benches of the jurors. Past the jurors 
were the benches of the litigants and their advocates, separated by an open space which provided. 
Behind the litigants’ benches would be more benches for the litigants’ immediate supporters, 
mostly close personal clients and family. On these secondary benches might also be additional 
scribes and junior advocates. Surrounding the entire setup would be the corona, the ring of 
spectators that watched the trials. Flowing around the corona was the daily life of the Forum.247 
Not far, possibly to the south of the court space was the Gradus Aurelii, the wooden grandstand 
set up for extra spectator seating at the tribunal.248 While calling the space in which the urban 
praetor’s trials took place a “courtroom” may have an uncomfortably modern feel, I follow Leanne 
Bablitz in using the term. The “courtroom” was delineated by physical objects—stands, benches—
and the people who filled them. However, no physical barriers separated the corona from the 
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litigants and jurors. This accessibility is critical to keep in mind when reconstructing instances of 
judicial violence.  
Patterns of Organized Judicial Violence, 66-61 
 
After a nearly decade-long respite, violence returned to the courts with the same type of 
disruptive tactics seen in the legislative assemblies in the previous chapters. In 66, the two men 
elected for the consulship of 65, P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, had been charged 
with ambitus (electoral corruption).249 Their prosecutors were L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius 
Torquatus.250 Sometime after July, Autronius’ trial began. The trial’s outcome had particularly 
high stakes—a conviction would result in Autronius being stripped of his office—and we can 
assume benches of the court and the Gradus Aurelii would have been packed full with witnesses, 
family, clients, and spectators. Around the court flowed the life one of the busiest sections of the 
Forum, with pedestrians entering and exiting from the Sacra Via, people conducting business on 
the steps of the nearby Temple of Castor which loomed over the court from the south, and the 
shops and bank-tables associated with the Basilicas Aemilia and Sempronia. Interested passerby 
would have no doubt stopped to watch the prosecution of a consul-elect. As examined earlier, the 
courts sat in the middle of this commotion at ground level with little protective fencing. As 
demonstrated earlier with L. Quinctius’ invasion of Verres’ courtoom during C. Junius’ trial in 75, 
these locational factors made the Roman courts easily permeable.  
Autronius was the first in his family to reach the consulship, and did not want to lose it all 
through a bribery conviction. To defend his newfound prestige, Autronius hoped to disrupt the 
proceedings. On the day of the trial, Cicero reports in his Pro Sulla, delivered four years after the 
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events, Autronius used a heavy-handed attack on the court by an organized gang under his 
command (#10).  
[Autronius] tried to disturb and get rid of a prosecution for bribery by raising in the first 
instance a sedition among gladiators and runaway slaves, and after that as we all saw, by 
stoning people, and collecting a violent mob.251 
 
Some aspects of Cicero’s report are exaggerated and designed to mis-represent Autronius, such as 
the allegation that Autronius commanded runaway slaves. This description comes during Cicero’s 
defense of P. Cornelius Sulla—Autronius’ consular colleague who was also convicted of ambitus 
in 66—against charges of participating in the Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63. Autronius himself 
was convicted in 62 for participating in the Conspiracy, and Cicero throughout Pro Sulla uses the 
negative comparison of the seditious Autronius as a foil to demonstrate Sulla’s comparative good 
behavior.252 However, despite Ciceronian rhetoric, it is entirely plausible that the attack was 
organized by Autronius’ legally-owned slaves, some of which were gladiators. By the late 
Republic, gladiatorial games had a central and entrenched role in popular entertainment. It was the 
custom for wealthy politicians to hold gladiatorial games to gain public prestige, and the leftover 
gladiators gladiators were easily converted to a bodyguard as part of a politicians’ retinue.253 
Autronius was merely one of the first in this period to turn his bodyguard into a riot squad.254 
Because the attackers are described as throwing rocks as opposed to physically entering or 
upending the courtroom, it seems possible that the group appeared after the trial had begun and 
found themselves on the outside of what must have been a rather large corona of spectators, given 
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that this was a high-profile trial of an elected consul. The attack was designed to cause damage 
and harm. The tables of scribes and time-keepers may have been knocked over, and the crowd 
around the court sent into a panic. The praetor, his lictors, the prosecutors, and even Autronius 
would have been forced to take cover with all of the projectiles flying about in the packed space. 
Autronius’ gang must have been of a significant size, as Cicero calls it a concursus, a “mob.” As 
with C. Junius’ trial, the assembled gang could have additionally drowned out participants with 
shouts.  
It is unclear what the immediate result of Autronius’ attack was, as Cicero provides few 
details.255 Despite his best efforts, Autronius was at some point convicted of ambitus and deprived 
of his office.256 Given the accessibility of the court and the large amount of tumult that Cicero 
implies, it is likely that the trial was significantly disrupted by Autronius’ attack, and the court 
adjourned by the praetor. However, Autronius’ reprieve was brief. The court reconvened on a later 
day and Autronius was convicted, Asconius informs us.257  
Autronius’ act had immediate imitators. Also in 66, C. Cornelius, the tribune who caused 
Cn. Piso much trouble in 67, was indicted on charges of maiestas by two brothers named Publius 
and Gaius Cominius.258 The charge was related to the assembly on the Rostra in 67 which resulted 
in the stoning of Piso (#6).259 Cornelius used a more subtle and targeted version of Autronius’ 
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riotous intervention, and was more attentive to both topography and timing. The trial took place in 
the court of the praetor L. Cassius Longinus. On the tenth day after the Cominii filed their 
indictment, both they and Cornelius were legally obliged to appear in court. However, on that day, 
the praetor Cassius was conspicuously absent. Asconius writes that he may have been called away 
to publicly account for his conduct while commissioner of the public corn supply. However, 
Asconius also suggests that Cassius had intentionally not appeared “to do the defendant a 
favour.”260 As the brothers Cominius stood up in front of the praetor’s tribunal stand, 
conspicuously empty, they suddenly found themselves cornered by men who ringed threateningly 
around them (#11).261 How these men got into the courtroom is left unexplained, not hard to 
reconstruct. They could have been just outside the court within the corona of spectators and burst 
in at a planned time. They also could have been seated in the benches behind Cornelius, as often 
did the litigant’s supporters, and quickly forced their way up to the front of the courtroom with 
ease. Without the praetor present, there was no figure representing magisterial authority to stop 
them. Asconius describes the men as noti operarum duces, “known-gang-leaders.”262 
Vanderbroeck suggests that they were organized through a collegium, one of Rome’s associations 
that were popular among poorer plebs and freedmen.263 It is unclear whether the group was 
organized by Cornelius himself, or by a group that acted on his behalf.264 From the lack of mention 
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of large mobs or similar language, it appears that there were no actual gangs present, just their 
leaders.265 
Regardless of who employed them, the gang-leaders evidently wanted Cornelius acquitted, 
and they had the Cominii cornered. Boldly in front of the courtroom, this group of men openly 
“threatened them [the Cominii] with death, if they did not desist forthwith” and rescind the charge 
against Cornelius.266 However, in a confluence of time and topography fortunate for the Cominii, 
the Consuls of 66, M. Aemilius Lepidus and L. Volcatius Tullius, happened to be strolling down 
the Sacred Way to conduct business in the Forum. Their path, as has been shown, took them 
directly by the location of the courts.267 As they came into sight of the courtroom trailed by their 
combined twenty-four lictors and personal retinues of clients, the gangleaders fled, apparently 
unwilling to enter into pitched battle with the consuls’ veritable squadron of attendants. Despite 
being saved from immediate danger, the gang-leaders’ threats left a huge impression on the 
Cominii. Instead of resuming the trial, the “The Cominii had taken refuge in some kind of garret, 
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mistaken about the Consuls’ support for the defendants and says that “it is merely their arrival, 
presumably with lictors, that dispersed the gangleaders.” He also notes that they need not have 
intended to scatter Cornelius’ support,” either. It appears most likely that the consuls arrived 
coincidentally at the right moment. Rome’s small area and close distances between important 
political functions facilitated this sort of coincidence. 
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locked themselves in and stayed their in hiding until nightfall.”268 Evidently, although there was 
no violence used at the trial, the gangleaders’ threats had significant credence. The fact that the 
Cominii went into hiding implies that members of their gangleaders’ gang or collegium were on 
the hunt for the brothers, or at least they feared so. Rome was a relatively small city, and the 
Cominii could not expect to stay concealed for long. The Cominii even judged the streets too 
unsafe to use. Therefore, at night, they “fled from the city over the roofs of the adjoining 
buildings.”269 The next morning, the Cominius brothers were far from the city, and the praetor L. 
Cassius was conveniently present again at his tribunal. When the Cominii failed to present their 
accusation, Cassius struck Cornelius’ name from the indictment list.270 
One more trial followed this pattern. In 65, Gaius Manilius was charged with corruption 
while in office—however, his accusers actually intended to punish him for his violent and 
unorthodox attempt to redistribute the freedmen’s votes from the Capitol.271 Although that 
legislation had been ill-fated, Manilius won popular support for his more famous Lex Manilia de 
imperio Cn. Pompeii, which—in the vein of Gabinius’ pirate bill—transferred command of the 
war against Rome’s enemy Mithridates of Pontus to the wildly popular Pompey. In 66, Cicero was 
praetor, and was at the time was strengthening his existing relationship with Pompey. So Manilius 
could be tried in his own court, Cicero attempted to accelerate the trial process and scheduling his 
court appearance before the statutory ten days provided to a defendant to prepare his case had 
elapsed. Sensing an injustice—or perceiving that they could create one—two tribunes forcibly 
                                                
268 Asc. 60C: “The Cominii had taken refuge in some kind of garret, locked themselves in and 
stayed their in hiding until nightfall.” 
269 Asc. 60C. 
270 Ibid.  
271 Lewis, 2006, 265-6.  
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dragged Cicero up to the Rostra and demanded that he account for his actions (#12).272 Cicero 
faced the hostility of an angry crowd and was denounced by the tribunes.273 As Chapter II 
demonstrated ad nauseam, the Rostra was an effective tool to compel compliance. Not only did 
Cicero allow Manilius his requisite ten days, but he promised to defend Manilius himself. 
 When the trial began in early 65, Manilius looked to the strategy of Autronius and 
Cornelius before him. Asconius reports that on the day of the trial, Manilius had “broken up the 
trial by means of gang-leaders” (#13).274 Dio correspondingly records that “a tumult that 
immediately arose prevented the court from being convened.”275 While no other details are 
supplied, the previous examples demonstrate the mechanics of how the physical disruption could 
have taken place. In this case, it is likely that Manilius’ gang-leaders had brought their adherents 
with them, intending to cause the most disruption and intimidation possible. Plebeians in the 
Forum nearby may also have joined in when they saw efforts being made to prevent the prosecution 
of a popular champion. Like the others, Manilius’ trial was adjourned momentarily.276 
Dio’s comment that the court was not only interrupted, but prevented from being convened 
in the first place reveals a relationship between topography, accessibility, and timing. Because 
trials took place at specified times and in an unchanging location, defendants, prosecutors, and 
others with access to that information could convey it to a well organized group. The group then 
appeared at the exact time and place where the trial was going to take place, ready to use violence 
                                                
272 Plut. Cic. 9.6-7; Dio 36.44.1-2. Plutarch writes τῶν δὲ δηµάρχων αὐτὸν διαγαγόντων ἐπὶ τὸ 
βῆµα, “when the tribunes carried him onto the Rostra.” Cassius Dio writes that Cicero, having 
mounted the Rostra, complained that he did so only ἀναγκασθεὶς δῆθεν ὑπὸ τῶν δηµάρχων, 
“having been forced in reality by the tribunes.” 
273 Plut. Cic. 9.5; Dio 36.44.2.  
274 Asc. 60C; Vanderbroeck, 1987, 229. 
275 Dio 36.44.2. 
276 Asc. 60C; Allen M. Ward, "Politics in the Trials of Manilius and Cornelius " Transactions 
and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 101 (1970): 548-50. 
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to stop it before it even started. Rome’s courts had always been open-air affairs, like legislative 
assemblies and elections. As judicial violence increased into the 50s, as described below, 
magistrates opted not to move the courts to an interior location like a basilica or a temple. Instead, 
they would reinforce the site with more and more supporters. The reaction of the consuls of 65 
was indicative of this reticence. Instead of changing the venue, they doubled down on defensive 
support. When the trial reconvened on a later date, both consuls stood in the court with their 
twenty-four lictors, determined to prevent further disruption.277 The presence of the consuls had 
an impressive effect. Asconius writes that Manilius did not even bother to show up to the trial: 
“He had made no answer, and had been condemned.”278  
 The succession of disrupted trials in 66 and 65 demonstrate consistency in how topography 
and violence interacted in the court system in the Eastern Forum. Given the physical insecurity of 
the courts, the commotion caused by the bustle of everyday economic and religious life, and the 
large crowds that attended trials, instigating violence was relatively easy. Since trials happened in 
exactly the same place, at pre-determined times, a politician with a well-organized base of support 
could enact well-coordinated strikes on specific targets. The accessible nature of the court left it 
vulnerable to rowdy crowds around it, as in the case of Autronius and Manilius, as well as 
individual entry into the courtroom itself, as in the case of the gangleaders at Cornelius’ trial. 
However, the centrality of the courts also worked against individuals who hoped to disrupt or 
influence outcomes with violence. Their location close to the aristocratic homes on the Sacra Via 
and the Palatine Hill meant that magistrates—often wealthy men from senatorial families—could 
mobilize backup quickly. As the consuls’ arrival in Cornelius trial showed, the Forum had a 
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number of magistrates who could offer their support to quell violence on short notice. The 
courtroom could also be fortified by magistrates, who were supported by lictors and authorized to 
use legal force. The courts’ ability to adjourn and reconvene at a later time also posed a challenge 
to violent actors. Unless they could find a way to intimidate prosecutors, as did the gangleaders in 
Cornelius’ trial, there was always the chance that the opposite outcome could result when the trial 
re-convened. Even in that case, Cornelius’ violence was only temporarily successful. Publius 
Cominius returned to the city in 65 and charged Cornelius with maiestas again. This time, 
Cornelius had no gang supporters to protect him, and was convicted.279 
The use of personal gangs would prove to be an enduringly successful tactic for defendants 
to escape prosecution. There was one more trial disrupted this way in 54.280 A former tribune 
named C. Cato was being prosecuted for violation of legislative procedure by Asinius Pollio. 
Seneca the Younger reports that during the trial, Cato’s personal clients arrived at the court and 
assaulted the prosecutor Pollio (#59).281 Although it is unclear from Seneca’s account what the 
immediate result of the violence was, Cicero wrote to Atticus that Cato was acquitted.282 Perhaps 
Pollio failed to re-appear to continue the prosecution, as had happened in Cornelius’ trial, or the 
jurors were intimidated into acquitting. As we have seen from the examples above, both are likely 
                                                
279 Asc. 57-81C; Alexander, 1990, 105. The second, undisrupted trial is where Cicero’s 
fragmentary Pro Cornelio comes from.  
280 This is not to suggest that the above trials were the only instances in the Late Republic where 
trials were disrupted by gang violence—but they are the only ones for which we have sources. 
Given the vast amount of litigation that took place in the Late Roman Republic, court disruptions 
must have occurred many more times than this section and chapter documents that fell outside of 
the realm of interest or the memory of our senatorial historians and writers. Many of those 
disruptions may have been caused by organized groups of personal supporters. 
281 Sen. Controversiae, 7.4.7.  
282 Cic. Att. 4.15.4, 4.16.5. 
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options. Cato’s tactics were by this time a run-of-the mill exploitation of the court’s physical 
vulnerabilities. 
Attempts and Failures to Fortify the Court 
 
The presence of the consuls at Manilius’ trial showed an acknowledgement that defensive 
force was required to deter outside agitators. In Manilius’ trial, the consuls’ presence was 
preventative. However, three instances of judicial violence between 61 and 54 demonstrated that 
providing a fortifying force to protect prosecutors and jurors was not in itself a foolproof measure. 
The section of the Eastern Forum was by nature accessible, and once a crowd got close enough to 
the court, it was nearly impossible to stop them from influencing the proceedings, despite a 
fortifying bodyguard.  
In 61, a young P. Clodius Pulcher faced a charge of incestum for multiple offenses of a 
scandalous nature, including violating the rites of the female-only Bona Dea festival, adultery with 
Caesar’s wife, and alleged incest with his sister.283 The trial was high-profile, and high stakes. 
Clodius, the scion of the wealthy Claudii Pulchrii family, was an ambitious man with his career 
ahead of him. If convicted, he faced the chance of exile, death, and worst of all, political disgrace. 
The prosecutors, advocates, and witnesses were all men and women of prominent aristocratic 
families who had brought their own family and supporters.284 Clodius likely had a significant 
crowd of supporters as well, composed of friends and clients of his famous family. Included in that 
                                                
283 Tatum, 1999, 71-86.  
284 Ibid., 80-83. The personages involved lent the publicity of something approaching a modern 
celebrity trial. Two future consuls, L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus (cos. 49) and Cn. Lentulus 
Marcellinus (cos. 56) were the accusers. Cicero, M. Porcius Cato, and L. Lucullus testified as 
witnesses, as did Julius Caesar’s mother Aurelia and sister Julia. C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76), 
who had won a military triumph in Macedonia, testified on behalf of Clodius.  
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group was perhaps bands of youths, or family retainers, the type of personal client who could be 
counted on to cause violence should the proceedings not go Clodius’ way.285 
The selection of jurors alone was a raucous process, with supporters from either side of the 
courtroom offering “cheers and counter-cheers” as jurors were rejected.286 When Cicero stood up 
to deliver his testimony as a witness, Clodius’ supporters caused attempted to shout him down. 
The approach was the same one that the supporters of L. Quinctius used when they swarmed the 
court during the trial of C. Junius in 74 and successfully intimidated the jury into conviction. 
Although Cicero did not admit himself cowed, the jurors were intensely disturbed. Perhaps 
inspired by the example of the consuls of 65 that prevented violence at Manilius’ resumed trial, 
the skittish jurors demanded a bodyguard to protect them when the trial resumed the next day.287 
Cicero wrote to Atticus that in the Senate, “Our eminent Areopagites then exclaimed that they 
would not come into the court unless a guard was assigned to them.”288  
Assigning a bodyguard—called a praesidium—was a measure the Senate did not take 
lightly. Usually, it depended on magistrates to use their lictors and personal clients to support them 
in maintaining order.289 Requests for official bodyguards were so infrequently granted—and 
skeptically treated—that even during the tension over the Catilinarian conspiracy in 63, Cicero did 
not request a bodyguard but enlisted private clients from the Equestrians as his guard.290 
                                                
285 Ibid., 81. At this point in his political development, Clodius had yet to organize his effective 
bands of demonstrators and rioters that Tatum calls Clodiani, recruited from members of the 
urban plebs. However, as a patrician from a politically powerful and wealthy family, he was 
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court.  
286 Cic. Att. 1.16. 
287 Cic. Att. 1.16; Dio. 37.46.2-3; Plut. Cic. 29.6, Caes. 10.7.  
288 Cic. Att. 1.16. 
289 Nippel, 1995, 51. 
290 Ibid., 52. 
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Bodyguards were granted only when the Senate considered that serious disturbances could occur 
unless there was a protective force. Such bodyguards were usually recruited from magistrates’ 
personal clients, and other citizen volunteers. It was not until a decade later would the praesidium 
be recruited from consular soldiers.291 
The bodyguard seems to have been successful in preventing physical violence against the 
jurors. Although the remainder of the trial was probably noisy and boisterous as the first day had 
been, no author records a flat-out attack on the court as recorded in Autronius and Manilius’ 
trials.292 However, the bodyguard certainly did not fill the jurymen with courage, either. Plutarch 
writes that when it came time to vote, frightened jurors wrote the letters A—absolvo—and C—for 
condemno—with shaking hands: “most of [the jurors] cast their voting-tablets with the writing on 
them confused.”293 Plutarch further explains that “the majority of the jurors giving their verdicts 
in illegible writing, in order that they might neither risk their lives with the populace by 
condemning him, nor get a bad name among the nobility by acquitting him.”294 The jurors—with 
the exception of Lentulus Spinther, who dropped his ballot to convict into the voting urn with an 
elaborate flourish—were evidently fearful that they would be targeted for their votes.295 It seems 
that the show of force the day before had instilled in them a fear that the senatorial praesidium 
could not shake. Additionally, the fact that they had to resort to illegible scribbling to physically 
protect their vote from prying eyes suggests that Clodius’ supporters had arrived in force on that 
day and were close enough to the jurors to see the ballots. Although the jurors were defended, the 
entire area around the courts in the Eastern Forum was still permeable to public traffic. Even if 
                                                
291 Ibid., 51. 
292 Cic. Att. 1.16; Dio 37.46; Plut. Cic. 29.5-6.  
293 Plut. Cic. 29.6.  
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295 Dio 39.6.2.  
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they were prevented from entering the immediate space of the court by the bodyguard, Clodius’ 
supporters could still ring around the bodyguards and make the usual intimidating noise and shouts 
(#24). When Clodius’ acquittal was announced, Clodius’ critics suggested that it was in part due 
to bribery, which modern scholars have agreed played a role.296 Despite allegations of bribery, it 
seems clear from Plutarch and Cicero’s reports that the threat of violence by Clodius’ supporters 
certainly influenced the conduct of the jurors. 
One lesson of Autronius, Cornelius, and Manilius’ trials was that violence that disrupted 
the functioning of the court were effective in bringing proceedings to a halt in the short term. 
However, this had a flipside. The denouements of these trials showed that disruption of the 
courtroom worked only as long as one was continuously able to use violence. In all three cases the 
courts reconvened and handed down convictions when the accused declined to use violence, or 
was prevented from using it. Clodius’ trial suggests that a more effective method of ensuring a 
lasting reprieve from prosecution was not to target the immediate proceedings of the court, but 
threaten violence against individual jurors who would have to deal with the consequences after the 
trial was over. Jurymen might be safe within the circle of the bodyguard surrounding the court, but 
once they left the safety of the bodyguard, they became targets. Intrusions physical space of the 
court could be foiled by a force occupying the space, as it did in Manilius’ and Clodius’ trials. 
However, the failed attempt to fortify Clodius’ trial against judicial interference also shows that 
the presence of a guard alone was not proof against intimidation if the crowd around the court was 
large enough.  
                                                
296 Cic. Att 1.16; Dio 37.45.2-3; Plut. Cic 29.6-7. Catulus is sarcastically supposed to have asked 
the jury afterwards whether the bodyguard was intended to protect them from the wrath of 
Clodius’ supporters, or because they feared being robbed of the bribes they had received. 
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The use of crowd violence to achieve a desired outcome in a trial was not restricted to the 
calculated planning of the upper echelons. Spontaneous crowds, if they were large enough, could 
have just as intense an effect on the permeable courtroom, as the following case demonstrates. In 
54 BCE, Pompey’s supporter Aulus Gabinius was tried multiple times before the praetor’s tribunal. 
He was officially charged with illegally interfering with the foreign affairs of Egypt by restoring 
Ptolemy XII Auletes to the throne of Egypt during his consulship.297 More importantly however, 
in doing so he violated a prohibition in the Sybilline Books, an ancient collection of oracles and 
religious orders. His violation of these religious prohibitions—widely publicized by his political 
opponents for propaganda purposes—made him deeply unpopular.298 At the first trial in late 
September, he was acquitted despite large and riotous crowds surrounding the court.299 Shortly 
after the trial though, the Tiber river flooded in October or November. While the homes of Rome’s 
political elite situated on the city’s central hills were safe, the flood devastated the lowlands 
alongside the Tiber.300 For Rome’s not-so wealthy residents who lived in this low-lying area, the 
flood was devastating. Houses collapsed, a large number of the city’s shops in the Forum Boarium 
and Holitorium were wrecked.301 Many plebs died.302 The floodwaters also devastated the city’s 
granaries which were also situated along the river, leading to food shortages and panic among 
                                                
297 Gruen, 1974, 323-28; Vanderbroeck, 1987, 260. 
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many plebs who were now homeless, without a livelihood, and close to starving.303 The flood was 
taken as a sign of divine displeasure at Gabinius’ acquittal and retribution for his religious 
violation. Gabinius’ second trial in 54, this time under corruption charges, provided the devastated 
plebeians a chance to violently voice their displeasure.304  
On the day of the trial, hundreds of plebeians, enraged over the divine misery that Gabinius 
had brought on them, packed into the Eastern Forum and surged into the space designated for the 
court. The crowd directed their anger not at Gabinius, but jurors who had the power to deliver a 
conviction. According to Dio, the crowd threatened the jurymen with death (#60).305 Orations by 
Pompey and Cicero did nothing to quell the crowd’s anger or calm juror’s nerves. Gabinius was 
convicted and sent into exile.306 It is not clear from the sources whether any attempt had been made 
to fortify the court against crowds, as no praesidium is recorded to have been requested. Even if it 
had, it is unlikely that it would have had an effect in the face of such large numbers and anger. 
 As the two examples above make abundantly clear, Rome’s court system’s problems 
stemmed not simply from the ease with which individual agents could enter the courtroom, but 
from the permeability of the whole area of the Eastern Forum itself. As long as the many 
thoroughfares into the Eastern Forum were open, large groups could ring a courtroom—whether 
defended or undefended—and use violence or the threat of it to compel a desired outcome. The 
Senate’s attempt to protect Clodius’ trial with a bodyguard failed not because there was violence 
inside the courtroom, but because Clodius’ supporters occupied the space all around it. Gabinius’ 
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trial similarly showed that spontaneous displays of crowd anger could overwhelm jurors as well, 
provided that the crowd was large and intimidating enough.  
Soldiers in the Forum: The Trial of Milo in 52 
 
 Efforts to prevent disruption in the courts reached their apex in April of 52 after T. Annius 
Milo murdered his archrival P. Clodius Pulcher in a bloody brawl on the Appian Way in January.307 
Clodius’ supporters embarked on a weeklong rampage, attacking private homes, and even burnt 
down the Curia in the Forum when they lit their dead leader’s funeral pyre inside it. In the midst 
of the chaos, the Senate voted Pompey sole consul and tasked him with restoring order to the city. 
To help him do so, they passed a senatorial decree to allow him to bring his troops within the 
pomerium, the city’s ritual boundary. One of Pompey’s tasks was to bring those responsible for 
the violence—both Clodius’ supporters and Milo—to justice.308 Pompey wanted these trials to be 
orderly, well-regulated, and non-violent, as proof of his ability to rein in civil disorder. He passed 
a number of laws re-structuring the judiciary process, and selected the potential jurors for the cases 
himself.309 The first agitator to be tried was Milo, whose trial in April was to be a test case of 
Pompey’s new regime.310 
Milo’s trial began like many others in the Eastern Forum. The late Clodius’ supporters, still 
wrathful over his murder, showed up in droves as a result of incessant urging in contiones held by 
                                                
307 Of all the instances of violence in Republican Rome, the physical action of Milo’s murder of 
Clodius has perhaps been examined in the most detail and is extremely well sourced from 
Asconius’ commentary to the Pro Milone. The battle happened in the countryside on the Appian 
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308 Dio 40.50.2. 
309 Asc. 38C; Nippel, 1995, 80-81. 
310 For a detailed chronology of the events leading up to Milo’s trial, see James S. Reubel, "The 
Trial of Milo in 52 B.C.: A Chronological Study," Transactions of the American Philological 
Association 109 (1979). 
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pro-Clodian tribunes during the proceeding days.311 On the first day, Asconius writes that a 
“Clodian mob surrounded the proceedings,” much as had been seen in previous years.312 When 
one of Milo’s advocates, M. Marcellus, rose to speak, he was met by a huge uproar from the 
Clodian supporters. Asconius writes that Marcellus was so afraid he would be physically attacked 
that he leapt onto the tribunal stand of the presiding quaesitor, Domitius, and begged him for armed 
protection.313 The disturbance was also loud enough to be heard by Pompey, who was stationed at 
the state treasury, the Aerarium.314 As the Aerarium was located inside the Temple of Saturn in 
the Western end of the Forum, it is safe to assume that Pompey was watching the drama unfold on 
the the temple’s steps, which afforded an impressive and unbroken view east across the Forum. 
Just as important, it had the added benefit of being a safe distance of 200 meters away from 
whatever violence might occur in the courtroom. However, at Domitius and Milo’s urging Pompey 
promised to appear the next day with a guard.315 
When the trial resumed the next day, Pompey arrived in the courtroom with an armed 
praesidium made up of consular soldiers. Asconius writes that the presence of armed soldiers 
intimidated Clodius’ supporters at least temporarily, and the trial continued undisturbed for the 
next two days.316 However, on the last day of the trial, it appeared that violence would return. 
Cicero—Clodius’ hated enemy and favorite target—was giving the closing oration, and violence 
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from Clodius’ group was almost guaranteed. The tribune T. Munatius held a contio the evening 
before.  
T. Munatius in a contio urged people to attend next day in large numbers and not allow 
Milo to escape, but to make clear their own view of the matter and their own feelings of 
outrage as the jurors went to cast their votes.317 
 
Munatius’ exhortation demonstrates a clear understanding of previous interventions in the court 
system. It is an almost textbook summary of the tactics used in judicial disruptions from 74 to 52: 
Show up in force, vocally assert your opinion through shouts and threats, and intimidate the jurors 
as they voted. As this chapter has demonstrated, the formula had worked many times before. On 
the next morning, individuals descending towards the Forum saw that the tabernae that surrounded 
the Forum were closed, a menacing sign that Clodius’ coalition of shopkeepers, artisans, and 
laborers would be foregoing their work to attend in large numbers.318  
Pompey took novel steps to counter this proven method of judicial intervention, doing what 
no political actor had yet been able to do to protect a trial: Restrict access not only to the courtroom, 
but to the entire Forum. As magistrates, defendants, advocates, spectators, and potential attackers 
alike descended to the various entrances of the Forum, they found something not seen in the past 
30 years: Armed consular soldiers, blocking the way in. Asconius writes: 
Pompeius deployed armed guards in the Forum and round all the approaches to it; he 
himself took is seat, as on the previous day, before the Treasury, fenced in by a picked unit 
of troops…After that there was as great a silence in the Forum as there could possibly be 
in any forum.319 
 
Pompey correctly divined that the problem had plagued the courts in the past was access to the 
entire Forum, particularly the Eastern end. Instead of using his praesidium to ring only the jurors 
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or the immediate court space, Pompey extended the concept of the bodyguard to the entire Forum. 
Asconius’ comment that Pompey re-stationed himself at the Aerarium at the Temple of Saturn, all 
the way across the Forum is significant. Plutarch writes that Pompey’s position at the Temple of 
Saturn was intended to intimidate all involved in the trial into compliance and submission. Pompey 
“posted his soldiers “as in a camp” in order that they might “command the forum.”320 Asconius’ 
emphasis on the Forum’s stillness suggests that if not emptied, the Forum was less populated than 
it regularly was. However, as Russell points out, the silence was not absolute, but relative. The 
Forum was famously the city’s most bustling space—now, it was only as silent as any forum could 
possibly be (which, an ancient reader would understand, was not entirely quiet).321 The Forum, 
with its main entrances and dozens of side-accesses, was a logistical nightmare to control. While 
the constant flow of traffic that moved across the Forum’s many entrances does seem from 
Asconius’ account to have been regulated, it cannot have been stopped entirely.322  
Asconius’ rosy picture of militarily-induced calm did not last for long. Spectators were 
quiet as the two prosecutors delivered their final orations without disruption. However, when 
Cicero rose to speak, “he was greeted by a shout from the Clodians [acclamatione Clodianorum], 
who could not contain themselves despite their fear of the surrounding soldiery.”323 Thus Cicero 
“spoke with less than his usual steadiness.”324 Later historians have exaggerated Cicero’s weakness 
in this scene. Dio and Plutarch speak of no Clodian interruption, and allege that Cicero was 
dumbfounded by the sight of Pompey’s armed soldiers and gave a brief and timid defense. 
However, a large number of modern historians have come to Cicero’s defense, arguing that 
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Asconius’ account of an interruption is credible.325 Cicero’s allegedly weak performance was not 
from fear, scholars argue, but the result of being interrupted multiple times by Clodius’s 
supporters.326 Given that the tabernae were closed and Munatius had encouraged mass attendance, 
we can assume that Clodius’ supporters showed up in even larger force than they had on the first 
day. For the moment, it looked like the events of the trial’s first day were going to repeat 
themselves. 
 This time though, Pompey was prepared to use the furthest measures to defend the 
proceedings. Pompey’s credibility as sole consul rested on his ability to maintain public order, and 
allowing the same people who burnt down the Curia to shout down a defense counsel would have 
been a severe embarrassment. Dio writes that Pompey ordered his soldiers into action: 
Pompey kept the rest of the city well under guard and entered the court himself with armed 
soldiers. When some raised an outcry at this, he ordered the soldiers to drive them out of 
the Forum by striking them with the side or the flat of their swords; and when they still 
would not yield, but jeered as if they were being struck in sport, some of them were 
wounded and killed.327 
 
                                                
325 For the development of the argument, see James Settle, "The Trial of Milo and the Other Pro 
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327 Dio 40.53.2-3.  
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It seems clear from this passage that Clodius’ supporters indeed attempted to intimidate Cicero 
with shouting as they had done to M. Marcellus on the first day. Asconius’ account of the 
acclamatione Clodianorum was thus the start of a protracted battle for entry to the Forum (#68).328 
The soldiers jumped into action, driving the Clodians back towards the Forum’s guarded entrances. 
Once the soldiers forced them out of the entrances, they had to resort to drawing blood to keep 
them out of the Forum for good. The frequent interruptions throughout Cicero’s speech were 
caused by the Clodians’ repeated attempts to burst through Pompey’s checkpoints. Given Clodius’ 
vast base of support, it is not a stretch of the imagination to think that significant numbers of people 
lined the streets around the Forum, either trying to get in or trying to get a good look at the action. 
Even though they had been forced out of the Forum, the entrances that Pompey’s soldiers were 
guarding still close enough for the sound and sight of violence to present. The main entrances to 
the Eastern Forum, the Sacra Via, the Scalae Graecae from the Palatine, and the Vicus Tuscus 
from the Velabrum, were respectively only around 30, 70, and 90 meters away from the praetor’s 
tribunal.329 Although no author mentions them specifically, members of Milo’s own gangs of 
gladiators and professional fighters were probably also in the mix, adding to the havoc. This 
fighting could have easily accounted for the interruptions in Cicero’s speech. Despite the conflict 
                                                
328 Appian 2.24 provides a similar description of judicial violence at a trial in 52 of M. Aemilius 
Scaurus for taking bribes. “The people interceded for Scaurus, but Pompey made proclamation 
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argument, it seems probable that this description, which matches Dio’s account of Milo’s trial, 
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Bucher, "Appian B.C. 2.24 and the Trial "De Ambitu" of M. Aemilius Scaurus," Historia: 
Zietschrift fur Alte Geschitchte 44, no. 4 (1995). 
329 Measurements made in ArcGIS based on Coarelli’s reconstructions of the Eastern Forum, and 
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raging at the Forum’s edges, Pompey’s guard held the entrances. Cicero’s completed oration—
albeit somewhat shaky, clocked in at nearly three hours.330 After his speech, the jury commenced 
voting. Milo was convicted by a large margin.331  
 As Wilfred Nippel writes in his book Public Order in Republican Rome, Pompey’s 
response to civil unrest was to some extent unprecedented. Fortifying the city with soldiers for 
significant periods of time was something that had not been seen since the civil wars between Sulla 
and his enemies in the 80s, and posed a threat to Republican values.332 Although unprecedented, 
the use of troops should not bee seen as unpredictable. Since Manilius’ trial in 66 when the two 
consuls appeared with their lictors in the courtroom to deter disruption, the Romans understood 
that the only way to ensure a trial free of disruption was to somehow fortify the court with enough 
clients, lictors, and supporters to keep opponents out. However, a civilian guard was an ineffective 
deterrent if those looking to disrupt the trial could outnumber and surround the bodyguard, as 
Clodius’ trial in 61 demonstrated. Pompey’s innovation on the last day of Milo’s trial was to 
expand the concept of the praesidium from only the area of the court to the entire Forum. 
Furthermore, the use of soldiers, as opposed to guards recruited from civilian groups lent 
professional fighting skills and fear to the court’s defense. The issue with the courts was that they 
were located in an inherently accessible and tough to control space. Pompey needed to go above 
and beyond what had been done before in order to combat that vulnerability. 
However, we should be cautious in accepting Pompey’s defense of the Forum as an action 
of measured neutrality. Nippel warns, “It might be argued that this use of troops did not differ in 
principle from the employment of the praesidia, but that would be a one-sided version of 
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332 Nippel, 1995, 80-81. 
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events.”333 Pompey was not merely a neutral arbiter attempting to ensure the restoration of the rule 
of law—it was a barely concealed secret that he wanted a conviction.334 He badly wanted to find 
a way to calm Clodius’ supporters while eliminating Milo, who had become a political liability for 
him.335 Pompey’s soldiers, stationed threateningly throughout the Forum, were there not only to 
protect the trial from Clodius’ supporters but to intimidate the defense. In his published Pro 
Milone, Cicero reproached Pompey for using his soldiers—ostensibly for their protection—to 
instill fear in the speakers and the jurors.336 The account of Cicero’s own fear of the soldiers may 
not be true, but the story speaks to Pompey’s overall intent. The sight of Pompey’s soldiers drawing 
swords and bloodying Clodius’ supporters at the Forum’s boundaries may have also brought more 
dread to the jurors than comfort. 
When this is taken into account, it suggests Pompey’s soldiers should not be viewed as a 
stabilizing, neutral force, but as the newest development in the use of personal gangs to intimidate 
jurors and advocates. Like the groups of personal clients, slaves, gang members, and gladiators 
that influenced earlier trials, these soldiers were answerable to Pompey alone. Levied from the 
countryside, they were immune to political and social links to individuals in the city, subject to 
military discipline, and and obliged to follow only the instructions of their commander.337 As Amy 
Russell sums it up, “the soldiers were not enforcing abstract political norms, but the private control 
of one individual: Pompey.”338 
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Russell’s framework of distinguishing private and public space is helpful for understanding 
the escalation of conflict in the courts during the 60s and 50s. Russell writes that whether a space 
can be considered private or public depends on the level of behavioral control that exists the space. 
Public space, Russell writes, was “often characterised by the absence of a controlling authority.”339 
In private space, however, “the owner wielded control and only he had the licence to use 
violence.”340 Spaces like the Forum were “public” because many individuals had the ability to use 
violence.341  Autronius, Cornelius, Manilius, Clodius, and Cato’s use of personal supporters, in 
Russell’s framework, demonstrates the continued uncontrollable nature of the Forum. However, 
even as their violence proved the uncontrollable, “public” space of the Forum, it was tinged with 
the private as well. By disrupting a trial, individuals used personal resources to impose a level of 
behavioral control—albeit extremely brief—on the speakers, jurors, and magistrates in the 
courtroom to achieve a desired outcome. While this does not make the space of the court a 
“private” one, it does show how violence was used repeatedly to try to claim the space of the court 
at least temporarily. In lining the Forum with soldiers, blocking out the Clodians, and intimidating 
the jurors, Pompey made the best stab at truly claiming the public space of the courts as his own. 
Pompey’s occupation of the Forum was intended to prove to everyone in Rome that he was the 
only person who had the right to use violence in the courts. In using violence to prevent the 
Clodians from doing the same, Pompey was asserting his monopoly of force over the area. 
However, as Asconius’ account shows, the violence of Clodius and Milo’s supporters was only 
held at bay, not really controlled. Like all spaces in Rome, spatial control was often fleeting. 
Clodius Personalizes the Temple of Castor and the Eastern Forum 
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Pompey was not the only person who attempted to establish a monopoly of force in the 
Eastern Forum. Of the fifteen instances of political violence that occurred in the Eastern Forum 
between 80 and 50, eight were the indirect or direct work of P. Clodius Pulcher, the patrician-
turned-plebeian tribune. Starting in 58, Clodius attempted to become the “controlling authority” 
over this zone of the Forum through a set of symbolic acts and violence associated with the area’s 
topography. Clodius’ activities in the Eastern Forum had a systematic and calculated approach. 
The Eastern Forum had a known popularis character that largely derived from the Temple of 
Castor, which developed as a site for contiones and comitiae in competition with the 
aristocratically-dominated Curia-Comitium complex. Two shocking instances of political violence 
committed by popularis heroes on the Temple of Castor in the late 60s BCE further lent a 
subversive and anti-senatorial symbolism to the area. Clodius used acts of munificence and legal 
recognition, directed at plebs urbana, the Temple of Castor and the Praetor’s tribunal to associate 
the space with himself. Having built these associations, Clodius consistently used violence to 
regulate activities of others and claim control over the area. In the same way that Pompey’s 
attempts to fully control the courts was ill-fated, Clodius’ attempts to control the Eastern Forum 
cannot be called “private.” They were, however, an ambitious attempt towards controlling the 
behavior of his political opponents in the area that achieved a remarkable level of success. 
Although he conducted violence all over the city, Clodius was successful building a personal 
relationship with the topography of the Eastern Forum that enhanced his political power and 
stature.  
Popular Politics at the Temple of Castor 
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The Temple of Castor342 visually dominated the Eastern Forum. It was the highest building 
in the vicinity, and its front façade towered over the adjacent Basilica Sempronia, the Atrium 
Vestae, and the Regia. Two of the three main entrances to the Eastern Forum, the Vicus Tuscus 
and the Scalae Graecae, entered the Forum alongside the Temple. The Temple’s podium was 
unusually high and stood at 7 meters above the Forum’s pavement level.343  
 Geoffrey Sumi has documented the close relationship between the Temple of Castor and 
popular political activity that predated Clodius’ tribunate. Before 145 BCE, comitae and contiones 
took place in the Comitium, the ancient space that was wedged between the Rostra and the Curia. 
Meeting there symbolically and practically reinforced the power of the Senatorial aristocracy. The 
limited space prevented too many individuals, in particular any disruptive elements, from 
participating in legislative activity.344 The presence of the Curia looming above the proceedings 
symbolically accentuated the Senate’s primacy in decision-making.345 However, in 145 a plebeian 
tribune C. Licinius Crassus was the first to lead a comitia plebis tributa to vote instead in the 
Forum’s central space on the other side of the Rostra. Crassus’ move may have been designed in 
order to allow larger audiences to participate in contiones and comitiae. It was also a pointed 
rejection of senatorial control over the popular legislative process.346 After Crassus, politicians 
addressed assembled groups in the Forum’s central space, looking eastward.  
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 It was not long until legislative processes shifted even further east. By the end of the second 
century, the Temple of Castor appears in sources as an alternative location for public meetings and 
legislative assemblies.347 To accommodate increased political activity, in 117 BCE the temple was 
renovated and a long platform that ran the full width of the temple was added.348 Its height was 
3.66 meters above the Forum’s pavement, approximately the same height as the Rostra on the 
Comitium.349 This platform became known as a second rostra.350 As Fig. 10 shows, the temple 
had no central stairs leading up to the platform, but small lateral stairways.351 These stairways 
allowed the temple’s front to function as a speaker’s platform similar to the Rostra, providing room 
in the front for large crowds to approach close to hear a speaker. For contiones and funeral orations, 
the stairless front was visually striking.352 It likely impressed upon a viewer a sense of power and 
inaccessibility, as did the stairless front of the Rostra in the Forum. The Senate also met frequently 
in the temple starting from the mid-second century, and it is likely the temple’s front was designed 
in part to lend seriousness to senatorial announcements and decrees.353  
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Figure 10:The Temple of Castor and Pollux, UCLA Virtual Reality Lab Digital Roman Forum Project. Although the 
Temple pictured is an Imperial restoration, the structure and the Rostra are the same as the Republican one. 
 
The unbroken façade also facilitated voting in the comitiae. For voting, a central wooden 
stair was erected that led up to a small platform or landing, just below the height of the temple’s 
stone platform. The cistae—the wicker baskets in which ballots were dropped—were placed on 
this stand. Directly above, on the temple’s platform, the magistrate presiding over the comitia sat 
with his attendants, including a herald and a scribe. The pontes—the wooden voting bridges 
described earlier for voting at the Rostra—were attached on either side of this central stairway. 
Voters marched up the pontes in single file lines with their tribe, cast their ballot on the landing 
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under the watchful eyes of the presiding magistrate, and descended down the central stair.354 
Because of the frequency that the Temple of Castor was used for legislation, the wooden structure 
was regularly installed for long periods at a time.355 The Temple may have also gained a popularis 
legislative character simply because it allowed more individuals to participate, as opposed to the 
Comitium or even the Forum area below the Rostra.356 
 As Sumi argues, the Temple of Castor’s topographical relationship to the traditional Curia-
Comitium complex in the west of the Forum naturally lent it anti-Senatorial connotations. It was 
far removed from the Curia, which stood diagonally across the Forum. It was close to the new 
praetor’s tribunal established after 74. Taken together, the complex of the temple, the speaker’s 
platform, and the courtroom provided a symbolic opposite to the senatorially-dominated 
Curia/Comitium/Rostra complex. Sumi eloquently paints a vivid picture of the the anti-Senatorial 
imagery that was performed during contiones and comitiae at the temple’s speaker’s platform: 
The rostra of the Temple of Castor provided an effective vantage point from which a popular 
politician could gesture angrily at the Curia across the Forum—the symbol of a remote and 
insensitive ruling elite; and the crowd would stand with its back to the Curia, instead of facing 
it, as it would if it were listening to a speaker standing on the Rostra357 
 
As a symbolically subversive analogue to the traditional sites of deliberation and legislation, the 
Temple of Castor provided opportunities to politicians with an axe to grind against the senatorial 
aristocracy. Sumi writes “The temple became the ideal location for a champion of the people…to 
                                                
354 Ibid., 298-99; Taylor, 1966, 24-28, 41-45. Taylor’s original work on the Temple of Castor 
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356 Mouritsen, 2001, 23. 
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emphasize the gulf that existed between the senatorial aristocracy and the urban plebs.”358 
Beginning in 58 BCE, that champion of the people was to be P. Clodius Pulcher.  
 Before Clodius began to cement his grip on the eastern Forum, however, there were two 
incidents at the Temple of Castor in the years preceding his tribunate that provided him with 
precedents for popular violence and led to the temple’s association with popular politics. In 62, Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos and C. Julius Caesar had attempted to pass a law recalling Pompey to 
take command against Catiline’s army in Etruria from the Temple’s podium. The bill was strongly 
opposed by the senatorial aristocracy, and had wide support outside of the senatorial class due to 
Pompey’s popularity.359 Potentially he may have been considering the anti-senatorial optics that 
such a location provided. The Temple of Castor also allowed for larger amounts of people to 
participate, and Metellus seems to have anticipated significant numbers in attendance, given 
Pompey’s popularity among the plebs.360 Compared to the Rostra, the narrow lateral stairways up 
to the speaker’s platform could be more easily blocked. On the day of the vote, Nepos and Caesar 
fortified the temple by stationing armed men and gladiators around the edges of the temple, 
specifically ordering the gladiators to guard the narrow stairways.361 Violence broke out when 
Cato the Younger, who was also on the temple’s platform, tackled Metellus and stuffed his hand 
in his mouth to prevent the bill from being read (#20). A fight broke out between competing groups 
of supporters in the crowd, and the assembly was dissolved.362 Three years later during Caesar’s 
consulship, the scene was repeated when Caesar and the tribune Publius Vatinius used the Temple 
of Castor to pass an equally controversial bill distributing public land for the veterans of Pompey’s 
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eastern wars. The two stationed men—this time, furloughed soldiers sent home from Pompey’s 
army for the sole purpose of supporting the vote—around the temple’s lateral stairways (#25).363 
When Caesar’s co-consul Bibulus attempted to climb the podium with his lictors, his fasces were 
broken and a bucket of excrement dumped on his head. Known for his persistence in summiting 
pieces of political topography, Cato attempted to climb the stairs twice. After being dragged out 
of the Forum’s exit at either Vicus Tuscus or the Scalae Graecae, he took a back street around and 
came out the other of the two streets, only to be thrown out again.364 
These two assemblies were quite sensational and must have left an indelible impression on 
politicians and regular citizens alike. Geoffrey Sumi writes that as a result of these incidents, “the 
temple became a locus for popular politics and therefore resonant of popular sovereignty.”365 They 
also demonstrated the tactical advantages of holding assemblies on controversial legislation from 
the platform of the temple as opposed to on the Rostra, which was harder to defend. The memory 
of the latter successful assembly was still fresh a year later in 58, when Clodius was elected tribune.  
Clodius Claims the Eastern Forum 
 
Clodius took pains to ensure that his supporters would associate the Temple of Castor with 
his personalized brand of popularis politics. His legislative program, outlined masterfully by 
Jeffrey Tatum, included two proposals designed to capture the support of large swaths of the plebs 
urbana.366 The first was a lex frumentaria, a grain distribution, providing a free monthly ration of 
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grain to all citizens 10 and over for the first time in Roman history.367 In a city frequently plagued 
by food shortages and hunger, this law gained Clodius immediate popularity. The second was a 
lex de collegiis, which re-legalized the city’s collegia, religious and social organizations based on 
occupation or neighborhood. The collegia were somewhat analogous to modern trade associations 
and neighborhood boards, and provided poor Romans job security, recreation, and social 
dignity.368 They were also a potent tool for political mobilization. Tapping into their networks of 
officers and members could yield a politician significant on-the-ground support for contiones or 
comitiae.369 The organizations had had been outlawed since 64 for their perceived contribution to 
increasing violence.370 Clodius’ law also created new collegia intended to enroll Rome’s poorest, 
who had heretofore been excluded from collegia as a result of inability to pay the membership 
fees. No source describes what site Clodius passed this aggressively popularis program. However, 
both Sumi and Cerutti indicate that it may have been from the rostra of the Temple of Castor, 
given Clodius’ later activites there.371 Passing his laws from there would have further deepened 
the association between the temple and the concept of popular politics.  
After passing his law re-instating the collegia, Clodius held a descriptio, an accounting of 
the city’s collegia and their members. Working street by street, Clodius publicly recognized and 
recorded each of the city’s collegia, restoring legitimacy and self-respect to much of Rome’s 
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lower-class population. The event also served as a recruitment fair for Clodius’ newly founded 
collegia. Cicero lambasts Clodius for holding a dilectus servi, a recruitment of slaves into these 
new collegia.372 He describes slaves and freedmen flocking to the site usually occupied by the 
courtroom to be enrolled by Clodius himself in a collegia. As Tatum more sensibly writes, it is 
likely that these “slaves” were simply “Romans of the poorest stamp.”373 While previously these 
citizens had been prevented from joining collegia because they were too poor to pay the dues, 
Clodius’ newly founded collegia accepted newcomers regardless of their ability to pay, supported 
by patronage from Clodius and his immediate associates. Tatum argues that the enrollment of the 
new collegia had an important symbolic impact on the new members. Recognition of their collegia 
bestowed a sense of significance and state recognition that was entirely new for the poorest 
members of the plebs urbana. These poor Romans who were newly enrolled in the collegia “had 
ample reason to feel grateful to the tribune who had raised their stake in public life by enhancing 
and enriching their local prestige.”374  
 What is most interesting about Clodius’ enrollment of the collegia is its location. Cicero 
writes that Clodius conducted the affair from the “Tribunal of Aurelius”—the wooden tribunal 
stand built at the center of the praetor’s courtroom.375 As new collegia members lined up to be 
officially recognized, they did so in the area that the praetor usually organized his court.376 Perhaps 
many waited on the Gradus Aurelii before it was their turn to come before Clodius. Why did he 
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use the the praetor’s stand, as opposed to the Rostra or some other public location? The stand, as 
described in Chapter I, would have been only 1 to 1.25 meters off the ground. In the courtroom, 
this height provided the urban praetor some imposing elevation above the courtroom, but leaving 
him close enough to the ground to be fully engaged in the proceedings. It seems from Cicero’s 
accounts of the event that Clodius was personally involved in the counting and recruiting for the 
collegia, and it would have been hard for him to be so engaged if he were on the Rostra, or the 
podium of a temple. Using the praetor’s stand lent an official and legalistic tone to the work, and 
contributed to the sense of importance that individual collegia members felt when they and their 
organization was legally recognized.  
More importantly, the choice of locale was also designed to foster an association between 
Clodius’ personal patronage and the topography of the Eastern Forum. By conducting his business 
at the tribunal stand, Clodius symbolically claimed jurisdiction over trials and judgments in the 
Eastern Forum, usually the purview of the urban praetor. Clodius’ use of the courtroom space was 
a symbolic collapse of the very distance between tribune and praetor that Aurelius Cotta aimed at 
in 74 when he moved the courtroom to the eastern Forum. By recruiting his supporters within the 
space that also contained the courtroom, it sent the message that this space belonged to Clodius 
and his supporters, at least for the moment. The entire process took place under the auspices of the 
Temple of Castor, which loomed conspicuously above the tribunal stand from the south. To 
demonstrate the visual impact holding the descriptio in this location, Fig. 11 shows the area of the 
Eastern Forum, facing south. At the photo’s center is the modern-day remains of the Temple of 
Castor, still standing commandingly above the central forum space. The stone structure on the left 
is the remains of the Augustan-era Temple of Divus Julius—also the theorized location of the 
urban praetor’s tribunal. The tourists in the foreground would be standing just to the side of the 
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urban praetor’s courtroom. For a plebeian waiting to be recognized or enrolled in a collegia, the 
Temple of Castor’s presence would have been impossible to ignore.  
 
Figure 11: The Temple of Castor Overlooking the Eastern Forum. Author's work, Feb 21 2016. 
 
The temple was already associated with contiones and popular legislation in the 
consciousness of the plebs urbana.377 By conducting an unprecedented act of recognition for the 
city’s poorest classes in the Temple’s shadow, Clodius tied his own name to the temple’s pre-
existing associations with popular sovereignty, popular legislative proposals, and tribunician 
violence. When newly minted members of the collegia looked at the Eastern Forum and saw the 
towering Temple of Castor and the praetor’s tribunal, they would have been reminded of the 
gratitude they felt for Clodius’ recognition and patronage in that very space. If Clodius did indeed 
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pass his legislative program from its Rostra, the association would have been even stronger. The 
descriptio in the Eastern Forum was a crucial second step in Clodius’ campaign to establish control 
over the area.  
Controlling Topography: Clodius’ Activities in the Eastern Forum 
 
Clodius’ attempt to foster semantic connections between his authority and the topography 
of the Eastern Forum was soon tested. Not long after the descriptio of the collegia, Publius 
Vatinius, the tribune who helped Caesar violently pass his Lex Agraria from the Temple of 
Castor’s steps, was indicted for illegal activites as a tribune.378 Vatinius boldly surrendered his 
legal immunity and returned to the city to face trial, hoping the charges would dissolve. When they 
did not, he appealed to Clodius for aid. After an attempt failed to defend Vatinius on a legal 
technicality, Clodius indicated publicly that he would be showing up to the trial in person. The day 
before the trial, he put out a call to the plebs: assemble and defend the liberty of a wronged 
citizen.379  Vatinius’ trial was to be Clodius’ first test of whether the topographical associations he 
had attempted to build by recognizing the collegia at the tribunal of Aurelius would pay off.  
Clodius’ work paid off spectacularly. The next day, judicial intervention occurred on a 
scale that had not been seen before. Large numbers of the plebs urbana turned out to the trial.380 
Apparently without Clodius’ prompting, the crowd wasted no time in completely destroying the 
court (#28). They physically pushed the praetor C. Memmius off his tribunal stand, scattered the 
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jurors’ benches, and overturned the voting urns.381 Tatum writes that this incident was a turning 
point in Clodius’ career: “It was the first sign that Clodius’ lex de collegiis and lex frumentaria 
had procured the tribune not only unprecedented popularitas but also a mechanism that could rally 
vocal and violent demonstrations whenever needed.”382 However, the incident was also evidence 
that Clodius’ had succeeded in linking his own person to the space of the courts. His supporters 
had no qualms in completely wrecking the praetor’s court on Clodius’ command. Having recruited 
many of them into collegia at that very spot, they may have felt that the space belonged more to 
their patron Clodius than to the praetor. 
Clodius lost no time in turning his symbolic relationship with the Temple of Castor into 
one of physical dominance as well. Cicero’s writings lay a serious allegation on Clodius, that he 
tore out the stairs of the temple of Castor and stored weapons inside it. Cicero harangued him thus 
in De Domo Sua:   
When you were having arms collected and carried to the temple of Castor, had you no other 
object beyond preventing others from being able to effect anything by violence? But when 
you tore up and removed the steps of the temple of Castor, did you then, in order to be able 
to act in a moderate manner, repel audacious men from the approaches and ascents leading 
to the temple?383 
 
Much has been made of this alleged “fortification” of the temple. Vanderbroeck interprets 
the event literally.384 Tatum dismisses the whole idea as empty Ciceronian rhetoric.385 However, 
Steven Cerutti presents the most sensible option. Clodius could not have actually torn out the 
lateral stone steps of the Temple, as it is noted to be intact by the summer when the Senate met 
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inside it.386 However, he could have easily destroyed the wooden stairs, landing, and pontes that 
were regularly set up in front of the temple for voting in comitiae. This would have been in part a 
tactical move to defend his legislative program, which was finalized with the bill formally exiling 
Cicero in April. After that, Cerutti argues, Clodius dismantled the frontal wooden stair to prevent 
anyone else from passing legislation that might repeal his laws.387 By preventing anyone else from 
passing legislation from the temple that year, Clodius asserted that the space was his for legislation, 
not anyone else’s. 
Instead of just occupying the temple with armed men, as Nepos and Caesar had done in 62 
and 59, Clodius altered its physical appearance. Altering the Temple’s exterior was a performative 
act that allowed Clodius to claim a space that had elements of the public and the sacred for his 
own. Russell writes that most temples in Republican Rome were built, paid for, and refurbished 
by individual members of the elite.388 Constructing these temples allowed the Romans responsible 
for them to stake a personal and private claim to sacred space ostensibly shared by the community. 
When individual Romans patronized a temple, or a basilica, or a portico that had been built by a 
wealthy aristocrat, he or she would have been reminded of the power of the patron that had built 
it. Clodius’ destruction of the Temple of Castor’s wooden voting apparatus reverses the 
expectation of senatorial refurbishment. Instead of renovating a temple, Clodius—in the eyes of 
his critics—destroyed it. However, the symbolic effect may have been the same. Anyone 
accustomed to looking at the Temple of Castor and seeing its wooden attachments would have 
been reminded of Clodius’ presence and past actions in the Eastern Forum. Like a renovation or a 
new construction, Clodius left a physical mark on the temple that was conspicuous. Clodius’ 
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alteration of the Temple of Castor was a bold statement of his own attempt to control the Eastern 
Forum.  
Having attained legislative superiority in the Eastern Forum, Clodius used the Temple of 
Castor and at the same time neutralize one of Rome’s leading men. As mentioned above, the Senate 
had met in the Temple of Castor frequently since the second century. Temple interiors, as we have 
seen, often served as refuge from outside threats like plebeian crowds and potential assassins. 
Clodius was to shatter that assumption of safety. On August 11th, the Senate was meeting in the 
Temple’s interior, and Pompey was in attendance. As Pompey entered the temple’s cella, a 
commotion erupted when a slave that happened to be near the door conspicuously let a dagger or 
a sword fall to the floor (#32)389 The slave was immediately seized. When questioned, he confessed 
that he had been ordered by Clodius to assassinate Pompey. It is probable that the attempt was 
intended to be discovered and not carried out.390 Even though Pompey’s popularity was waning, 
killing the man who restored the tribunician potestas and won numerous wars in the east would 
have been a rash move. Tatum argues that it is more likely Clodius wanted Pompey intimidated.391 
If that is the case, then Clodius’ was again entirely successful. Pompey was notoriously afraid of 
assassination, and after the failed attack in the Temple’s cella, he barricaded himself in his house 
on the Carinae hill and refused to enter the Forum until the end of Clodius’ tribunate.392 There was 
no investigation and no charges against Clodius on account of the incident.393 Not only had Clodius 
physically penetrated a bastion of the Senate and shaken their sense of security, he had 
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singlehandedly expelled one of the most powerful men in Rome from the Forum and forced him 
out of political life for multiple months.  
Clodius’ control of action in the Eastern Forum outlived his tribunate. In 57, Cicero’s ally 
the tribune Publius Sestius attempted to interrupt a legislative assembly being held by Metellus 
Nepos in front of the Temple of Castor. Although the circumstances and the substance of the bill 
are unknown, Tatum suggests that Sestius’s attempt to end the assembly was part the senate’s 
decision to filibuster all government activity in protest until Cicero was restored.394 In this case, 
the interruption of the assembly would have been a public insult to Clodius and the anti-Ciceronian 
forces. Clodius would brook no senatorial obstruction in his stronghold. His subordinates 
Lentitdius and Titius—both collegia leaders who had perhaps joined Clodius after their 
recruitment at the Tribunal of Aurelius—attacked Sestius and beat him nearly to death. When the 
presiding consul attempted to intervene, Lentidius and Titius attacked him too, shattering his 
lictors’ fasces (#36).395  Nor did Clodius let events at the praetor’s tribunal go awry. When C. Cato 
disrupted his own trial in 54 by attacking his prosecutor (#59), Clodius may have played a role. 
Tatum notes that Clodius and Cato were political allies, and Clodius may have even been on Cato’s 
defense team.396  
Clodius’ control of the Eastern Forum also spilled out into the neighboring section of the 
Sacra Via that ran into the Eastern Forum along the Regia. In November of 57, Clodius and a group 
of supporters actually ambushed Cicero as he was descending the narrow and compact Sacra Via 
towards the Forum. Clodius’ forces charged down the road towards Cicero, brandishing clubs, 
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swords, and throwing stones. Although hemmed in, Cicero and those accompanying him did not 
have to go far for safety. Like the consuls Cotta and Octavius who were attacked on the road in 
75, they took refuge in one of the nearby aristocratic houses that lined the road. Apparently, the 
attack occurred right as Cicero was passing the house of a friend named Tettius Damio. Cicero’s 
group hastily “stepped aside” inside Damio’s vestibule and drove Clodius and his men off from 
that position of relative protection.397 Clodius may have been trying to keep the newly arrived 
Cicero, triumphantly returned from exile, out of the Forum. A more serious clash occurred in 53, 
when the retinues of the consular candidates T. Annius Milo and Plautius Hypsaeus met on the 
Sacra Via alongside the Regia.398 Cicero was backing Milo, and Clodius was supporting Hypsaeus, 
Asconius tells us, and both were present with their respective candidates. Given that both 
candidates were on their consular canvass, their retinues would have been swelled with dozens of 
clients and freedmen. Milo had his guard of gladiators. Clodius likely also brought a large group 
of supporters. In the 9-meter space of the road between the Regia and the houses on the other side, 
the two trains collided with force. A number of Milo’s supporters were killed, and Clodius himself 
nearly murdered Cicero alongside the Regia.399 In both cases, Clodius may have been attempting 
to keep Cicero and his allies out of the Forum, and in particular out of the Eastern Forum. 
Additionally, if Clodius had planned to ambush or kill Cicero both times, the narrow, alley-like 
space of the Sacra Via would have been an opportune location.   
Assessing Clodius’ “Control” 
 
Taken together, these instances of Clodian violence in the Eastern Forum demonstrate that 
the popular demagogue took pains to establish some type of personal control over the Eastern 
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section of the Forum. That is not to say that the space was entirely under his control, or that he had 
a monopoly of political activity that took place there between 58 and his death in 52. Legislative 
and judicial activity went on as usual in the Eastern Forum. Compared to the amount of trials that 
took place between 58 and 52, Clodius’ presence, and more importantly, Clodius’ violence—is 
miniscule.400 Additionally, after his tribunate expired in 57, Clodius no longer could avail himself 
of tribunician lawmaking. As a result, his need for the Temple of Castor’s tribunal likely waned, 
although, although he still probably held contiones from it. Furthermore, particularly as trials are 
concerned, Tatum notes that in the years after 56, Clodius was attempting to maintain a level of 
détente with the senatorial aristocracy to gain support for a race for the praetorship in 52. Clodius 
was active in the courts, but as an advocate. Nor should this section suggest that Clodius’ interest 
was restricted to the Eastern Forum. Chapters II and III have amply demonstrated that Clodius 
attempted to use violence to control spaces all over the Western Forum, especially as they related 
to his campaign to prevent Cicero’s recall. After 57, Clodius violent ire was more frequently 
targeted at the private homes of his enemies, as the next chapter will show. 
 However, this section should impress upon the reader the calculated process with which 
Clodius attempted to combine symbolism, topography, and ideology in an attempt to create himself 
a clientele and a political stronghold out of the Eastern Forum. He demonstrated a keen interest t 
regulating the political activity of others, and ensuring that he could achieve his own goals with 
impunity. His followers, having first been swayed and recruited in the area by his legislation and 
his descriptio of the collegia, enthusiastic responded to his calls to conduct violence in the area. It 
is his supporters’ enthusiasm and that sense of ownership of the space which Pompey’s soldiers 
had to reckon with even after Clodius’ death in 52 during Milo’s trial. Clodius’ attempt to 
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personalize the eastern form, and Pompey’s stab at privatizing the Forum’s space are indicative of 
important trends in Roman politics. As the next chapter will show, the battle over Rome’s political 
direction—via its political spaces—was becoming increasingly personalized. Clodius and Pompey 
in particular used novel combinations of political and private space to assert their own political 
interests.  
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Chapter V: Violence at the Aristocratic Domus  
 
 Of the 69 instances of political violence that occurred between 80 and 50 BCE, 11 of them 
involved the urban homes of Rome’s elite. The central and multifarious role of aristocratic houses 
in Roman political culture is a field unto its own. Homes were the site of business and political 
transactions; the location where social obligations between clients and patrons of all differing 
levels were performed; showcases of a family’s fame, history and its political standing; and the 
location where a politician organized his social network.401 As urban real-estate grew increasingly 
scarce in the Late Republic, the importance of having a home that was visible and close to the 
Forum multiplied exponentially. Rome’s most influential political families packed into homes 
within a two-kilometer space between the Palatine and Esquiline hills.402 The most prominent of 
those were squeezed into the coveted real-estate of the Palatine Hill, which housed nearly more 
than thirty of the Republic’s most famous political families. A house in the district signaled 
elevation to fame and prominence. Building grander and grander homes became a central part of 
the bitter aristocratic competition for dignitas in the first century BCE.403  
Scholars have established that an aristocratic home cannot be strictly called “private.” Hans 
Beck recognized that aristocratic houses, although nominally in the control of their owner, were 
governed by a set of communal traditions and behavioral expectations relating to the idea of the 
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libera res publica.404 Amy Russell writes that we should think of Republican homes “not just as 
semi-public, but as mutable and even manipulable.”405 Complexes like the Porticus Catuli, a 
victory monument attached to the home of Q. Lutatius Catulus, and Pompey’s theater complex, 
which included his own residence, used monumental architecture to blend public and private to fit 
the owner’s needs for political and social influence.406 However, despite the claims the community 
might have on a house, it is clear that it existed first and foremost to amplify its owner’s personal 
prestige.407 Hans Beck writes in summary, “aristocratic homes came to symbolize their owners 
and everything they stood for in politics.”408 
This chapter examines the role of the aristocratic domus in the political violence of the Late 
Republic. The first section of this chapter will show how the aristocratic home functioned both as 
a stronghold for weathering political violence and a space from which it could be organized. The 
architectural layout of aristocratic homes of senatorial homes made them eminently defendable, 
and the relative privacy that they offered meant that homes were the space where political violence 
was planned in secret. The second section of the chapter will focus on the aristocratic home’s 
primary role in the political violence of the 50s: as a proxy for the political power of the owner. 
Although homes had been the targets of violence in the past, that violence had been an act of the 
community and sanctioned by the state. However, starting in 58, P. Clodius Pulcher inaugurated a 
calculated program of personalized violence against senatorial homes, using them as proxies for 
formal political space in the Forum. In the battle over control of urban space between Pompey and 
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Cicero on one hand and Clodius on the other, the ostensibly “private” aristocratic houses packed 
into the Palatine, Velia, and Carinae became a public battlefield. Although homes were already 
politically significant, Clodius’ actions made senators’ residences central to the spatial battles that 
defined the Republic’s last decade. At the same he made houses central to public politics, Clodius 
also attempted to effect a sort of privatization on them. By attacking certain homes, Clodius made 
the buildings serve not the owner’s prestige, but his own. Clodius’ targeting of senatorial homes 
had an impact on Roman political culture even after his death in 52. The actions of other actors in 
the urban violence following Clodius’ funeral showed that the tribune’s elision of political and 
residential space had permeated Roman political culture.    
Defensive Bastions and Offensive Headquarters 
 
In 75, the consuls Octavius and Cotta were chased up the Sacra Via by a mob of plebeians 
enraged over food shortages (#2), as described in Chapter I. Sallust writes that that the consuls 
were luckily saved only by escaping into Octavius’ own house, which was not far up the road. 
Sallust’s text is fragmentary and only records that the consuls were chased to the house, leaving 
what happened when they got to the house unclear.409 However, a similar attack on Cicero in 57 
can help explain how Octavius and Cotta’s experience may have ended—and helps explain the 
utility of the aristocratic domus as a defensive site. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Cicero 
escaped an attack by Clodius on the Sacra Via (#42) in much the same way the consuls of 75 did. 
When charged by Clodius’ gang, he hopped off into the vestibule of the house of a friend, Tettius 
Damio: “There were shouts, stone-throwing, brandishing of clubs and swords…I and my party 
stepped aside into Tettius Damio’s vestibule (vestibulum).” Once inside the vestibule of the house, 
Cicero wrote Atticus that “those accompanying me easily prevented his [Clodius’] roughs from 
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getting in. He might have been killed himself.”410 According to Cicero, once he and his retinue 
were inside the house, it was no trouble to defend themselves against Clodius and his attackers, so 
little trouble that they were able to turn the tables on Clodius and nearly kill him.  
 Why were these houses such effective in-the-moment bastions? The answer lies in an 
investigation of the street-facing architecture of an aristocratic home. As Johanson’s modeling of 
processions on the Sacra Via has demonstrated, Republican houses were imposing two-story 
edifices that towered over over the road.411 They had balconies that projected over the street; under 
the balconies were independent tabernae spaces, rented out for extra income, and wooden benches 
placed alongside the façade on which clients awaited access to the house and their patron.412 In 
between these benches and tabernae was the home’s entrance, which was designed to regulate the 
access of outsiders. The plan below, adapted from Shelly Hales’ plan of the Late Republican 
aristocratic “House of Diana” at the Latin colony of Cosa—a Latin colony 140 kilometers from 
Rome—demonstrates the features of an “ideal” aristocratic house, including its entranceway.413 
                                                
410 Cic. Att. 4.3.3. 
411 Johanson, "Spectacle in the Forum: Visualizing the Roman Aristocratic Funeral of the Middle 
Republic," 58, 62-64. 
412 Hales, "Republican Houses," 54. 
413 Ibid.; Elizabeth Fentress, Cosa V: An Intermittent Town, Excavations 1991-1997 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2004). As a result of the building projects of the Emperors on the 
Palatine, much of the Late Republican housing has disappeared under these structures. Many 
scholars look to Pompeii, preserved by dint of its grim fate, and Roman colonies like Cosa. Hales 
follows Fentress in viewing the House of Diana as “standard pattern and size” for Republican 
housing. 
 153 
 
Figure 12: The "ideal" aristocratic atrium house, demonstrating the features of the entranceway. 
From Hales, "Republican Houses," 55. 
 
Entrances to an aristocratic home were quite restricted. A visitor from the street would first 
enter the vestibulum, the small outdoor space between the door and the street which was bounded 
by the three walls of the building. Climbing a set of steep steps, the visitor crossed the threshold, 
itself only two meters wide. Then, he entered a narrow corridor of the same width (A)—what some 
scholars call the fauces—leading into the atrium (B).414 The doors to these homes were also 
frequently left open, so passerby could be appropriately impressed by the wealth, decoration, and 
power of the home’s paterfamilias, seeing across the building’s central axis to the beautifully 
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painted atrium, decorated with spoils of war and the images of famous ancestors.415 However, the 
narrow entrance placed a restrictive frame on the passerby’s view, preventing visual access to the 
majority of the home. Thus aristocratic homes managed to both provide the image of accessibility, 
but in reality be visually and physically inaccessible.416  
It was this mix of accessibility and inaccessibility that saved Cicero and the consuls of 75. 
The two-meter wide threshold was perhaps room for only two people to at most to get through. It 
could be blocked with a door, ropes, chains, or manpower. If the door was open, an assailed group 
could retreat into the narrow fauces and then fight from there. When Cicero wrote that he stepped 
into Damio’s vestibulum, it seems likely that his group backed as far as into the fauces. The 
vestibulum would likely have been too small to contain his whole group. As mentioned above, it 
is likely that the door was open to provide passerby an impressive glance at the owner’s power.417 
However, if the door was closed, the vestibulum would have provided enough protection at least 
for Cicero, the group’s patron, to back in while his attendants defended him. If Tettius Damio was 
home, he, members of his family, and his household slaves may have come to Cicero’s aid. 
Octavius and Cotta likely escaped the mob on the Sacra Via the same way. Since the home they 
fled to was Octavius,’ members of the consul’s household probably joined in repelling the assault.  
                                                
415 Ibid., 63. 
416 Ibid.; Russell, 2016, 13. 
417 Another famous Roman was inadvertently saved by an inadvertently open door. In 89, the 
eventual dictator L. Cornelius Sulla was forced to flee from a riot that broke out in the Eastern 
Forum during an assembly at the Temple of Castor. With a group of armed equestrian men on his 
trail, Sulla ran from the temple to the Forum’s exit along the Sacra Via. As he rounded the corner 
of the Regia with the crowd close behind him, Sulla did what no one expected him to do: He ran 
across the street and burst through the front doors of the closest home, which had been left open. 
His pursuers rounded the corner of the Regia and missed him, thinking that he ran further off up 
the road. The great irony? The home belonged to Sulla’s great rival Gaius Marius, the very man 
who was attempting to force Sulla out of the city. 
 155 
It was not only the main entrance that provided defensive strength. The balconies that 
projected from the second floor of a building also provided a house’s defenders with a tactical 
advantage vis-à-vis those in the street below. The members of a besieged household could use the 
balconies to get a better vantage point with which to appraise a crowd outside the building and 
negotiate with them. Like the Rostra, the balcony provided the speaker a high point from which to 
address a group. In 62, when Caesar resigned his praetorship in advance of being stripped of his 
position by the Senate, an unruly mob of plebeians flocked to his house (#21). At the time, he had 
moved into the Domus Publica, the official residence of the Pontifex Maximus, a position Caesar 
had achieved in 63.418 It was located just to the east of the Atrium Vestae and to the immediate 
southeast of the Regia; Today, the modern Temple of Romulus stands immediately across the 
Sacra Via.419 In the Late Republic, the area represented the the end of the Forum, and the start of 
the thickly packed residences on the Palatine’s northern slope. Suetonius writes that the crowd was 
unruly and “with riotous demonstrations offered [Caesar] their aid in recovering his position.”420 
Given their enthusiasm for Caesar in the past, it is not hard to imagine that the crowd intended to 
do some violence to Caesar’s perceived opponents.421 Caesar, we are told, had to rein the crowd 
in—Suetonius writes that “held them in check.” This suggests that he gave some sort of speech or 
address to calm them. With such a large group clogging the street, Caesar likely addressed them 
not from his narrow doorway, but from the imposing elevation of the balcony. Suetonius’ language 
is similar to that of a magistrate calming a crowd before the Rostra, and we ought to imagine 
Caesar, from the height of his balcony, urging calm. The balcony could also be used for more 
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assertive defensive tactics. In 52 when Clodian mobs attempted to burn down Milo’s house, they 
were repulsed by men with arrows shooting from his home’s balcony.422  
 
Figure 13: Reconstruction of a large aristocratic domus along the Sacra Via, demonstrating the height of the balcony over the 
road. The taller door in the center was the narrow entranceway of the home—the other doors led to small tabernae that were 
installed in the façade. From Johanson, “Spectacle in the Forum,” 58. 
It may have been for these defensive purposes that Cicero imprisoned the Catilinarian 
Conspirators of 63 not in the state prison in the Forum, the Carcer, but committed them to house 
arrest in the homes of various prominent senators.423 The majority of these senators lived on the 
Palatine Hill.424 Appian writes that the personal slaves of Lentulus and Cethegus led a crowd of 
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slaves and artisans to attack the homes where each was imprisoned in an attempt to free them.425 
However, the attacks were repulsed and unsuccessful, as sources report that Cicero and his 
subordinates reinforced the homes with guards and dispersed the attackers.426  Later, as Cicero led 
the prisoners down the Palatine Hill to be executed in the Carcer, there was no disruption.427 With 
its closed-in streets lined by towering aristocratic homes high up above the Forum, the Palatine 
residential complex as a whole seems to have been viewed as aristocratic stronghold and a refuge 
from the accessibility and vulnerability of the Forum. After the Curia was burnt down in 52 by 
Clodius’ mobs, the Senate’s first meeting to not in a temple or basilica in the Forum or the 
Capitoline hill, their usual refuge, but on the Palatine.428  When endangered, the senate met 
amongst its own class and amidst the protective thick of aristocratic homes.  
Houses could also be used as strongholds for offensive purposes. Many accounts exist of 
the interior rooms of an aristocratic home being used as a secret space for planning conspiracies 
and attacks, away from the prying eyes of the Forum where nearly all activity was visible. Matthew 
Roller writes that even in the earliest conspiracy narratives (retold later by Livy) about citizens 
allegedly aiming for tyrannical control, the home was viewed as a space that could be used to 
nurture ambition and plan sedition.429 Sp. Maelius, a wealthy equestrian who allegedly desired a 
                                                
unknown. Because of the ambiguity of the location of the homes, I have represented them on the 
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Publica.  
425 App. 2.5.1: “The slaves and freedmen of Lentulus and Cethegus, reinforced by numerous 
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426 Ibid. 
427 App. BC 2.5.1; Plut. Cic. 22.1-4; Sall. Cat. 55.1-2.  
428 Dio 40.49.5. 
429 Matthew Roller, "Demolished Houses, Monumentality, and Memory in Roman Culture," 
Classical Antiquity 29, no. 1 (2010): 125-31. Roller’s observation that Livy’s picture reflects the 
Late Republic and Early Prinicpate more than it did Archaic Rome, indicates that these 
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kingship in 440 BCE, used his home to distribute free grain and gain a plebeian clientele, stored 
weapons secretly in it, and held meetings to plan a coup.430 M. Manilius Capitolinus, executed in 
384 for alleged tyrannical ambitions, was accused of using his house as a personal surrogate for 
the Rostra, delivering seditious speeches akin to contiones to assembled plebs in his atrium.431 The 
home was a place where the paterfamilias could marshal his social network for undisclosed and 
violent purposes.432 When the corrupt C. Verres wanted to prevent Cicero’s election to aedile in 
70, he had Q. Hortensius Horaltus campaign against Cicero publicly in the Forum. However, in 
the relative privacy of his own home, he summoned together the divisores—the tribal bribe-
distributors—and planned secretly with them to distribute money to the tribes and defeat Cicero’s 
candidacy.433  
In the 60s, these “conspiracies” within the house had a particularly violent hue. When 
Catiline first began his conspiracy in 63, he gave his initial recruitment speech to his closest 
conspirators in a abditam partem aedium, a “concealed part of his house” from which witnesses 
had been excluded.434 The inaccessibility of the space allowed him to utter sentiments that could 
not be made outside of the home. Catiline similarly summoned his co-conspirators to the domus 
of M. Porcius Laeca on the “street of the scythe-makers” in the dead of night to plan an 
assassination attempt on Cicero and his army’s march on the city.435 While the location of the 
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430 Liv. 4.13-16. 
431 Liv. 6.11-20. 
432 Roller, "Demolished Houses, Monumentality, and Memory in Roman Culture," 171. 
433 Cic. Verr. 1.22-26; Millar, 1998, 68. 
434 Sall. Cat. 20.1.  
435 Sall. Cat. 27-2.4; Cic. Cat 1.8-10, 2.13; Richardson, 1992; Eva Margareta Steinby, Lexicon 
Topographicum Urbis Romae: Volume Secondo: D-G (Roma: Edizioni Quasar, 1995), 241. It is 
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street of the Scythe-makers is impossible to discover, Cicero’s indignation stems from the fact that 
Catiline, within an ostensibly private home, made personal plans for divvying up the res publica: 
“At the house of Laeca on that night, Catiline, you apportioned the parts of Italy…you parceled 
out the parts of the city to be burned.”436 When Catiline’s co-conspirators were trying to woo the 
ambassadors of the Allobroges to revolt against Rome, they took them “to the house of Decimus 
Brutus, which was not far from the Forum” and disclosed their plan.437 Planning attacks inside the 
privacy of one’s home also permitted individuals of lower status not usually privy to political 
planning and discussion in the Forum to participate. Inside his own home, a paterfamilias could 
freely organize slaves, freedman, and gladiators. Many of the pre-planned attacks on trials and 
comitiae were probably planned in the interior rooms of homes. Meeting in the home meant that 
women also had the opportunity to play a role in the planning political violence. Sallust famously 
writes that Catiline sought the help of many aristocratic women in his conspiracy. Sempronia, 
whose husband was Decimus Brutus, is described as one of the most talented of Catiline’s 
conspirators.438 When the conspirators wanted to woo the Allobroges, Decimus Brutus’ home was 
“not unsuitable for their plot because of the presence of Sempronia.439 Sallust also suggests that 
Sempronia’s husband is unaware of her participation on the plot, writing that at the time of the 
meeting, “Brutus, as it happened was away from Rome at the time.”440 While scholars have cast 
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Catones, but they had achieved senatorial rank in the past making, a home on the Palatine not out 
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436 Cic. Cat. 1.9. 
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doubt on Sempronia’s prominence within the conspiracy, meeting in houses allowed women like 
Sempronia to play a role in planning political violence that they could not achieve out in the Forum 
or the streets.441 
Later in the 50s, houses served as more immediate headquarters for instanes of political 
violence. In November 57, Clodius and a group of supporters attempted to burn down Milo’s 
house, the Domus Anniana, on the southwestern Palatine Hill overlooking the Circus Maximus.442 
Clodius, Cicero writes, that Clodius used the home of P. Sulla  as the headquarters from which he 
planned the attack, and the location to which he retreated.  
At eleven o'clock in the morning he brought men there armed with shields and with their 
swords drawn, and others with lighted torches. He had himself occupied the house of P. 
Sulla as his headquarters from which to conduct the assault upon Milo's. Thereupon Q. 
Flaccus led out some gallant fellows from Milo's house, the Anniana; he killed the most 
notorious bravoes of all Clodius's gang. He wanted to kill Clodius himself, but my 
gentleman took refuge in the inner part of Sulla's house.443 
 
Sulla’s house, large and protected as all aristocratic houses, seems to have been chosen as a staging 
ground particularly because of its proximity to Milo’s. It was not far from Milo’s and located on 
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the Cermalus as well. 444  Clodius’ group could easily retreat into its safety if the assault on Milo’s 
home went south (as it did). Using a home as a staging ground for violence was not restricted to 
Clodius, and his opponents warmed to his tactics. In the Pro Milone, Cicero had to respond to 
allegations that Milo himself had purchased an extra property on the lowest slopes of the Capitoline 
along the Vicus Iugarius behind the Temple of Saturn and filled it with shields and other arms.445 
The accusation indicates that Milo may have purchased the house because of its proximity to the 
Forum. An extra home with weapons on the street that lead to the Curia would have allowed Milo 
an organizational and tactical edge in responding to Clodian violence in the Western Forum.  
Clodius and the Elision of Political and Domestic Space 
 
As summarized at the start of the chapter, an aristocrat’s home was indisputably 
representative of his personal political power. An attack on a home, then, represented both a 
symbolic and an extremely practical way to neutralize a political opponent. Physically attacking 
or destroying a home endangered its ability to serve as a visible symbol of a politician’s prestige. 
It also prevented the target from using the home as a base of social organization, political activity, 
and business transactions, thereby striking a blow to their role within social and political life.446  
There existed a tradition of attacks on homes from Rome’s earliest days. Attacks on houses 
were one of the earliest forms of quasi-legitimate popular justice in Rome. In the procedure known 
as occentatio, a crowd would gather around the home of an individual who had done an act deemed 
unconscionable by the community and harass him with loud shouting and chanting of insulting 
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words. The process was designed to bring immense public shame on a violator of community 
norms, an experience that was politically fatal in Rome’s dignitas-driven society. Sometimes, a 
severe occentatio would result in a man’s door being burnt down, but rarely anything further.447  
Matthew Roller and Hans Beck skillfully explore the tradition of razing the houses of those 
deemed to be enemies to the Republic. Spurius Maelius (440 BCE) M. Manlius Capitolinus (384 
BCE) M. Vitruvius Vaccus (330 BCE) were all accused of using their homes to conspire towards 
tyranny. Their homes were razed by the state after a vote of the comitia.448 Two equestrians who 
had elaborate homes north of the Forum had their homes confiscated by the state and razed when 
it was discovered they were also robbers. The censors initiated a building project on the site, 
replacing the private homes with a new basilica, the Macellum, which held a public fish market.449 
Fulvius Flaccus, a supporter of Gaius Gracchus, had his home demolished after for his perceived 
attempts to make Gracchus king during the violence of 122 BCE.450 All of these acts of violence 
against homes were originally communal ones—decisions made by the community to punish an 
individual who had violated community values, carried out by representatives of the state. Between 
80 and 58, there is little evidence for political violence against homes outside of this mold. What 
instances occurred were ad hoc. As described above the Catilinarian conspirators attempted to free 
themselves from custody by attacking the homes that in which they were imprisoned. In 62, an 
angry crowd assembled at Caesar’s house, but with little organized intent to commit violence. 
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These do not provide evidence of a pattern of politicized house attacks between 80 and 50. Political 
violence, before 58, remained almost without exception the Forum.451  
However, beginning with Clodius’ tribunate in 58, there are records of eight physical 
attacks on aristocratic homes. Except for one, these attacks were not sanctioned by the state but 
carried out on the initiative of individual citizens. Six were carried out by Clodius himself. Clodius’ 
attacks on homes were calculated, discriminate, and designed to further his own campaign for 
personal political control of the city during and after his tribunate. Although he began by drawing 
on the tradition of state-sanctioned demolition, Clodius soon went beyond tradition. His innovation 
was to turn senatorial homes into politicized targets. Republican homes on the Palatine and 
elsewhere became proxies for the battle between Clodius, Pompey, and Cicero to bring the city’s 
political space under their control. In using violence against Cicero, Milo, and Pompey’s homes, 
Clodius attempted to claim the prestige they brought their private owners for himself.  
After passing his legislative program from the Temple of Castor and thus securing an 
enduring base of popular support, Clodius turned his ire towards Cicero, whose testimony at 
Clodius’ Bona Dea trial and his incessant harangues of the tribune since 61 had engendered a deep 
enmity between the two.452 More importantly, as Jeffrey Tatum argues, Cicero was “a vital symbol 
of senatorial authority” and whose public oratory made him “the very embodiment of senatus 
auctoritas.”453 If Clodius could use his newfound popular support to bring Cicero to heel, he could 
potentially do the same to almost any member of the Senatorial aristocracy.  
                                                
451 The other exceptions are the food riot on the Sacra Via in 75 (#2) (which although resolved at 
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To effect Cicero’s complete political destruction, Clodius turned towards that symbol of a 
senator’s power, his house. In February, Clodius passed the lex Clodia de capite civis. The law 
provided for the exile of anybody, regardless of position or magistracy, who had put Roman 
citizens to death without trial.454 Although the law’s language was general, only one man was 
intended. Cicero’s spectacular command of the Forum’s political space achieved by his tense and 
barely-legal execution of the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 (#18) had finally come back to haunt 
him. Clodius had masterfully isolated Cicero from his senatorial allies through political 
machinations with the triumvirate, and the law passed in the comitia plebis tributa without 
violence.455 On the day that Cicero left Rome, Clodius’ supporters plundered his home almost 
immediately, stealing his possessions and burning the building to the ground.456 However, Clodius 
sought to make Cicero’s home’s destruction permanent and formal. A few weeks later, Clodius 
passed a second bill, the Lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis. The law declared Cicero a public enemy 
and declared the actions of his consulship illegal. Most importantly, it confiscated Cicero’s 
property, provided for its sale at auction, and assigned to Clodius the job of demolishing Cicero’s 
home and the construction of a new monument on the site.457 
To gauge the impact of the demolition of Cicero’s home, it is important to understand the 
house’s topographical context. The location of Cicero’s house and its relation to its neighbors was 
paradigmatic of Roman aristocratic housing. After his election to the consulship, Cicero paid M. 
Licinius Crassus a fabulous sum of 3,500,00 sesterces for a mansion on the Palatine.458 The cost 
was minimal compared to the public exposure and prestige Cicero gained from moving into the 
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district, a spectacular leap for a novus homo whose family had never achieved consular status.459 
Cicero entered a neighborhood dominated by famous families: The Aemilii Scauri, Caecilii 
Metelli, Licinii Crassi, Claudii—a veritable who’s who of the Roman aristocracy. Cicero’s home 
had belonged to the famous M. Livius Drusus (tr. pl. 91) before it passed into Crassus’ hands, and 
the home was renowned even in antiquity for its visibility.460 On one side of Cicero’s house was 
the Porticus Catuli, a large portico set up by Q. Lutatius Catulus to celebrate his victories over the 
Cimbri. The porticus was apparently viewable from the Forum as well. On the other side of Cicero 
was the home of an equestrian, Q. Seius Postumus. Adjacent to Seius and only a plot away from 
Cicero, in an ironic demonstration of the clustered nature of Republican housing, was the home of 
Clodius. Clodius’ home was itself linked to a complex of houses of famous aristocrats that included 
L. Licinius Crassus and M. Aemilius Scaurus, both of whose houses Clodius would ultimately 
purchase by 53.461 After Seius died before 58 under mysterious circumstances, Clodius acquired 
the home, thus making him Cicero’s next-door neighbor.462 
Given its role in urban politics in 58-57, scholars have for decades have sought the location 
of Cicero’s home, and this chapter will not conclusively end the debate.463 Although early scholars 
located Cicero’s home on the north-northeastern Palatine, most 20th century scholars associated it 
with the Clivus Victoriae, a road that began at the Temple of Victoria at the southern end of the 
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Palatine Hill and ran along the hill’s western side through the Cermalus neighborhood.464 
However, excavations by Andrea Carandini since the 1980s have challenged that assumption. 
Carandini identified the remains of the large republican house (Fig. 14 #11) the intersection of the 
“Clivus Palatinus” and “Sacra Via,” slightly to the northwest of the Arch of Titus as the house of 
M. Aemilius Scaurus (aed. 56).465 This positive identification means that nearby must be the homes 
of Clodius, Cicero, Cicero’s brother Quintus, Q. Lutatius Catulus must not be far away. Carandini 
goes as far as to label a home three plots to the west of Scaurus’ as Clodius’ home (Fig. 14 #8). If 
we follow Carandini’s reconstruction, this would put Cicero’s home close by, separated by the plot 
of Q. Seius Postumus, but clearly within the lower north-eastern section of the Palatine Hill. 
Carandini’s conclusions about Clodius’ home is controversial, and it is unclear from his 
reconstruction of the ancient streets in Fig. 14 exactly where Cicero’s home would have to be to 
be judged adjacent to Clodius’ complex.466 However, Coarelli, Beck, Hales, and Tatum all agree 
that it is likely Cicero’s home was on the northeastern side of the Palatine in the exclusive area 
between the Arch of Titus and the Atrium Vestae, not the northwestern side that overlooked the 
Velabrum.467 What is important for this thesis is that the house was deep in exclusive aristocratic 
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territory, visible to those above and below on the hill and even in the Forum, and by 58, adjacent 
to Clodius’ residence. Like all aristocratic homes, it was a signifier of Cicero’s dignitas and his 
political importance.  
 
Figure 14: The residential quarter of the northern Palatine, reconstruction by Hans Beck, 2010, after 
Carandini. 1. Sacra Via, 2. Temple of Vesta, 3. Regia, 5. Domus Publica, 7. Temple of Jupiter Stator, 8-14 
Aristocratic houses. 11 is the home Carandini identifies as Scaurus’ residence. 8. Is the proposed location of 
Clodius’ home. 
On its face, Clodius’ treatment of Cicero’s home reflected the historical tradition associated 
with men who had behaved tyrannically and were punished for it. Clodius completed the 
demolition of Cicero’s house, and in haste began the construction of the promised monument to 
replace it. Clodius constructed a shrine to the goddess Libertas, the personified deity of the freedom 
of Roman citizens.468 For Clodius’ supporters, Cicero’s exile could be viewed as an exercise of 
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political freedom and a restoration of liberty to the city, and Clodius evidently hoped to foster this 
association. However, despite the dedicatory justification, it was clear to all that this shrine was 
also a monument to Clodius’ personal victory over his opponent. Threatening the prestige of 
another senatorial politician, Clodius’ monument incorporated the pre-existing Porticus Catulus 
on the other side of Cicero’s home. Clodius removed the initial inscription bearing Catulus’ name 
on the portico and inserted his own.469 Along with the statue of Libertas, the shrine housed a statue 
of Clodius himself, designed by a sculptor for whom Clodius was the personal patron.470  
Furthermore, in addition to being a monument to Clodius’ strength, the monument was 
meant to be a permanent attack on Cicero’s memory. Matthew Roller determined that the 
monuments built over demolished houses in the Republic were not meant to eliminate the memory 
of the former owner, but to ensure their enduring infamy. A demolished house would “keep an 
account of the proprietor and his misdeeds in circulation, but in a negative ethical mode—that is, 
as a negative exemplum.”471 The shrine of Libertas did not occupy the entire space, meaning that 
the ruins of Cicero’s burnt home remained to be viewed by passerby.472 As long as Clodius’ shrine 
stood, it was a reminder that the man whose house lay in ruins beside it had been deemed a tyrant 
and a public enemy of the Republic. 
As Tatum notes, up to this point Clodius had done nothing novel. He was following typical 
precedent for the treatment of exiled public enemies.473 However, his subsequent behavior towards 
another private house was markedly different. After eliminating Cicero, Clodius turned his gaze 
towards Pompey and his house. As described in the previous chapter, Clodius orchestrated a failed 
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assassination attempt on the general during a senate meeting in the Temple of Castor (#32). 
Legitimately frightened for his life—and shocked by the lack of public outcry for his safety—
Pompey retreated to his home on the Carinae, a section of Rome just northeast of the residential 
quarter of the Palatine, on the lower slopes of the Esquiline Hill.474 Clodius, however, was not 
merely content with Pompey’s elimination from the Forum—and thus, from Roman political life. 
He wanted to control Pompey’s activity in his ostensibly private space as well. Not long after 
Pompey’s self-imposed retreat to his house, Clodius made it a forced exile. According to Asconius, 
Clodius’ freedman Damio laid Pompey “under siege” in his own house. Damio deployed armed 
men at various “guard-posts” around Pompey’s house.475 It is unclear for how long this siege 
lasted. It need not have been constant to be effective. Perhaps Damio would send plebeian 
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that year. Asconius reports that that the praetor had brought some sort of proceedings against 
Damio for his harassment of Pompey, but Damio was defended by L. Novius, a tribunician ally 
of Clodius.  
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supporters by Pompey’s home often enough to be conspicuous. Paranoid (and perhaps not without 
reason), Pompey remained inside his home until the end of Clodius’ tribunate, months later.476 By 
simply threatening violence, Clodius publicly made himself not only master of the Forum, but 
master of Pompey’s property. If—as some scholars have proposed—Pompey’s home on the 
Carinae was his Domus Rostrata, decorated with the prows of enemy ships captured during his 
pirate campaign, Clodius’ victory would have been even more symbolic. It would have been a 
second senatorial victory monument he triumphed over, following Catulus’ portico.477 Clodius was 
cognizant of the symbolic victory his barricade of Pompey lent him. To make his victory more 
complete, he let slip the rumor that he was planning to build a porticus on the Carinae—suggesting 
that he intended to confiscate Pompey’s home as he had done with Cicero’s on the Palatine.478 Had 
Clodius gone through with the threat, he would have built two monumental complexes facing each 
other—one on the Palatine and one on the Carinae. The twin sites would have cast Clodius’ 
symbolic dominance over the many aristocratic homes on the Palatine, the Velia, and the lower 
Carinae that fell on the axis between the two.  
Whether he actually intended to raze Pompey’s home is beside the point. That he could 
even make the threat represented the extent to which Clodius had politically neutralized the man. 
Clodius’ domination of Pompey and Cicero’s houses demonstrate the extent to which personal 
homes had become elements of political competition. However, it was at the same time indicative 
of how personal Clodius’ crusade for political control had become. His destruction of Cicero’s 
                                                
476 Tatum, 1999, 174. 
477 The location of the Domus Rostrata is a question still up for debate. However, Russell has 
made a convincing argument that Pompey’s new house in his gardens by his theater complex 
was actually the Domus Rostrata and the home on the Carinae was his original, more modest 
home.  
478 Cic. Har. Resp. 49; Craver, "Urban Real Estate in Late Republican Rome," 148; Tatum, 1999, 
174. 
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house had been justified as a sacred dedication and a state-sanctioned punishment for Cicero’s 
violation of citizens’ rights legalized by the passage of the Lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis. His 
domination of Pompey’s home, accomplished by his own private clientele, was a bald move to 
consolidate political control, with Pompey’s property serving as a proxy for the man’s political 
power.  
When Clodius’ tribunate expired in 57, Pompey struck back. He attempted to effect 
Cicero’s recall at the cost of spectacular legislative violence in the Western Forum. His weapons 
were the tribunes T. Annius Milo and P. Sestius, who themselves organized armed gangs of 
professional fighters to combat Clodius’ plebeian ones. Milo in particular earned Clodius’ ire by 
launching an investigation of his slaves after the violence over the Lex Fabricia in January.479 
Seeking to intimidate Milo in the same way he did Cicero and Pompey, Clodius attacked Milo’s 
home (#35), the Domus Anniana. It was located on the Cermalus, the western section of the 
Palatine hill that, overlooked both the Velabrum and the Circus Maximus.480 Like the northern 
slope of the Palatine, it was densely populated with aristocratic homes that were conspicuously 
                                                
479 The bloody battle over Fabricius’ bill to recall Cicero (#34), fought in the Western Forum.  
480 Cic. Att. 4.3.3; Coarelli, 2007, 131; Ingrid Edlund-Berry, "Early Rome and the Making of 
"Roman" Identity through Architecture and City Planning," in Blackwell Companions to the 
Ancient World: Companion to the Archaeology of the Roman Republic, ed. Jane Evans DeRose 
(West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 412-13; Richardson, 1992, 81. As with the 
location of Cicero, Clodius, and Pompey’s homes, the location I have chosen for Milo’s home is 
an approximation. The Cermalus/Germalus has been variously defined as above the Velabrum 
and more on the center of the hill (Richardson), or closer to the Scalae Caci and the Temple of 
Magna Mater, where it is associated with the remains of archaic huts that have been located 
south of the Magna Mater temple (Coarelli, Edlund-Berry). The Digital Augustan Rome 
mapping projects, citing excavations of the Domus Tiberiana (which later occupied much of the 
Palatine’s western side), locates the foundations of several Late Republican houses along the 
middle Palatine’s western side. I have chosen for imaging purposes the location of their “Domus: 
Palatine (4)” to represent Milo’s home. While far from certain, it is in a location that is not far 
from the southern section usually called Cermalus while still maintaining its publicity along the 
Velabrum overlook, which slopes steeply to the west of the proposed site of the house.  
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visible to viewers looking up from the flatlands to the south and west along the Tiber. Just as on 
the northern slope, many famous Romans had homes not far from this zone. Cicero in Pro Sestio 
claimed one year later that “the house of another tribune of the people [Milo]…was attacked with 
fire and sword by the army of Clodius.”481 Milo’s supporters repelled the attack, and the tribune 
continued his opposition to Clodius unintimidated.482  
Clodius was persistent in his use of violence against the personal homes of Cicero’s 
supporters. Drawing on the tradition of occentatio, Clodius strove to include the larger population 
of the plebs as a whole in his attacks on politicians’ homes. During the Ludi Apollinares, the yearly 
festival to Apollo in July of 57, the city was struck by a severe grain shortage, leaving many of the 
poorer plebs dependent on the grain distributions panicked and angry.483 At the same time, Pompey 
proposed his bill to recall Cicero to the Senate. Popular fury over the grain prices culminated in a 
riot by some of Rome’s poorest and hungriest citizens at the festival’s theater performance 
(#37).484 Simultaneously, Clodius directed a second group to besiege the home of L. Caecilius 
Rufus, the urban praetor who was responsible for producing the games (#38).485 Caecilius was a 
supporter of Cicero and had attempted to legally obstruct Clodius’ confiscation of Cicero’s 
property.486 Clodius knew that Caecilius was a target that the plebs could get behind attacking. As 
praetor, Caecilius was also the highest official responsible for the grain supply and could be blamed 
                                                
481 Cic. Sest. 85; for similar language, see Cic. Red. Sen. 19, Sest. 88-90, Mil. 35; Tadeusz 
Maslowski, "Domus Milonis Oppugnata," EOS 64 (1976); Tatum, 1999, 179, 307 n. 24. 
482 Tatum, 1999, 179. 
483 Vanderbroeck, 1987, 247-48; Tatum, 1999, 176-83. 
484 Asc. 48C. 
485 Asc. 48C describes the attack as “a house siege.” Vanderbroeck theorizes that the group that 
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argues for wider participation by broader sectors of particularly poor plebs. It is likely a 
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486 Cic. Red. Sen. 22. 
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for the grain shortages.487 It is unclear where Caecilius’ home was, although like many others he 
may have lived on the Palatine, given his prestigious family connections.488 While details do not 
exist of what the crowd did when it got to Caecilius’ house, it seems that a traditional occentatio 
may have been in order. Caecilius’ failure to provide an adequate grain supply for Rome’s poorest 
was certainly justification enough to justify shouting insults and creating a commotion to publicly 
shame the man. However, Clodius’ personal supervision may have resulted in a more violent 
scene, with rock-throwing and firebrands. The attack on Caecilius’ house allowed Clodius to 
continue presenting himself as the protector of the plebs while continuing his crusade against the 
homes of Cicero and his allies.    
 Despite Clodius’ best efforts, Cicero was recalled and returned to the city in September 
determined to fight Clodius at his own game. Cicero had only one thing on his mind: the 
reconstruction of his home. Although he might be back in Rome, his prestige would not be mended 
until his house was reconstructed. Cicero confessed this to Atticus himself, fretting “What of my 
domus? Can it be restored? And if it cannot be restored, how shall I myself?”489 After a 
complicated legal case argued before the College of Pontiffs disputing the legality of Clodius’ 
procedure in erecting the shrine of Libertas, Cicero convinced the Senate to vote that his home be 
rebuilt, and at the state’s cost no less.490 If destroying a house was destruction of a politician, 
reconstruction of his home represented a restoration of his political power. Clodius’ shrine to 
Libertas and new porticus was torn down, and senatorially-paid workmen began reconstructing 
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appears that Caecilius and P. Sulla, the son of the dictator, were half-brothers, meaning that 
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489 Cic. Att. 4.1.3. 
490 Tatum, 1999, 187-93.  
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Cicero’s destroyed site.491 Just as the sight of Clodius’ Libertas shrine rising on Cicero’s burnt site 
was a mark of Clodius’ power, Cicero’s rebuilt home was a testament to the orator’s revived 
political potency. The destruction of the shrine also represented Pompey’s restoration to political 
pre-eminence in Rome. Pompey had personally arranged Cicero’s recall as a way to combat 
Clodius, and the orator’s restoration of his home was a vindication of Pompey’s ability to manage 
politics.492 Both sides could use private homes as political footballs, Pompey’s actions indicated 
to Clodius. For Clodius, who now lived immediately next door to Cicero, the sound of workmen 
rebuilding the house must have been a grating reminder of defeat.493 
Clodius would not go down without a fight. On November 3rd, 57, he sent a group of armed 
men to the site where workmen were rebuilding on Cicero’s foundations. The men physically 
knocked down what had been rebuilt of the Porticus Catuli and Cicero’s house. Taking the building 
materials of Cicero’s home, they used them as projectiles which they threw at the adjacent home 
of Quintus Cicero. Shortly thereafter, they took the ritual of occentatio to its violent end, setting 
Quintus’ home alight with firebrands.494 It was a move that represented the depth of Clodius’ 
anger. Rome, with its narrow streets, and wooden buildings packed closely together, was 
particularly susceptible to conflagration. Even in the Late Republic, many residential buildings 
were still constructed with a flammable combination of wood and plaster.495 Fires frequently 
ravaged sections of the city, most recently in 83 BCE. As shown by Cicero’s repeated reference to 
                                                
491 Cic. Att. 4.3.3. 
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house. Cicero wrote to Atticus in Cic. Att. 4.3.3 that one of Clodius’ allies, a candidate named 
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494 Cic. Att. 4.3.3. 
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fire in his orations against Catiline in 63, fear of a conflagration was a potent motivator.496 Homes 
were packed particularly close on the Palatine residential complex. Clodius’ home now abutted 
Cicero’s, and was nearby to Quintus’. Lighting a home on fire in the densely packed Palatine so 
close to his on complex was a risky move that likely frightened Clodius’ allies and opponents 
alike, seeing that many were his neighbors. When Cicero writes that “simply every human being” 
in the city reacted with “loud exclamations of indignation and sorrow” at the arson, it is more 
likely that this aristocratic outcry was in fear of fire spreading to their own property rather than an 
overriding concern for Cicero’s.497  
 Clodius did the same to Milo’s home a week later. On the Ides of November, he led a group 
of men armed with swords, shields, and torches out of the atrium house of his ally P. Sulla on the 
Cermalus and attempted to light the Milo’s house on fire at 11 o’clock in the morning. Milo’s 
client Q. Flaccus led an armed group out of his vestibule where a vicious battle occurred in the 
narrow street. As Milo’s house was situated high above the Velabrum and the Eastern Forum, 
people going about their daily commerce in these areas may have heard the commotion and looked 
up to see the beginnings of flames. Milo’s men fought Clodius’ group back, forcing them down 
the street to Sulla’s home, which was close by. Clodius’ group retreated to the relative safety of 
Sulla’s home’s entrance and then the basements deep in the house.498   
Clodius’ attacks on the homes of his opponents were clearly meant to be intimidating. 
However, there was something more innovative in Clodius’ approach than mere terrorism. Fergus 
Millar notes that Clodius was the first man in Roman history to translate political discourse in the 
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Forum into physical effects on prominent houses.499 As we saw in chapters I-IV, the spaces that 
were controlled by violence were constantly expanding. In the early 60s, political violence in the 
Forum was directed at specific locations in pursuit of particular results—attacks on the Rostra, the 
Curia, and the Praetor’s tribunal were designed to ensure a particular legislative, senatorial, or 
judicial outcome. These spaces were ones understood to be expressly political and to a large extent 
public. However, beginning in the late 60s, the space in which political battles were fought began 
to expand. Cicero’s execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, in a triumphal style that mirrored 
that of a victorious general, constituted a claim to not just specific topography but the entire Forum 
that had not been seen by civilian politicians. The legislative battles over the Lex Fabricia in 57 
(#34) and the Lex Trebonia de provinciis consularibus in 55 (#56 & 55) demonstrated that that 
political control was no longer supplied by mere dominance of individual spaces, but control of 
the Forum as a whole. Likewise, the trajectory of political violence around the courts examined in 
Chapter IV saw violence move from ad hoc disruptions, to a calculated, programmatic attempt on 
the part of Clodius to assert a sort of personalized dominance over the area, ultimately countered 
and then replicated by Pompey and his soldiers, who fought to make the entire Forum his own. By 
making senatorial residences part of the equation, Clodius again expanded the field on which the 
Late Republic’s political battles were fought. Aristocratic homes, although always marked by 
significant elements of the public, had long been personal strongholds that served their owner first 
and foremost. However, by making them sites of political violence, Clodius’ attacks transformed 
aristocratic residences into expressly political spaces and effective proxies for the Rostra, Curia, 
and courts where violence traditionally played out. At the same time as he dragged the aristocratic 
domus fully into the sphere of public space, he simultaneously used violence to privatize them 
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under his own control. Clodius’ subsequent attacks on homes after Cicero’s in 58 were not, as 
previous attacks were, acts of community-sanctioned violence. They were part of a private 
campaign that used violence to arrogate both the political power and personal dignitas of the owner 
to himself. 
Clodius’ tactics had a profound impact on the practice of political violence that outlived 
him. Multiple attacks on homes during the violence after his death in 52 shows that Clodius had 
created an indelible link between violence, private homes, and political control. After he was 
murdered by Milo on the Appian Way, Clodius’ body was brought back to his home on the 
northeast Palatine. That night, Clodius’ house took on an entirely public character. Asconius writes 
that Clodius’ body was laid out in his atrium and “a huge crowd of the lowest commoners and 
slaves stood round it in the hallway of his house in deep sorrow.”500 Given Clodius’ popularity, 
the crowds must have filled the house and clogged the streets outside of his house, effecting a sort 
of Plebeian invasion of what was undoubtedly viewed as aristocratic space by most Palatine 
residents. The home was Clodius’ newest annexation to his ever-growing complex, the sumptuous 
mansion of M. Aemilius Scaurus.501 Clodius’ wife Fulvia officiated at what had the appearance of 
an informal contio. She displayed Clodius’ wounds and spoke to the crowd, allegedly attempting 
to inflame them. The next day, the house was used as a rallying point for Clodius’ supporters. An 
even larger plebeian crowd flooded the streets to escort Clodius’ body to the Forum as part of the 
funeral procession.502 At the funeral, things went awry when Clodius’ scribe and lieutenant Sextus 
Cloelius brought the body into the Curia and lit the funeral pyre inside (#33). The Curia Cornelia—
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the preeminent symbol of the senate’s primacy—soon went up in flames. With it went the adjacent 
Basilica Porcia, the headquarters of the tribunes of the plebs.503 
 After destroying the Curia, Clodius’ supporters chose not to attack other “public” 
monuments, but directed their ire at a succession of senatorial homes. Cassius Dio reports that with 
a clear and deliberate sense of purpose, the crowd marched up the Palatine Hill and attempted to 
once and for all burn down Milo’s long-suffering Domus Anniana, the third such attempt in the 
past six years.504 However, Milo’s supporters were prepared. Archers from the second-story 
balcony barraged the crowd with arrows and forced them off. After their assault on Milo’s home, 
they marched to the grove of Libitania on the Esquiline and stole sets of dummy fasces from the 
headquarters of the libitinarii, the professional undertakers.505 They then ran to the homes of Q. 
Metellus Scipio and P. Plautius Hypsaeus and demanded they become consuls, offering each the 
stolen sets of fasces. It is unclear exactly where the homes of both were. Scipio, being both a 
member of the storied Caecilii Metellii family and a Scipio, likely had a home on the Palatine, the 
location of his illustrious forebears. Hypsaeus too was from a consular family, but this evidence 
provides little more than supposition.506 Finally, the crowd marched all the way the other direction 
across the city towards the Campus Martius, where they ringed Pompey’s home in the gardens 
behind his massive theater and acclaimed him at once consul and dictator.507 It is telling of a shift 
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in political behavior that when they wanted to make their desires known regarding Rome’s highest 
public office, the crowd did not continue to demonstrate in the Forum, but went directly to the 
homes of the decision-makers they were targeting.  
 The spontaneous crowd was not the only group that targeted homes in the wake of Clodius’ 
murder. Scipio and Hypsaeus, Clodius’ supporters and two candidates for the consulship against 
Milo, hoped to capitalize on the chaos to have the elections called quickly while Milo’s forces 
were disarray. The decision was in the hands of M. Aemilius Lepidus (the future triumvir) whom 
the senate had appointed interrex.508 Whereas in an earlier decade Scipio and Hypsaeus might have 
held riotous contiones in the Forum to compel a magistrate’s action, the two did not bother waiting 
for Lepidus to come to the Forum. With a large group of personal supporters, they ascended the 
Palatine’s slopes and began a multi-day siege of Lepidus’ home.509 On the fifth day, when it 
became clear Lepidus was not going to budge, the group “broke through the gateway with all 
manner of violence.”510 Once inside, they set about destroying valuable symbolic pieces of 
Lepidus’ property. The “pulled down his ancestral portraits, broke up the symbolic marital couch 
of his wife…and also vandalized the weaving-operations which in accord with ancient custom 
were in progress in the entrance-hall.”511 Lepidus was only relieved on the 5th day because Milo’s 
gang arrived and engaged Scipio and Hypsaeus’ group. Showing the extent to which Clodius’ 
tactics had been adopted even by his greatest opponents, Milo had not intended to come to Lepidus’ 
aid. Instead, he was planning on laying siege to the house himself, and inadvertently freed him 
when he found Scipio and Hypsaeus’ group there first.  
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 Pompey also benefited from the elision of residential and political space that took place in 
the wake of Clodius’ death.  Dio writes that after the Curia was burnt down, the Senate met not in 
the Forum but on the Palatine Hill to elect an interrex. Although the meeting space is not specified, 
it is likely that they met in one of the three temples on the southern side of the hill near the 
Cermalus.512 However, the attacks on Milo’s and Lepidus’ homes seem to have convinced the 
senators that not even their residential stronghold on the Palatine was safe from assault. The next 
senate meeting took place far away from the dangerously public Forum and the now-unsafe 
Palatine. Dio writes that the senate assembled under an armed guard outside the city’s walls in the 
Curia hall in the monumental theater-garden-portico-house complex on the Campus Martius 
belonging to Pompey.513 
As Amy Russell writes, Pompey’s complex was the most ambitious attempt yet to use a 
mixed-use complex to claim public space as private. Although the theater, its gardens, and its 
porticoes were ostensibly open to the public, the complex was architecturally designed to regulate 
the behavior of attendees and project Pompey’s power.514 Pompey’s complex made a particularly 
strong claim to privatizing political space. Attached to the complex at the far end of the portico 
was a large exedra, consecrated as a templum specifically so it could be an alternate Curia. Pompey 
constructed the building’s Curia as a clear attempt to impose his name on one of the Republic’s 
oldest political processes. In offering his Curia to the senate as their last bastion of safety, Pompey 
exercised that control over its members. Meeting in a Curia named after Pompey, surrounded by a 
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armed guard of the general’s personal soldiers, and standing underneath a massive statue of the 
man, the Senate unprecedentedly voted Pompey consul for the third time without a colleague, and 
bid him take all measures necessary to protect the city.515  
Pompey continued to break down the barrier between private and political in his residential 
complex after 52. Russell notes that after the Senate had formally received Caesar’s letter 
proposing that he and Pompey lay down their commands at the same time, Pompey summoned the 
entire Senate at dusk to his personal residence at the complex. Although senate meetings were 
illegal after dusk, Pompey held an informal meeting in his own house, as if it were a Curia.516 In 
the days that immediately preceded the senate’s decision to strip Caesar of his command—thus 
inaugurating the civil war—Caesar wrote that “the senate is convened outside the city.”517 While 
the Senate had multiple meeting places on the Campus Martius, they were likely meeting in one 
place: Pompey’s complex.  
Conclusion: Towards the Politicization of Private Space and the 
Privitization of Political Space 
 
As this chapter has shown, the private homes of senatorial aristocrats played an important 
role in the political violence of the Late Republic. The architectural layout of aristocratic homes 
meant that they were eminently defendable and could be used as a bastion from which to repel 
attack. The different levels of privacy afforded by a house’s interior rooms provided space for 
individuals to plot political violence. Before 63, it was infrequent that houses were the targets of 
the same sort of calculated political violence seen in the Forum. However, starting in 58, Clodius 
expanded the political battlefield to include the private homes of the elite. An attack on a home 
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was an attack on a politician’s power, and Clodius used attacks on Cicero and Pompey’s home to 
diminish their prestige and increase his own. His campaign in 57 against Milo and Cicero’s houses 
left an indelible mark on political culture. After his death in, private homes, just as much as the 
formal political spaces, were the sites where individuals attempted to claim control over Rome’s 
politics. These claims could be made with violence, or they could be made more subtly, as Pompey 
did by extending his Curia space to the senate. In the same way that Pompey ultimately used 
Clodius’ own tactics to assert a type of dominance over the Eastern Forum during Milo’s trial, in 
the wake of Clodius’ funeral Pompey embraced Clodius’ amplified elision of residential and 
political space to his advantage.  
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Chapter VI: Class and Conflict in Rome’s Theaters 
 
Four out of the remaining eleven instances of political violence in Republican Rome took 
place in yet another new category of spaces; the city’s theaters. Like aristocratic homes, Rome’s 
theaters were also imbued with a political role before they became the target of political violence 
in the 50s. Theaters were places where attendees could voice their opinions without compunction. 
They were also places where class divisions were reified and tensions ran high. Starting in 58, 
Clodius drew on the class tensions around the theater, mobilizing excluded members of the plebs 
urbana to attack two separate theater performances as part of his campaign against Cicero’s recall. 
However, lower-class mobs rarely needed organizing or encouragement. As is shown by a final 
attack on festival games that Clodius himself held, lower-class crowds used attacks on theaters as 
a legitimate mode of making their demands known to Rome’s elite.   
Locating Rome’s Theaters 
 
Although theatrical performances are attested in Rome from the 3rd century BCE onward, 
the question of where these performances took place, and what form the stages and audience 
seating took is complicated by Rome’s lack of a permanent single space for theatrical events518 
Rome’s earliest theaters were temporary and erected in multiple sites as a result of their religious 
nature. Roman drama developed as performances associated with Rome’s annual religious 
festivals, such as the Ludi Romani, Ludi Plebeii, Megalenses, and Apollinares, and this association 
limited the locations where theatrical performances took place.519 As Wiseman writes, “The theatre 
games (ludi scaenici) were held in front of the respective temples of the deities honoured at each 
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festival.”520 Therefore, during the Ludi Apollinares for example, a festival in honor of Apollo, the 
ludi scaenici would be performed near the Temple of Apollo in the Campus Martius. In the earliest 
days of Roman theater, plays were initially performed in the space directly in front of the temple, 
and the audience sat or stood on the steps leading up to the temple’s podium.521 As Rome’s 
population grew—and its festival occasions for theatrical performances increased—Romans began 
by at least 179 BCE to construct ad hoc stages and auditoria out of wood to hold larger audiences. 
These stands would still be located within the temple precinct, or within reasonable sight of the 
temple.522 Importantly, these stands were always temporary—they were constructed for the 
festival, and were deconstructed soon thereafter, following the dictates of Rome’s conservative 
political elite, who feared decadent Greek social influences.523 As a result of conservative political 
and their association with festivals, Roman theaters remained both location-specific and temporary 
until Pompey’s construction of his enormous stone theater in the Campus Martius in 55. 
Despite their temporary nature, these stages could be quite elaborate. Constantly 
constructing and deconstructing theaters each year, made Romans experts at wooden architecture, 
and by the first century BCE, elite patrons were commissioning increasingly showy temporary 
theaters. M. Aemilius Scaurus’ theater, which was built and taken down within the year 56, was 
lavishly decorated with 360 columns, mosaic floors, gilded wood, and was allegedly three stories 
high.524 C. Scribonius Curio (tribune in 50) built two large wooden theaters in 52 that rotated 
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impressively on a pivot.525 Wooden republican theaters were frequently decorated with marble 
statuary and often even marble columns. These theaters were treated as architectural marvels and 
sites of significant notice.  
However, despite the alleged size of theaters’ cavea, attendance at theater performances 
was an extremely exclusive affair. The Theater of Pompey, the largest theater in the Republican 
period, could only hold 13,000-15,000 people; the temporary wooden theaters that preceded it held 
even less.526 If estimates of Rome’s population as near 1 million at the start of the Principate are 
true, then the wooden theaters of the Late Republic would have held only a miniscule amount of 
the population.527  Katherine Welch writes that access to most games was based on one’s 
connections to the elite. High ranking magistrates provided passes to their wealthy family, friends, 
and colleagues. These well-to-do Romans handed out passes to their personal clientele. Those not 
linked into the network were out of luck.528 “Romans who lacked connections could only have 
access to seating at gladiatorial games by paying a substantial amount of money,” something that 
would have been impossible for much of the city’s non-elite.529 As a result, much of the audience 
in a typical Roman theater—at least those seated in the cavea, the wooden seats—was drawn from 
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the Senatorial and Equestrian classes. Cicero, in multiple letters and speeches, describes the 
audience at theaters and games as boni, referring to Rome’s social elite.530 Vanderbroeck surmises 
realistically from the conservative political outbursts that occurred in the theaters during festivals 
that the majority of theatergoers at the ludi scaenici were of this social group.531 The rest of the 
population that lacked connections or wealth had to improvise. As with packed contiones on the 
Rostra, when ludi scaenici or funeral games were held in the Forum, excluded spectators—largely 
poorer urban dwellers—crammed into the natural rise of the Capitoline slope and clambered onto 
the balconies of the Forum’s basilicas in order to see the show.532 Sometimes, these attempts were 
unsuccessful, and the height of the wooden stands prevented those outside of the stands from 
seeing the performance. Plutarch records an instance in which Gaius Gracchus had wooden seating 
for an arena in the Forum taken down overnight because they blocked poorer citizens’ view.533 
 As Kathleen Coleman and Amy Russell both note, the theater was clearly a political space. 
Coleman writes that the theater “bred a politicized atmosphere in which audience response could 
invest the spoken word with highly-charged political and ideological overtones.”534 Crowds 
expressed political opinions by responded with acclamation or booing to lines deemed to be 
freighted with political value; They also reacted, positively and negatively, to the arrival of famous 
politicians in the theater.535 Russell notes that in particular elite audience members, who lacked 
anonymity, put themselves on public display when they entered the theater.536 The tradition of 
political outbursts, along with the very public optics of class exclusivity inherent in theater 
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performances made Rome’s theaters especially charged locations. The politics of class exclusion 
and inclusion within the theater was central to their role as sites of political violence in the Late 
Republic.  
Class Distinctions in the Theater: Riot at the Ludi Apollinares 
 
The first instance of violence took place in 63, during Cicero’s consulship. L. Roscius 
Otho, one of the tribunes who succumbed to the crowd’s intimidation on the Rostra in 67, had 
passed a law during his tribunate that only went into effect in 63.537 Roscius’ law affected the 
distribution of seats at public theatrical performances. Traditionally, the first fourteen rows of 
Rome’s temporary theaters were reserved for members of the senatorial class.538 The reservation 
of seats for only Senators in the theater, like the privilege to serve on juries for quaestiones, was a 
mark of the Senatorial class’ prestige that set them apart from Rome’s other classes. Plutarch writes 
that before Roscius passed this law, the rest of Rome’s population, equestrians and plebeians sat 
mixed in the theater: “Men of the equestrian order were mingled with the multitudes in the theatres 
and saw the spectacles along with the people [µετὰ τοῦ δήµου], seated as chance would have it.”539 
However, Roscius’ law provided that the fourteen rows of the theater immediately after the seats 
of senators be reserved for members of the equestrian class only.540 The equestrian section was 
apparently conspicuously marked, as Dio writes that the law, “marked off sharply the seats of the 
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knights in the theatres from the other locations.”541 In terms of visibility, the new section was the 
ancient equivalent of a high-profile luxury box. The Lex Roscia went further in stratifying the 
theater based on class reputation. Cicero writes that it also required equites who had gone bankrupt 
to sit in a separate section.542  
Preferential social policies directed towards the equites had been very controversial in the 
past, and this was law was to be no exception. Roman politicians of both elite and popular 
persuasion had attempted to use laws like these to either divide the equites from the senatorial 
class, or unite them. Gaius Gracchus had attempted to turn the equites against the Senatorial class 
by removing the Senators from jury duty and giving that privilege to the equites alone. Sulla had 
attempted to co-opt the equites into political complacency by selecting many members of his new 
600-man senate from their ranks, while simultaneously excluding those equites not conscripted 
into the senate from jury service.543 A Lex Aurelia in 70 reversed Sulla’s change and restored 
equites’ right to serve on juries.544 In opposing Gabinius’ legislation to give the Pirate command 
to Pompey in 67, Roscius took a distinctly pro-senate stance. His goal in passing this theater law 
may have been to draw the equites politically further away from the plebs and closer to the 
senatorial class, as others had done before.  
Regardless of intent, Roscius’ law was a physical and visual change that had a visceral 
symbolic impact and violent repercussions. For an equestrian theater attendee who had formerly 
sat shoulder to shoulder in the higher wooden stands with plebeians—albeit plebeians wealthy 
enough to gain access to the limited seating at theater performances—sitting in a clearly reserved 
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section alongside Rome’s senatorial elite was a “point of honor,” as Plutarch writes.545 For the 
plebeian attendee who remained stuck in the upper seating, every time he looked down to towards 
the stage and glimpsed the new equestrian section, he would be reminded of his own lower social 
and political position. Many plebeians already suffered restricted access to ludi scaenici if they 
lacked funds or attentive elite patrons. Removing the equites to their own section seemed to add 
insult to injury, and Plutarch writes that “The people took this as a mark of dishonour to 
themselves.”546 By sharply sectioning off the theaters, Roscius’ law allowed Rome’s class 
distinctions to constitute themselves anew in the mind of each individual Roman who entered the 
theater. 
As recorded by Plutarch, the tension caused by the law exploded into violence July of 63 
during a theater performance given as part of the Ludi Apollinares, the yearly games held in honor 
of Apollo. Although Plutarch’s account does not state where the theater was located, it was 
certainly erected in front of the Temple of Apollo Sosianus on the Campus Martius, the plain 
directly to the West of the city walls.547 This temple was the primary shrine to Apollo by the Late 
Republic, and thus most likely to serve as the location for theatrical performances.548 The flat land 
of this section of the Campus Martius alongside the Tiber River offered ample space to construct 
seating and a stage. In the early Principate, it would become the site of one of Rome’s most 
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prominent permanent theaters, the Theater of Marcellus. John Arthur Hanson argues that the 
modern Theater of Marcellus is a “virtual rebuilding” of the temporary theaters that had stood in 
front of the Temple for centuries. The theater in 63 would have stood on approximately the same 
site as Theater of Marcellus, although with a slightly different orientation designed to align its 
cavea along the central axis of the theater. As Coarelli’s plan of the Campus Martius in the Late 
Republic demonstrates, the curved back of the cavea in the 63 theater would have been very close 
to temple’s steps.549  
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Figure 15: The Campus Martius in the Late Republic, from F. Coarelli, 2007, 268. 
 
After thousands of spectators had arrived and taken their wooden seats—those without 
reserved seats in the back and the senators and equites in front—one man’s entry created a stir: L. 
Roscius Otho himself.550 As he entered and headed towards the first fourteen rows, resentful 
members of the plebs started hissing at him. At the same time, the equites, seated in the first 
fourteen rows, greeted their benefactor with raucous applause. What followed was a shouting 
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match reminiscent of two athletic teams’ supporters each trying to drown the other out. Plutarch 
writes, “The people renewed and increased their hisses, and then the knights their applause.” As 
tensions escalated, the two groups abandoned mere noises and took to trading insults. Shortly after 
that, members of both groups rose to their feet, and chaos erupted in chaos as plebs and equites 
broke out into a physical brawl (#14).551  
It appears that the fight was significant, because Cicero, one of the year’s consuls, was 
forced to intervene. He did so with rapidity. Plutarch writes that “when Cicero heard of this [the 
brawl], he came and summoned the people to the Temple of Bellona, where he rebuked and 
exhorted them.”552 The Temple of Bellona was an ancient temple, built in 296 on the Campus 
Martius.553 Cicero chose this temple for a number of reasons. The Temple of Bellona was a well-
known building in its own right that carried connotations of state authority. It was known to house 
meetings of the senate, and because it was outside the city’s ritual boundary, it was there that the 
the senate often received returning generals and debated whether to grant a triumph.554 Members 
of the senate announced the decisions of those debates from the Temple’s podium, and citizens 
would have been accustomed to receive such announcements while waiting in the space in front 
of the temple’s steps.  
However, equally as important for Cicero would have been the temple’s location: it was 
located mere meters east of the Temple of Apollo.555 Fig. 16 demonstrates the very short distance 
between the modern ruins of the Temple of Bellona and cavea of the Theater of Marcellus, which 
as Hanson argued, is an approximation of the theater in 63. The wooden theater set up for the Ludi 
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Apollinares may have been only 10 to 20 meters away from the steps of the Temple of Bellona.556 
Thus, rioters in the theater would have had to move only a small distance once Cicero summoned 
their attention. Cicero most likely addressed the crowd from the temple’s podium. Those plebeians 
in the highest seats of the cavea may have even been able to Cicero mounting the temple’s steps 
from their seats. Having been notified to the presence of a consul, the crowd worked its way out 
of the theater—although some may have stayed in their seats to get a good view—and walked the 
few meters to the area around the Temple of Bellona. The sight of a consul, attended by his lictors 
and his consular retinue, mounting a stand frequently associated with public addresses seems to 
have encouraged calm. Cicero delivered a speech rebuking all for their fighting and praising 
Roscius.557 The speech was apparently effective in shaming Roscius’ detractors. After Cicero 
finished, the crowd returned to the theater peacefully. The performance proceeded without further 
interruption.558   
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Figure 16: Distance between the front steps Temple of Bellona (foundation outlined in blue)  and the back of the cavea of the 
Theater of Marcellus. Author's work, Feb 23rd 2016. 
While Plutarch ascribes Cicero’s successful quelling of the riot to “the charm of his 
discourse” it was in fact a result of a combination of fortunate proximity and canny use of 
topographical symbolism.559 While Plutarch suggests that Cicero was away from the site of the 
theater and had to arrive, it is more likely that he himself was in the vicinity of the performance, 
or at least nearby on the Campus Martius. Consuls and other magistrates are frequently recorded 
in attendance at Rome’s festal theatrical performances, and it is likely that Cicero, as one of the 
highest magistrates, would have been at the theater during a major annual festival.560 If he were in 
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the Forum, or elsewhere east, it would have taken him longer to reach the theater. In the time that 
it took him and his retinue to be notified, leave the Forum via the Vicus Iugarius and, exit the city 
walls onto the Campus Martius, the crowd of thousands should have been expected to have done 
significant damage to the theater or each other. However, because he was not far from the action, 
Cicero was also able to reach the Temple of Bellona before the riot had moved anywhere, or too 
much damage had been done to the theater and its occupants.  
Food, Class, and Clodius 
 
For the remainder of the Late Republic, violence at theatrical performances did not come 
from inside the theater, but from outside of it. Having already taken his battle against Cicero and 
Pompey to the private homes of the aristocracy, Clodius took the same battle to Rome’s theaters.  
In the year 57 alone there were two attacks by crowds on festival theater performances, one in 
July, and another in September. Instead, they were carefully orchestrated by Clodius, who hoped 
to use public attacks against upper-class theatergoers to pressure politicians into acceding to his 
personal political agenda regarding Cicero’s recall. To do so, Clodius channeled the discontent of 
the plebs urbana against Rome’s exclusive theaters.  
Between the years 58 and 56, Rome experienced continuous grain shortages and bouts of 
high prices that were particularly acute in 57. While modern consensus is that poor harvests and 
speculation by private businessmen were the most probable culprits, in the moment blame 
abounded.561 Some blamed the large free grain distributions instated during Clodius’ tribunate in 
58; Clodius himself publicly accused senatorial politicians of conspiracy and graft.562 The poorer 
members of the urban plebs were dependent on the free grain, and even a mild shortage could 
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provoke panicked rumors of famine.563 To make matters worse for the plebs, during July’s Ludi 
Apollinares, many out-of-towners came in for the celebrations, swelling the city’s population and 
exacerbating the grain shortage. Many of these new arrivals were members of municipal elite, 
countryside residents who were well-to-do enough to travel for the length of a six-day festival. At 
the height of the festival, Pompey planned to announce a senate bill to recall Cicero from exile. 
The timing was calculated to encourage the support of these municipal elite, whom Pompey was 
counting on to return to Rome the next month to vote on the bill in the comitia centuriata.564  
As they had in 63, the ludi scaenici were being held in a wooden theater in front of the 
Temple of Apollo. In the middle of the performance, as magistrates, senators, Equites, and well-
to-do members of the municipal elite were watching the stage with their backs to the Temples of 
Apollo and Bellona, a crowd appeared and charged up to the theater (#37). Asconius derogatorily 
writes that the group was infima coacta multitudo—“a gathered crowd of social dregs.”565 Despite 
his bias, it is clear that these individuals were very poor members of the plebs who were most hard 
his—and and most angry—about grain shortages.566 Struggling for daily survival and squeezed by 
spikes in grain prices, were the sort of people who would never make it into the theater’s stands 
during a normal performance.567 The social distance between themselves and the people sitting in 
the theater was immense. Vanderbroeck asserts, reading coacta as “having been gathered,” that 
the crowd had been organized by Clodius’ well-organized networks of mobilization among the 
plebs urbana.568 Knowing that Pompey was attempting to sell Cicero’s recall to many of the people 
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sitting in the theater, Clodius wanted to deliver a threatening message: support Cicero, and there 
will be consequences. Jeffrey Tatum suggests that the initial outpouring of anger was spontaneous, 
but that he likely gave it direction.569  
 Once they had arrived at the plain surrounding the theater, the mob created a violent 
commotion, interrupting the performance. In fact, Asconius writes that they “rioted so 
violently…that all who had taken their seats were driven off.”570 It appears that the demonstrators 
had not simply wanted the attention of Rome’s elite, but intended to stop the performance 
altogether. Unlike the incident with Roscius, in which both groups started out inside the theater, 
the crowd came from outside, and had never been included in the show. A group of poor plebs 
ejecting the wealthy spectators from a theater that they could never make it into was subversive 
symbolic act that drew on the tension of accessibility and exclusion that Rome’s theaters so 
prominently displayed. Unlike in 63, magisterial force seems to have been unable to stop the 
demonstrators, which seems to indicate that the crowd was particularly large. It also suggests that 
the group was particularly angry and violent—the poor plebs may have been enthusiastic to attack 
such a symbol of class distinction. In stating that everyone was driven off, Asconius suggests that 
even the high magistrates present, cornered inside the theater, were forced to flee ignominiously. 
By directing their ire towards the physical space of the theater, the plebs delivered a frustrated 
political cry for redress of their grievances. 
 The riot had mixed results. For the plebs urbana it appeared that their protest had been 
heeded. Grain prices dropped shortly after the riot. Vanderbroeck suggests that Rome’s upper 
stratum were affected by the disorder demonstrated by the riot, and put pressure on grain traders 
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to alleviate the shortages in order to prevent further disorder in the weeks leading up to the vote 
on Cicero’s recall.571 However, Clodius’ personal threat, although colorfully delivered, was less 
effective. In August, the comitia centuriata, swelled by arrivals from the countryside, voted to 
recall Cicero from exile.572  
Two months later, when Cicero returned to Rome, Clodius was intent on spoiling the 
victory, and he was prepared to use similar tactics. Cicero’s return from exile was staged to 
coincide with another festival, the Ludi Romani, the annual games to Jupiter Optimus Maximus. 
The games provided Clodius another opportunity to target the theater, a space for which his 
supporters had demonstrated an enthusiasm for disrupting. As in July, food prices spiked again 
with the arrival of thousands into the city, and the poorer members urban plebs felt a rising panic 
which Clodius stoked into violent resentment.573 
This time, the main theater for the games was not located immediately the precinct of 
Jupiter, as tradition might suggest. That would have put the stage in the middle of the Area 
Capitolina in front of the Temple of Jupiter, an area intensely cluttered with statues, other temples, 
and statuary dedications. The space was too crowded to accommodate ludi scaenici of the size 
common during the Late Republic. So, T.P. Wiseman explains, the Romans compromised by 
building two theaters: A smaller one was set up in the Area Capitolina, and second theater, far 
enough away to accommodate more spectators, but close enough to still be deemed technically in 
view of the god.574 Wiseman argues that the theater would have stood where the natural slope of 
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the Capitoline begins to rise up to the Tabularium, close to the site of later Rostra of Caesar.575 
The hill’s slope would have provided a natural incline to put up seating. The theater would have 
been situated at the heart of the Western Forum. Directly to the north would have been the curve 
of the Comitium, and the curved cavea would have backed on to the Vicus Iugarius, a path ran 
between the Temple of Saturn and the Central Forum towards the Curia. 576 This location provided 
a sight line to the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, as well an enormous statue of the god that 
had been erected on the Capitol in 63.577 For the sake of convenience, the clear sight line allowed 
the actors to perform under the eyes of the god, if not immediately in his space. 
 The theater was surrounded by buildings symbolizing senatorial authority. Turning behind 
themselves in their seats, spectators would have seen immediately to the west the massive Temple 
of Saturn. Turning their heads to the right, they would have seen the Curia. Further up the hill, the 
Temple of Concord and the Basilica Opimia jutted out above spectators’ heads. Both were the 
work of Lucius Opimius, a conservative politician famed for his role in the killing of the popular 
hero Gaius Gracchus.578 Behind them, Sulla’s Tabularium loomed imposingly from the valley 
between the Capitoline’s twin summits.579 These last three buildings, constructed by senatorial 
champions after bloody violence, reminded the viewer far below of the Senate’s authority and 
were designed in part to encourage compliant political behavior.580 The controlling intent was 
recognized, and sometimes resented by Romans, as Plutarch’s account of rueful anti-senatorial 
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graffiti on the Temple of Concord indicates.581 Any attack on this theater, then, would be an attack 
deep in the heart of senatorial symbolic territory.  
 During the night of September 5th, Clodius’ organizers spread themselves throughout the 
city, again playing on poorer citizens’ resentment, and organized them into a large mob that 
included Clodius’ normal supporters, craftsmen and shopkeepers, as well as destitute 
individuals.582 When the 6th dawned, with Clodius at the front the mob poured into the Forum and 
headed towards the theater at the western end where a performance was taking place. This time, 
the crowd performed an even more subversive act. Instead of stopping at causing havoc outside of 
the theater, the mob forced its way into the theater and occupied the seats that they were otherwise 
not privileged to sit in (#40).583 The imposing marble edifices and political symbolism of the 
Western Forum had failed to control rebellious behavior, and the disorder that reigned was an an 
assertive challenge to senatorial authority by Clodius and his collected crowd. 
However, in this case, attacking the theater was a prelude to the main goal—which was to 
directly attack the Senate itself. Having thoroughly disrupted the show, Clodius and a group of 
supporters quickly ascended the Capitoline Hill behind the theater and made a beeline for the steps 
of the Temple of Concord, where the Senate was meeting to discuss the grain shortages.584 Clodius’ 
group was armed, and began chanting threateningly that Cicero had caused the dearth of grain. 
When one of the consuls, Q. Metellus Nepos emerged from inside the temple with his lictors, it 
provoked an even more violent response. Clodius’ rioters picked up stones from the ground and 
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began pelting Metellus, who had to retreat, injured.585 The crowd, now seemingly out of Clodius’ 
control, began demanding that the remaining senators huddled inside do something—anything—
about the grain shortages.586 With the stairs blocked by the rioters, the senators inside were trapped. 
At some point—the sources are not clear how or when—the crowd dissipated. Again, the 
demonstration of anger and resentment seems to have worked in the plebs favor. The next day, the 
senate met in a tense session and appointed Pompey special commissioner for Rome’s grain 
supply, empowering him with legates and funds to address the plebs’ anger.  
As with his targeting of private homes, Clodius’ attacks on the theaters were largely 
unprecedented. Before 57, there is no record of attacks on a theater in Rome or elsewhere in Italy. 
The only record of rioting within a theater before 63 comes not from Rome, but the town of 
Asculum Picenum, where in 91 tensions preceding the Social War bubbled up into a lynch mob.587 
In both cases, Clodius took advantage of plebeian concerns about the grain and directed them 
towards his own personal goals. Theater performances with thousands in attendance—including 
the majority of Rome’s ruling class—were opportunities for Clodius to demonstrate his own 
strength. However, they also provided the plebs a way to get their grievances at the center of the 
political stage, so to speak. 
The Plebs’ Conditioned Behavior: The Attack at the Ludi Megalenses in 
56 
 
One more attack occurred on a theater, and this time, it was definitively not organized by 
Clodius. In 56, Clodius was elected aedile, and was as a result was responsible for putting on the 
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Ludi Megalenses, the annual games in early April dedicated to the deity known as Magna Mater. 
Like the Ludi Romani, there were two theaters set up for the event due to space restrictions. The 
Temple of the Magna Mater was located on the southwest corner of the Palatine, perched on a 
steep slope overlooking the Circus Maximus to the south.588 Below it, a street called the Clivus 
Victoriae curved northwesterly around the corner of the Palatine and led towards the Forum (?). It 
was also accessible from two other directions, the Clivus Palatinus, which led south through the 
center of the Palatine up from the prestigious residential section on the hill’s northern slope. The 
other was the Scalae Caci, which steeply descended the Palatine below the Temple of Magna Mater 
and ended in the valley below near the Lupercal, the sacred cave in which Romulus and Remus 
were said to have been found.589 It was not the only monumental building on this corner the 
Palatine. Slightly to the east was the Temple of Victory. A small shrine to Victoria Virgo was 
crammed in between the two.590 In front of the three temples was a precinct which was where 
theater performances had been celebrated for centuries before 56 BCE. In 191, the dedication of 
the Temple of the Magna Mater was celebrated by a performance of plays by Plautus and Terence. 
In fact, a number of abortive attempts had been made to construct Rome’s first stone theater here 
in 154.591  
However, the area, as so many other Temple precincts in the Late Republic, was 
particularly cramped. The distance from the temple’s steps to where the slope dropped off was 
only around 60 meters. In the Late Republic, the area around the temple was residential, and the 
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monumental houses of many senatorial families were nearby.592 There was so little space that at 
the southern end of the precinct, a platform was built to extend it over the Clivus Victoriae to 
accommodate additional spectator space for festival games.593 In light of the cramped space in the 
Magna Mater precinct, there was a second, larger theater constructed below the the foot of the 
Palatine. The additional theater was located near the Lupercal cave. Wiseman asserts that like the 
theater for the Ludi Apollinares in the Forum which was theoretically in Jupiter’s sight, “the 
Lupercal site was linked to the temple precinct by the Scalae Caci, and was no doubt through of 
as under the goddess’ influence, if not literally within her sight.”594  
Our single ancient source for this event, Cicero, presents a predictably sensational story. 
He claims that Clodius ruined his own performances by gathering a group of “slaves” from 
neighborhoods throughout the city, and at a planned signal, ordered them to invade both the theater 
on the Palatine and at the Lupercal grove. In the former case, they most likely ascended the Scalae 
Caci, which began at the Lupercal. Once they reached the precinct of the Magna Mater, Cicero 
writes, the slaves burst into the theater.595 They leapt on stage and started jeering at and mocking 
the audience. In the cramped conditions in the platform in front of the Temple of Magna Mater, 
the audience was trapped in and unable to move. Cicero describes evocatively the cramped space 
within a wooden theater, swelled with an angry mob: “[they were]…hampered by the dense body 
in which they were sitting, chained as it were to the spectacle, and hindered by the crowd and 
narrow space, to a multitude of slaves and buffoons”596 In the theater down at the Lupercal grove, 
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something different—and equally enraging—happened. Like the earlier instances in 57, the crowd 
ejected the wealthy spectators. Cicero describes the consuls, senators and equites getting up and 
leaving the theater. However, in this case, Cicero says that the performance continued performed, 
with only the gleeful invaders in the audience. “These games, I say, were celebrated by slaves, and 
had slaves alone for the spectators,” Cicero complains.597 
Modern scholarship has noted the immediate exaggerations in Cicero’s story. Instead of 
being slaves, the crowd was likely composed of the poorer members of the plebs urbana, who 
Cicero so frequently reduces to slaves.598 A strain of modern scholarship accepts Cicero’s claim 
that Clodius engineered the attack himself as “a challenge to the ‘elitst’ nature” of festival theater 
performances.599 The argument is that Clodius did so to shore up his role as the patron of the 
poorest citizens that were systematically excluded from theater performances. By encouraging 
them to invade the theater, and allowing the shows to continue, Clodius could have satisfied poorer 
plebs’ longing for the privilege of attend theater shows. This might seem to be a natural 
development from his two previous riots: the mob first stopped a performance by rioting outside 
of it; then it invaded the theater; Finally, the mob disrupted, entered, and stayed in the theater.  
However, as Jeffrey Tatum argues, it is unlikely that Clodius would have so dramatically 
sabotaged his own festival. Successful aedilican games were important for future electoral success, 
and Clodius was still aiming to climb the cursus honorum in the traditional way.600 Additionally, 
Clodius spent an immense amount of money on the games as a whole—going as far to import lions 
from Macedonia—and it is unlikely that he would have done so if he was planning to disrupt them. 
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Clodius was still attempting to make inroads within the senatorial aristocracy, and sabotaging that 
with such an outrage to the entirety of the upper class, Tatum argues, “must be considered 
absurd.”601 Tatum concludes that the riot was not an instance of political largesse on Clodius’ part, 
but simply a food riot in response to still-volatile grain prices. Tatum writes that the riot was “in 
reality spontaneous and unforeseen,” and likely unlooked-for by Clodius.602 
Accepting Tatum’s argument leads us to a much more interesting conclusion about 
topography and the political behavior of the plebs. Before Clodius began his food riots in 57, there 
are records of food riots—but never food riots at theaters. Hard-pressed plebeians had 
demonstrated their displeasure during the food shortages of 75 by attacking the consuls Cotta and 
Octavius in the Forum, the traditional space for political activity and protest. However, in 56, 
unprompted by Clodius’ organizing, rioters attacked not one, but two theaters in the middle of the 
performances. It seems that participating in the riots of 57 had conditioned the behavior of 
members of the plebs urbana. The results of the first two riots—a drop in grain prices and the 
appointment of an emergency grain commissioner—must have left the impression that invading 
and attacking theaters was not only a legitimate, but effective model of addressing grievances. The 
theaters, with their identifiable locations and readymade audiences, had been proven to be spaces 
where their voices could be most heard. As with the festivals in 57, the Ludi Megalenses had 
caused yet another grain shortage, putting stress on the plebs urbana. Drawing from previous 
experience, the two groups of plebs applied the lessons they had learned. The stage in front of the 
Temple of Magna Mater was particularly crowded in by the surrounding temples and houses, and 
the crowd understood they had a captive audience which had little chance of escaping. By leaping 
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on stage in the theater on the Palatine to deliver a mocking performance, the crowd seems to have 
realized that rioting at theaters provided them a stage from which their desires could be publicized. 
Shortly after the riots, the Senate voted to allocate 400,000 sesterces to Pompey to further fund his 
work as grain commissioner.603 The tactic that Clodius had pioneered in 57, the plebs discovered, 
could be used effectively without him.  
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Chapter VII: Violence on the Campus Martius 
 
The remaining instances of political violence (#s 46, 52, 53, 54, 62, 69) in the Late Republic 
occurred outside of the city walls, on the plain west of the Forum called the Campus Martius. The 
Campus Martius is considered the space between the Capitoline Hill to the east, the bend of the 
Tiber River to the West and the North and the Quirinal and Capitoline to the south. Named after 
an ancient altar of Mars. Since the beginning of the Republic, the space had a civic nature. It was 
was initially the rallying space for Rome’s citizen-soldier army in the Republic’s earliest days, and 
by the Late Republic, important civic functions such as the taking of the Census and voting in 
elections occurred on the Campus. The northern end of the space was dominated by the Saepta, 
the large rectangular complex used for annual elections. By the late Republic, the southern portion 
had become a monumentalized mixed-use zone that combined the residential, the sacred, and the 
political. The flat land was ideal for the construction of temples. As we have already seen, the 
Temples of Apollo and Bellona as well as the former’s temporary wooden theater stood in the 
southern part of the Campus. By the Late Republic, the southwestern section of the Campus had 
become cluttered with shrines and monuments—fifteen were built between 218 and 31 BCE, many 
of them before 50 BCE.604 The land had begun as ager publicus, public land, but after Sulla’s 
reign, pieces of it were increasingly sold to private owners. Men like Q. Caecilius Metellus and 
Pompey built huge religious complexes that blurred the line between public and private. In the 
space between the Theater of Pompey, the Sapeta, and the Porticus of Metellus, stood the Villa 
Publica, a porticoed park used for tasks related to the taking of the Census.  
In contrast to the previous two chapters, which dealt with violence in spaces that were not 
explicitly related to formal political functions, the violence that occurred on the Campus Martius 
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related to two prominent structures of state functioning—the Villa Publica and the Saepta. One of 
the instances of violence took place within the Villa Publica and was a result of Clodius’ 
characteristic tactical mix of plebeian demonstrations with humiliating attacks on property. The 
final five instances were related to the electoral process. The voting process for elections took 
place in the open air and had similar characteristics to that of voting in legislative comitia in the 
Forum. The patterns of violence seen in electoral settings drew on tactics used earlier in the Forum. 
Clodian Demonstration at the Villa Publica 
 
In 57, as discussed in the previous chapter, Pompey was appointed as a special 
commissioner of the grain supply in the wake of frequent shortages and Clodian-organized 
violence against private homes and Rome’s temporary festival theaters. Pompey’s work as grain 
commissioner stationed him in the Villa Publica, which was located on the Campus in the area 
north of the Temple of Bellona, East of the Largo Argentina, and south of the Saepta.605 Originally 
a park without structures, by the Late Republic it became an open central area surrounded by 
porticoes, and planted with trees throughout to provide shade. The Villa Publica was undeniably a 
political space, and was designed to facilitate the linked functions of citizenship and military 
service: From the earliest days of the Republic, Censors conducted the census within the park, and 
consuls levies for early Rome’s citizen-army there.606 There was at least one building in the park 
by the Late Republic, the Temple of the Nymphs, which stored the records of the census.607 After 
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58, records of relevance in particular to the urban plebs were also stored in its cella: The names of 
those who had the right to receive public grain under Clodius’ lex frumentaria.608 In his capacity 
as grain commissioner, in 57 and early 56 Pompey directed his free distributions from the Temple’s 
podium.609  
In March of 56, the temple was burnt down. In later speeches, Cicero accused Clodius and 
his scribe Sextus Cloelius of the deed.610 Cicero asserted that Clodius burnt it down “in order to 
extinguish the public record of the census which was committed to the public registers.”611 Pompey 
was in the process of revising Clodius’ records, and it has been posited that Clodius intended to 
foil Pompey’s attempts to alter them. At this point, Clodius and his supporters had a solid track 
record of attempting to burn down buildings, albeit residential ones. A direct attack of firebrands 
on a temple, however, would be another thing entirely. Tatum argues that it is more likely the 
destruction of the Temple was not a direct attack, but an inadvertent result of a Clodian-staged 
food riot gone wrong.612 Throughout 57, Clodius had been staging demonstrations and attacks over 
the grain supply in a variety of spaces—the Ludi Apollinares theater (#37) the house of Caecilius 
(#38), The Ludi Romani theater and the Temple of Concord (#57)—in each case taking advantage 
of the plebs’ hunger to publicly shame Pompey. Given its role in Pompey’s ill-faring grain 
commission, the Temple of the Nymphs was a natural choice for a demonstration that would 
embarrass Pompey and portray Clodius as the defender of the plebs. Although made of travertine 
marble, the temple, like most Roman temples, had a wooden roof that was susceptible to fire. An 
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attempt by Clodius’ supporters to threaten Pompey or wreck the temple could have easily gotten 
out of hand and knocked a torch, lighting the scrolls of the census records aflame. Although the 
location was different from Clodius’ usual targets, the tactics fit his established pattern. 
Electoral Violence in the Saepta 
 
After the destruction of the Villa Publica, the remaining violence on the Campus Martius 
was not against buildings, but against persons. The remaining instances of political violence 
occurred in a sole location, the large rectangular zone of the Saepta, the structure used for annual 
elections of magistrates. The years between 56 and 50 saw the violent battles for control over 
physical space that had become matter of course in the Western and Eastern Forum, Palatine, and 
even the city’s theaters, penetrate the electoral process. Battles in the Saepta drew on tactics that 
had been developed and refined during the legislative fights in the Western Forum.  
Like voting in the comitia in the Forum, the civic experience was highly spatial. The Saepta 
was a long, rectangular space that stretched from just north of the Villa Publica all the way to the 
later Pantheon. Before the vote, the voters massed at the northern end of the Saepta, in the area 
just north of the modern Via del Seminario. On the northern end of the Saepta was a wooden 
tribunal stand inaugurated as a templum on which the presiding magistrate sat, along with any 
additional magistrates. The candidates up for election also stood on the stand as votes were cast. 
The tribunal stand must have been tall enough for the presiding magistrate to been seen offering 
the introductory prayer, or in the case of bad omens, dismissing the crowd. As with legislative 
assemblies, the magistrate’s support staff stood around the stand.613 When voting, citizens walked 
single file down long passages. Instead of ropes, as in legislative assemblies, these passages were 
more akin to wooden fencing. At the southern end of the passage, the voter climbed a wooden pons 
                                                
613 Taylor, 1966, 57. 
 211 
to a platform where he cast his vote in a wicker cista and walked away, or waited for the results to 
be counted in the shade provided by the Villa Publica which was just to the south. The passages 
of fencing were designed to be more solid than the temporary ropes in the Forum, to control up to 
thirty-five  lines of voters at the same time.614 However, they were still permeable, like almost 
everything else in Roman politics. Plutarch wrote in his life of Marius an anecdote about someone 
being accused of bribery during a praetorian election because his slave had been sighted moving 
through the partitions. The accused’s explanation: the slave was bringing him a cup of water.615 
The anecdote demonstrates that the fences were not solid, but could be entered and exited.616 The 
anecdote also demonstrates how long and arduous a process elections were. Citizens could be lined 
up and waiting for hours for the voting to finish. Anywhere in that process, disruptions could be 
introduced. 
With his public prestige plummeting and pretensions to control over the city vanishing in 
the wake of Clodius’ humiliating attacks, Pompey held his famous conference at Luca with Caesar 
in 56, renewing the triumvirate’s bonds. One of the many decisions made was that Pompey and 
Crassus would stand for the consulship. Although they had done their best to intimidate opponents 
out of the race, there was a third competing consular candidate, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. He was 
campaigning on the promise that he would remove Caesar from Gaul, which threatened the 
triumvirate’s stability.617  
When it came time to vote, the triumvirs drew on tactics refined over legislative violence 
in the Forum. As the battle over the Lex Fabricia of 57—the bloody attempt to recall Cicero in the 
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Western Forum—had shown, arriving and occupying a desired space before your opponent was 
viewed as key to securing victory, and an opportune time to do that was at night. A few hours 
before daybreak on the day before the election, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus set out with by torchlight 
with a train of followers—including his brother-in-law, Cato—from his home on the Velia. Their 
plan was to seize the area of the Saepta and defend it when the voting began at daybreak. However, 
Pompey and Crassus had anticipated their actions and were already stationed on the plain. In 
addition to their own personal clientele, they had proconsular soldiers from Gaul, furloughed by 
Caesar for the sole purpose of supporting his fellow triumvirs in the vote.  
It is unclear what route Domitius took taken out to the Campus Martius. The two most 
direct gates out of the city walls were the Porta Fontinalis, which was just north of the Arx, and 
the Porta Carmentalis, which exited the walls south of the Capitol.618 From Domitius’ home on the 
Velia, the former would have been the most direct route, and thus should be treated as more likely. 
However, once Domitius’ group never made it to the Saepta. Soon after they exited the gate, they 
were set upon by Pompey and Crassus’ group, reinforced by Caesar’s soldiers. They killed 
Domitius’ torchbearer first, plunging the procession into darkness and panic. In the ensuing brawl, 
the soldiers wounded Cato in the arm and attempted to kill Domitius. Despite Cato’s urging that 
he stand his ground, Domitius fled all the way back up into the city and to the safety of his home.619 
There was no vote, and an intimidated Domitius later pulled out of the elections.  
 Violence happened again at the subsequent Praetorian elections, held in February of 55. As 
consuls, Pompey and Crassus were the candidates that presided over the elections in the comitia 
centuriata. Having won the consulships for themselves, they wanted to ensure their own candidates 
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were elected, including Caesar’s old ally P. Vatinius. Complicating matters, their enemy Cato also 
entered his name for the office. On the day of the comitia centuriata, Pompey was officiating from 
the stand, with the assembled voters—likely no more than 6,000, according to Mouritsen’s 
calculations—standing in their units waiting to enter the enclosure.620 As first unit started walking 
down the Sapeta, it became clear to Pompey that Cato had the votes to carry the day. After the first 
unit voted in favor of Cato, Pompey dismissed the assembly on account of an apparent bad omen, 
the sound of thunder. 621   
 After an unspecified period of time—likely the next comitial day allowed by the calendar—
the comitia centuriata reconvened and Pompey was prepared with a more foolproof strategy. As 
the voting began, an unspecified group of people under Pompey’s command “ejected the best 
citizens from the Campus Martius, and so by force got Vatinius elected praetor instead of Cato.” 
(#53).622 While Plutarch’s account is sparse, at this point the mechanics of disrupting the voting 
process have been made clear. Plutarch’s writes that during the first aborted comitia that Pompey’s 
supporters stood offering bribes at the southern end of the Saepta, where votes were cast. Having 
forced out their most vocal opponents with violence, it would not be surprising that they stationed 
men at the balloting urns again, this time menacing instead of bribing voters. Vatinius and other 
trivumviral allies were elected, and Cato was defeated.  
 56-55 was to be a violent year at the Saepta. During the election of the aediles later in 55, 
another fight broke out. It occurred in the immediate vicinity of the wooden platform on which 
Pompey was presiding. According to Dio, Plutarch, and Appian, a number of people were killed. 
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Pompey was so close to the fight that his toga was completely splattered with blood.623 Pompey’s 
proximity to the bloodshed suggests it may have been an altercation between different candidates; 
perhaps they had refused to co-exist peacefully up on the tribunal. Or, perhaps it was a battle over 
the entrances to the Saepta, which would have been just behind the tribunal stand. The 
circumstances of the fight are unclear, and our sources provide no motivation.  
 In 53, Cicero, Milo, and Clodius returned to the fore. Milo, Hypsaeus, and Scipio were all 
running for the consulship. Earlier in the year, Milo and Hypsaeus’s gangs had collided with 
bloodshed on the Sacra Via alongside the Regia. A consular position for Milo would be an 
insufferable victory for Cicero over Clodius. On the day of the comitia, Clodius waited until the 
comitia had begun voting to attack. Appearing suddenly with a group bearing swords and stones, 
Clodius, “burst into the enclosures [in saepta inrupisset] and and contrived to have swords drawn 
and stones thrown.”624 It seems that rather than give Milo the chance to be elected, Clodius opted 
to destroy the wooden enclosures and attack voters in an attempt to disrupt the whole process.   
Why did Clodius attack after the comitia had begun voting, as opposed to occupying the 
space? The majority of voters that participated in consular elections were not members of the urban 
plebs, but from the propertied classes that had the leisure to participate. The exclusionary tactics 
of the Forum, although used in 56 and 55 for the Saepta, may not have been completely adaptable 
to the Campus Martius. The central voting space of the Forum had an area of around 10,000 square 
meters, and although permeable was also surrounded by buildings that constricted the space. By 
contrast, the Saepta covered a hundreds of thousands of square meters. Clodius’s gangs functioned 
best in the constricted spaces of the Forum and the narrow streets between homes. He also may 
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not have had enough support among his plebeian clientele for a full-out occupation. Milo had also 
amassed a significant amount of popularity among the urban plebs for holding a set of magnificent 
public games.625 Cicero later writes that Clodius fled the Saepta in fear of Milo’s forces, running 
west towards the Tiber river. Rather than fear—which can be attributed to Cicero’s purple prose—
it would seem that Clodius was outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and was forced to flee.  
 One last instance of violence occurred on the Campus Martius in 50, the year before the 
Republic’s collapse. In his increasingly tense battle with the Senate, Caesar enlisted the aid of 
Mark Antony the future triumvir, to serve as a political bulwark. With the help of Caesar’s ally 
Curio, Antony won election to the tribunate. However, he also ran in 50 to become a member of 
the college of augurs. Cicero writes in his scathing Second Philippic that Antony only secured 
election with the help of the clientele of Curio. Cicero mentions these same clients “were convicted 
of violence for having been too zealous in your favour.”626 The comitia that elected augurs was 
the comitia sacerdotum, and it, like the other electoral comitia, met on the Campus Martius.627 The 
type violence committed on Antony’s behalf is unrecoverable, and may not have actually 
happened. In a letter from M. Caelius Rufus to Cicero about the election results, Rufus fails to 
mention any violence. However, Antony’s opponent was L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the consular 
candidate who was attacked in 56. Domitius coveted the consulship, and was reportedly incensed 
that a newcomer as Antony would dare challenge him.628 Antony himself was renowned later for 
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his brutality, so violence may have well been used on both sides. It was not long after Antony’s 
election the the augurate in 50 that affairs came to a head between Caesar, Pompey, and the senate, 
leading to Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon river and the resumption of civil war. 
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Conclusions 
 
To restate, the goals of this thesis were to:  
1.   Find out how many instances of political violence occurred between 80 BCE and 50 BCE 
2.   Where possible, locate where these instances occurred. If possible, map with accuracy this 
information onto a GIS-based digital mapping platform (Geographic Information System) 
3.   Explain why there: What about these places contributed to violence in politics—or vice 
versa? How did trends in Roman politics contribute to the use of these spaces? 
The question that first prompted this thesis was “Where did violence happen in the Late Republic?” 
This thesis, if anything, provided an answer to that question in detail. This thesis identified 69 
instances of political violence that occurred in the last thirty years of the Roman Republic, located 
them, and provided detailed examinations of their contexts and impacts. Some of those, like the 
ones in the Western Forum, Rome’s legislative heart, or the Campus Martius, Rome’s election 
space, could be expected.  However, it is not a reductive conclusion to say that political violence 
happened in the spaces that politics took place. Political violence, even in the formalized spaces 
of the Forum, took a variety of forms and interacted with different locations in different ways. 
Political violence was rarely random in this period. It almost always had a function within 
the space it occurred in. Elite politicians and lowly plebeians alike learned from past experiences 
with political violence; They tried it, refined it, and developed it. The plebeian crowds at Rome’s 
theaters in 56 and the aristocratic homes in 52 used the violence they saw modeled by political 
leaders and made it their own, using it to stake their own claims to political relevance.  
Throughout the thesis, I attempted to trace an arc of the changing scale of battles over 
space. In the civil wars of the 80s BCE, violence was large-scale, bloody, and overwhelming. 
Military men clashed outside the city walls and soldiers enforced vicious proscriptions. In the 
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subsequent 70s, political violence changed dramatically. With the vanquishing of Lepidus’ revolt 
in 78, political violence became intramural, urban, and to a certain extent, regulated again. In the 
early 60s, violence was used in ad hoc ways for ad hoc goals that fit the political space it was in. 
Tribunes wanted bills passed? They intimidated consuls at legislative assemblies. Defendants 
wanted charges dropped? They disrupted the court system. However, in the late 60s and early 50s, 
politicians began going beyond the bounds of a single piece of topography. Battles for the Rostra 
escalated into battles for the entire Forum, where domination of the entire space and exclusion of 
one’s opponent became par for the course. The same with the court system, which saw a similar 
escalation come to a head with the showdown between Pompey’s soldiers and Clodius’ supporters. 
The expansion was not merely a matter of scale, but also a matter of scope. Aristocratic homes, 
although always semi-public locations, were dragged fully into the public sphere and made prime 
targets for political violence. Rome’s theaters, too, seemed to have a minimal role in urban violence 
before they became a target of lower-class resentment, encouraged but not created by Clodius. As 
battles over formal politics expanded outward from the Forum, these adjacent spaces—both 
physically adjacent, and in terms of their adjacent in terms of their relatively political nature—got 
caught. Spaces all over the  
 Something else this thesis tracked was individual politicians’ attempts to extend their own 
personal control over topography, both public and private. At the end of the Catilinarian 
conspiracy, Cicero achieved the symbolic role of military general and triumphed over his peers in 
the senatorial aristocracy, at cost of the Catilinarian conspirators’ ritually-ended lives. Clodius 
made the most outwardly calculated attempts to bring more and more space—be it ostensibly 
public or private—under his own personal control. In doing so, he modeled activity for his allies 
and opponents. However, by 52 the trajectory seen in the Eastern Forum section and in the 
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Aristocratic homes section saw Clodius’ two —the Forum and the Senate itself—devolve instead 
under the private control of Cn. Pompey Magnus. Both Clodius and Pompey’s interactions with 
political space indicate in their own way a trend towards the privatization of public, political space.  
This thesis has made a concerted effort to steer away from categorical claims about the 
“Fall of the Republic,” which so often accompany analyses of violence. If anything, the trend 
towards the privatization of public space through the use of political violence foreshadows the 
eventual privatization of the res publica under the Principate. However, I argue that locating and 
examining violence’s role in situ has certainly yielded thought-provoking results in its own right. 
It is my belief that pinpointing and analyzing these 69 instances of political violence provides an 
illustrative contribution to our scholarly understanding about Romans’ political behavior and how 
they interacted with the spaces in which they lived—and with each other.  
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